THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

TOWARD A RENEWED FUNDAMENTAL MORAL THEOLOGY: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THOUGHT OF JOHN MACMURRAY FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS

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Edward George Bozzo, C.F.X.

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This dissertation was approved by Daniel C. Maguire as director and by

Jude P. Dougherty

R. Baldwell

as readers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter

I. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW MORAL THEOLOGY . . 9

On Judging the Past
The Key Area of Concern
Surmises Concerning the New Moral Theology
Attention to the Philosophical Base of Morality

II. THE PRIMACY OF THE PRACTICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL. 61

The Range of Macmurray's Thought
Macmurray's Criticisms of Kant
Macmurray on the Nature of Philosophy
The Primacy of Experience
Emotional Reason
Theological Applications
Summary

III. THE ACTION OF PERSONS IN RELATION. 129

Characteristics of Action
Persons in Relation
The Rhythm of Withdrawal and Return
Patterns of Motivation in Personal Development
Intention: the Knowledge Dimension in Action
Morality in General
The Three Typical Modes of Morality
The Relation of Persons from the Social Standpoint
Community

IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF MUTUALITY FOR REDOING MORAL THEOLOGY 225

Page

Mutuality and Self-identity
Mutuality and Rationality
Mutuality and Freedom
Summary

BIBLIOGRAPHY 312

INTRODUCTION

This thesis concerns morality, the technical discussion of which has never been easy. Moralists differ among themselves in the emphases they employ: one, for example, might stress obligation, another love. At present some moral philosophers think it either impossible or presumptuous to attempt normative ethics. The audience a moralist addresses varies in its ethical bias as well. One who has grown accustomed to the discourse of an ethic of duty, for instance, finds the now popular stress on love alone perhaps perplexing or impractical. Another might deem the present moment of history so chaotic that he judges all constructive counsel as doomed to fall on deaf ears.

It is not news to the moralist that his is an uncomfortable vocation. Maritain once observed that when moralists insist on the immutability of moral principles they are reproached for imposing unlivable requirements on us; and when they explain the way in which these immutable principles are to be put into force, taking into account the diversity of concrete situations, they are reproached for making morality relative.[1] So it happens that for some the moralist is too lax and vague, for others too demanding.

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[1] Cf. Ewart Lewis, "Medieval Thought and Western Political Tradition," Thought, XXXVII (1962), 172.

This thesis concerns Christian morality--a further complication--for the Christian moralist faces the same difficulties any moralist does, and in addition, the obligation to do justice to a tradition, or more accurately to traditions, of Christian moral thought.[2] At present he writes for a Christian audience which is in part elated by aggiornamento, in part alarmed by that clarion, for some who have rediscovered what they deem the liberty of God's sons, for some tearful that holy Mother Church no longer wields over men the suasive influence it once did. Here too, the present situation is not all that novel. Anyone with a modicum of penetration into his faith and into history, realizes with Newman, that "Christ never will reign visibly upon earth; but in each age, as it comes, we shall read of tumult and heresy, and hear the complaint of good men marvelling at what they conceive to be the especial wickedness of their own times."[3] For those who judge the present situation of the Church especially perilous, some assurance might be offered by proffering the thoughts the same writer catalogued over a century ago:

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[2] Like the moral philosopher, the moral theologian must deal with concrete moral experience. As James M. Gustafson states, "There is no unique method or procedure for the theological analysis of morality in general, or for Christian morality in particular," Christ and the Moral Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 3. Without denying this, it is also true that Christian ethicists select from the rich store of images of God found in Scripture and Christian tradition those particular images which support or substantiate their presentation of ethics. "If they preached a rigorous ethic of duty, they chose to speak of God as ruler and judge. If they preached a morality of love, their God appeared as redeemer and savior. The ethic of natural law needed a creator of nature; and ethic of otherness and separation required God as deliverer. Asceticism displayed the incarnate, suffering Lord; enthusiasm invoked the Holy Spirit. Some few great figures in Christian ethics endeavored to draw much of this together in more comprehensive images: Augustine's creator, the beginning of all things, was also object of desire, the end of all things; Luther's God is creator, source of the orders of nature, and redeemer, source of saving faith and love. Thus, while the God of Christian faith is all of this, theological ethicians must find in this superabundance of divine names one or several which best serve the Lord of their lives," Albert R. Jonsen, Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics (Washington, D. C.: Corpus Books, 1968), p. 213.

> A number of reflections crowd upon the mind in surveying the face of society, as at present constituted. The present open resistance to constituted power, and (what is more to the purpose) the indulgent toleration of it, the irreverence towards Antiquity, the unscrupulous and wanton violation of the commands and usages of our forefathers, the undoing of their benefactions, the profanation of the Church, the bold transgression of the duty of Ecclesiastical Unity, the avowed disdain of what is called party religion (though Christ undeniably made a party the vehicle of His doctrine, and did not cast it at random on the world, as men would now have it), the growing indifference to the Catholic Creed, the sceptical objections to portions of its doctrine, the arguings and discussings and comparings and correctings and rejectings, and all the train of presumptuous exercises, to which its sacred articles are subjected, the numberless discordant criticisms of the Liturgy, which have shot up on all sides of us; the general irritable state of mind, which is every where to be witnessed, and craving for change in all things. . . .[4]

Yet, it cannot be denied, the tone of formal theology today is one of questing, in search of viable views and methods. There is both a sense of refreshing newness in the field as well as an awareness of the arduous task it faces in creating something worthwhile to fill the vacuum left by surrendering past systems whose inadequacies are all too easily observed, and whose merits occasionally too unthinkingly discounted. Of all areas of theology, moral theology is perhaps the most difficult to work in now since so many of the tools it employs are themselves in the process of refashioning. Not to mention the variety of fresh approaches prevailing in branches of theology itself (biblical studies and ecclesiology, for example), there are revolutions, or at least splinterings, in the realms of philosophy, psychology and sociology. The Christian moralist today, therefore, faces the task, in his formal presentation, of situating his particular effort in the tradition that has gone before him, as well as selecting what he judges the most viable offerings of disciplines on which he depends, realizing that these ancillaries themselves are in flux.

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[3] John Henry Newman, Oxford University Sermons, Vol. IV: Complete Works (London: Rivingtons, 1887), p. 97.

[4] Ibid., p. 174.

To specify the particular purpose of this study, one might explicate some terms of its title: "Toward a renewed fundamental moral theology: the implications of the thought of John Macmurray for Christian ethics." Like so many studies today, it begins with "toward," here intended to convey the modesty of the present effort, in no sense as complete or detailed as the usual seminary texts bearing the phrase fundamental moral in their titles. "Fundamental moral theology" is used in the title to recall what is usually done in that section of moral theology. On that detailed background this study relies as a necessary ground of contrast. "Fundamental" is likewise meant to convey that this study is trying to work out a basic perspective. To do so it employs the work of the contemporary English philosopher John Macmurray who thinks of his own work as an effort to establish a distinct point of view in philosophizing.

Like the philosophy upon which it relies, then, this study seeks to establish a serviceable starting point for a renewed moral theology. In using Macmurray's works, the writer has concentrated on those aspects of them which are especially pertinent to the moralist.

The first chapter of this study revolves around the state of moral theology today: it reacts to reactions of past moral theology, attempts to do justice to the past, to some current assessments of the past, to surmise the direction of a new moral theology, and to designate the principal problem with which moral theology must deal if it is to be renewed--its philosophical base.

The second and third chapters present major aspects of Macmurray's philosophy, selected with an eye for their utility in elaborating a moral theology grounded in an ontology of the person. In particular they treat of Macmurray's criticisms of Kant, Macmurray's view of the nature of philosophy, and his analyses of the self as agent, of the primacy of experience, the dimensions of action, the emotive character of reason, the relational character of personal existence and the rhythm of its development, patterns of motivation, the modes of moral apperception and the typology of moral styles to which these apperceptions give rise.

The last chapter centers on mutuality, the keystone of Macmurray's analysis of the personal, as it applies to self-discovery, rationality and freedom. In this way the utility of Macmurray's distinctive emphasis on mutuality is exemplified when brought to bear on key concerns of moral theology.

In designating the aim of this study as an attempt to establish a point of view, the writer is thinking, with Josef Blank, of a "pattern," or as St. Paul and the Fathers would say, a "type,"--something at the same time concrete and capable of adjustment.[5] As an angle of vision, the personalist perspective offered here is fundamental in the sense that it grapples with who and what we are. Even though personal reality is mysterious, we live it, and it offers the most accessible source for a definite Archimedean point of departure. In arriving, with Macmurray's aid, at a pattern of personal existence we are provided with a reference which allows us as men of faith to rethink the implications of our existence and the meaning of our faith in the present. In this the morality of the New Testament serves as an indispensable signpost in the ethical patterns it provides as well.[6] In concentrating on the importance of Macmurray's consideration of mutuality for moral theology, the last chapter aims to provide the moral theologian with the means for explicating the self-emptying character of Christian existence described in the New Testament, and its communal dimension emphasized in the same source. For in concentrating on the realization of community as the basic condition for the realization of freedom Macmurray's analysis issues in a consideration of the Church as a brotherhood which intends universal community.

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[5] Cf. Josef Blank, "Does the New Testament Provide Principles for Modern Moral Theology?" Concilium, XXV (1967), 9-22.

[6] Ibid., 21-22: "Up until now," Blank observes, "the attitude toward the Sermon on the Mount hovered between legalism and irrelevance. What is important in it is the presentation of an ethos that binds without a law. This is precisely what it set out to give. We have suffered too long from a mentality which considered that anything that could not be regulated by general prescription but had to be left to man's free will was bound to go wrong. Jesus clearly thought differently. He expects man to believe, and that means to trust. Between a legalism with its absolute claims--which can only lead to an absolutist practice and, with it, lack of freedom--on the one hand, and the lack of all compulsion through indifference and arbitrariness on the other, the problem of the historical limitations of the New Testament (and therefore of the whole moral theology since then) and the problem of interpretation and application need the concept of 'ethical patterns.' "

Presuming sufficient emphasis has been given to the limits of this study, one last advisory word is required concerning it: namely, it does not entertain the illusion that there can be a really new morality. As the sagacious C. S. Lewis observed:

> New moralities can only be contradictions or expansions of something already given. And all the specifically modern attempts at new moralities are contradictions. They proceed by retaining some traditional precepts and rejecting others: but the only real authority behind those which they retain is the very authority which they flout in rejecting others. Of course this inconsistency is concealed: usually . . . by a refusal to recognize the precepts that are retained are moral precepts at all.[7]

Further on he adds, "Unless the ethical is assumed from the start no argument will bring you to it."[8] What is possible is a shift in emphasis, a basic turn in one's outlook which can alter his view of existence. Such an alteration involves a basic philosophy of life, not just for non-believers, but believers as well. Macmurray's philosophy, hospitable as it is to man's religious dimension, recommends itself to moral theology's concern with formulating a meaningful interpretation of human existence. As H. Richard Niebuhr says, "In our historical present we make our individual decisions with freedom and in faith; but we do not make them in independence and without reason."[9]

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[7] C. S. Lewis, Christian Reflections, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), p. 53.

[8] Ibid., p. 56.

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[9] H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbook, 1956), p. 249.

CHAPTER I

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW MORAL THEOLOGY

On Judging the Past

In recent years a spate of essays has diagnosed the malaise of Catholic moral theology, or Christian ethics in general.[1] While that necessary task, as handled by competent scholars, matches critical appraisal with sympathy for past achievement,[2] it is nonetheless easy to be less sensitive to the latter and more conscious of the deficiencies that have come to light. While it is not pertinent to this study to rehearse the fusilade of adverse criticisms, many of them justified, leveled at some varieties of past moral theology, it would be advisable to reach for breadth of perspective by prefacing a detailed consideration of that subject with a few counterbalancing reflections.

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[1] Until recently, "moral theology" was customarily used to designate, roughly speaking, what Protestant theologians called "Christian ethics." With no intention of implying that both endeavors shared identical spirit, method and scope, moral theology and Christian ethics are used interchangeably in this study when issues common to both are under discussion. An appreciation of the subtleties which emerge when the two terms, long since married in the phrase "Christian ethics," are joined, is available in such places as the first chapter of Paul Lehmann's Ethics in a Christian Context (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

[2] The following references are offered as indicators to the body of competent critical evaluation of past moral theology. Most of the entries are laced with suggestions for that discipline's partial or full scale renewal. Franz Bockle (ed.), Moral Problems and Christian Personalism, Concilium, V (New York: Paulist Press, 1965), and Understanding the Signs of the Times, Concilium, XXV (1967); Robert H. Dailey, "New Approaches to Moral Theology," in Current Trends in Theology, ed. Donald J. Wolf and James V. Schall (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 171-98. John F. Dedek, "The New Morality Catholic Style," Chicago Studies, VI (1967), 115-25; William Dunphy (ed.), The New Morality: Continuity and Discontinuity (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967); Gustave Ermecke, "Catholic Moral Theology Today," Theology Digest, II (1954), 19-22; John C. Ford and Gerald Kelly, Contemporary Moral Theology (Westminster: Newman Press, 1958), Vol. I, 42-103;

Gerard Gilleman, *The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology*, trans. William F. Ryan and André Vachon (Westminster: Newman Press, 1961), pp. xxi-xxxvi; Robert W. Gleason, "Situational Morality," *Thought*, XXXII (1957-58), 533-58; James M. Gustafson, "Christian Ethics," in *Religion*, ed. Paul Ramsey (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 285-354; Bernard Haring, "Moral Theology and the Apostolic Formation of the Priest," in *Apostolic Renewal in the Seminary*, ed. James Keller and Richard Armstrong (New York: Christophers, 1965), pp. 174-84; Mariko Isomura, "The Place of Prudence in the College Teaching of Moral Theology," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Dept. of Religious Education, The Catholic University of America, 1964)--rich in references to periodical literature by French thomists, in particular, on the state of and suggested remedy for moral theology; John G. Milhaven, "Toward an Epistemology, of Ethics," *Theological Studies*, XXVII (1966), 228-41, and, with David J. Casey, "Introduction to the Theological Background of the New Morality," *Theological Studies*, XXVIII (1967), 213-335; James B. Nelson, "The Moral Significance of the Church in Contemporary Protestant Contextual Ethics," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, IV (1967), 66-91; Raymond J. Nogar, "The Emergency of the Person in Natural Law Theory," *Chicago Studies*, V (1966), 81-92; Servais Pinckaers, "Revival of Moral Theology," *Cross Currents*, VII (1957), 56-67; Paul Ramsey, *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967); Francis Simons, "The Catholic Church and the New Morality," *Cross Currents*, XVI (1966), 429-45; Gregory Stevens, "Current Trends in Moral Theology," *Catholic Educational Review*, LVIII (1960), 1-11 and "Moral Theology and the Liturgy," in *Yearbook of Liturgical Studies*, ed. John H. Miller (Notre Dame, 1960), I, 65-122; Urban Voll, "Contemporary Developments in Sacramental Moral Theology," *Proceedings of the Society of Catholic College Teachers of Sacred Doctrine*, VII (1962), 122-37; Thomas A. Wassmer, "A Re-Examination of Situation Ethics," *Catholic Educational Review*, LVII (1959), 29-37; and "Is Intrinsic Evil a Viable Term?" *Chicago Studies*, V (1966), 307-14.

As Michael Novak remarked in another connection, "In every human experience, the language of transcendence is available to men. . . . It is not necessary to kick the faces of those who preceded us in order to speak of transcendence in our own way."[3] Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said of Christian ethical thought. It attempts to characterize Christian life and its implications which can be and have been concretized in various ways as successive generations receive the gospel and apply it to their times. All such concretizations, undertaken conscientiously, will attempt to mirror the mind of Christ and will--it is not risky to predict--only partially approximate this aspiration. Christians of any age, like their non-believing contemporaries, are limited in the breadth and penetration of their vision. Each generation has to do its own homework, without expecting that of previous generations, or indeed previous centuries, to adequately meet present needs, especially now when, to indulge an oxymoron, change seems the only predictable constant. Furthermore, as Kierkegaard among others has pointed out, the most that one can do for another is to try to help him by an indirect kind of communication to discover for himself the Christian he is called to be.[4]

Aside from the futility of expecting past Christian ethical perspectives to fully meet present demands, another point worthy of more sophisticated appreciation than it usually gets concerns the hermeneutics of earlier theology. Specifically, we cannot adequately judge past views of Christian life simply on the basis of contemporary texts which treat of Christian ethics. The point is best scored by citing a specific instance. In a scholarly study of third century pagan and Christian thought, E. R. Dodds[5] notes that Christian ethics of the period were not easily distinguished from those of the neo-platonists. Indeed, the same observation could be documented for the second century when Celsus found Christian ethical counsel so similar to that of the cultivated pagan that he thought the Christian variety banal.[6] One of the most striking similarities between pagan and Christian thought in the third century is the preoccupation of both traditions with the salvation of the individual soul rather than concern for bettering the world. It is too easy to move from such a finding to the conclusion that Christians of the time were unconcerned with today's too insistent homiletic injunction to build the earth. Yet Dodd, himself an agnostic,[7] points out that despite the expressed "unworldly" ethical perspective espoused during the period he examined, Christians of the time maintained a welfare organization unparalleled in the Empire:

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[3] Michael Novak, "The Absolute Future," Commonweal, LXXXV (1967), 402.

[4] Cf. Gabriel Moran, Catechesis of Revelation (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), pp. 38-39.

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[5] E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (Cambridge University Press, 1965).

[6] Ibid., pp. 119-20, 75.

[7] Ibid., p. 5.

caring for widows and orphans, the old, unemployed and disabled, providing nursing service in time of plague and burial funds for the poor, none of which services was confined to Christians, but extended to pagans as well.[8]

With some justification, the common observation that life outruns theory might here be educed to explain this disparity in third century Christianity between unenergetic ethical policy, literarily expressed, and apostolic activity in Christian life as then lived. At a deeper level, however, what is ultimately involved in judging past views of Christian ethical theory are issues concerning the transformations of word that accompany stages of verbalization in human culture as it moves from oral-aural, to writing, and eventually to print and electronic media. Walter J. Ong, one of the few who have probed the relevance for religion of the changes in phenomena of communication, notes that while works such as those of Mircea Eliade have brilliantly manifested the roots of religion in special attitudes toward time and space, little attention has been paid to man's relation to sound, specifically the understanding or investigation of the history of the word as such.[9] A literary culture tends to over-rate verbatim record, the text literally taken. "In literate cultures the illusion is widespread that if one has the exact words someone has uttered, one has by that very fact his exact meaning. This is not true. In the last analysis, all our interpretation of the most exact verbal records of the past is dependent not on writing but on vocal exchange in the present."[10] We do wrong to think that Christian writing of earlier centuries, however literary those times might be, adequately reflects, or was intended to reflect Christian practice during the period. Obvious enough in itself, this point merits recall lest one too hastily judge as tenuous in the extreme an earlier theology that hardly tells the whole story. W. H. M. Van Der Marck shows his appreciation of this point when, in the course of his discussion of medieval theological thought on marriage, he comments: "A single glance into non-theological sources suffices to demonstrate the divergence between official theology and common opinion and practice."[11] After citing some examples from non-theological literature of the time, he concludes:

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[8] Ibid., pp. 27, 137.

[9] Walter J. Ong, The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 14-15.

> It seems to me that this brief encounter with another part of the Church, well aware of the fact that elfs and fairies had left where monks came in and that man does not live by theory and intellect alone but by living example and human feelings as well, should convince us at once that the attitude of the Church towards marriage in these centuries showed many more shades than were represented by official theology, and that official theology was on the right track,

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[10] Ibid., p. 32.

[11] W. H. M. Van Der Marck, "Toward a Renewal of the Theology of Marriage," The Thomist, XXX (1966), 320.

> and really much more Augustinian than it supposed it was, by gradually loosening its tight theoretical control on marriage ethics.[12]

Finally, one need but recall that even a prolific writer like Augustine, closer to an oral culture, in The City of God (XIII, xxi) and elsewhere, differed markedly from us in our predilection to take the literary meaning of texts as adequate.[13] To extend these remarks further would turn the present discussion from a passing caveat into a treatise.

The main concern of these reflections is to urge recollection of the demonstrable fact that even when literary output becomes common in a culture, the latter long remains orally oriented. A practical result of this, as it applies to judging past Christian ethics, is that such cultures did not think it necessary that their full thinking on Christian life be expressed literarily, since they were still devoted to the oral character of the word as its only fully adequate use. "All reductions of the spoken word to non-auditory media, however necessary they may be, attenuate and debase it, as Plato so intensely felt."[14] The statement deserves profound consideration for its implications regarding the hermeneutics of the theological thought of our forebears.[15]

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[12] Ibid., 320-21.

[13] Ong, op. cit., p. 47.

[14] Ibid., p. 322.

[15] For those who serve fellow Christians through the written word it is well to remember that "The Christian Church is . . . inevitably a missionary Church, committed to sharing its good news with all men,

The Key Area of Concern

Within the pale of these provisos, the matter of isolating what this writer deems the principal ill of a currently ailing moral theology can be given more ample discussion. In the interest of clarity the contention of this chapter is best made explicit from the start: the chief area of concern for a renewed moral theology is its philosophical basis. One of the root causes, if not the sole one, for the catalogue of castigations leveled at the moral theology of seminary manuals is the inadequacy of the philosophical underpinnings of that kind of moral theology. Such is the issue pared to its pith. Ramifications of it will be disclosed in the course of the following necessarily circuitous exposition which attempts to acknowledge the dimensions of the major difficulties which lie within moral theology itself and which arise from critical scrutiny of it from without.

One might begin with the ecumenical dimension of moral theology or Christian ethics. An apposite passage in the Second Vatican Council's Decree on Ecumenism reads:

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driven by the Word to maximum communication, and in all this, through the personal contacts effected most basically by the spoken word. Fides ex auditu. . . ." Though "the word of God in both Old and New Testament is also involved in writing, and thus in man's shift from a primitive oral-aural culture to one organized through a more visual sensorium . . . nevertheless, despite this addiction to literacy, the spoken word retains always for the Christian some special value." Ibid., pp. 13-14.

> And if in moral matters there are many Christians who do not always understand the gospel in the same way as Catholics, and do not admit the same solutions for the more difficult problems of modern society, nevertheless they share our desire to cling to Christ's word as the source of Christian virtue and to obey the apostolic command: "Whatever you do in word or in work, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God the Father through him" (Col. 3:17). Hence, the ecumenical dialogue could start with discussions concerning the application of the gospel to moral questions.[16]

At the risk of betraying unwonted skepticism, one wonders, in reading the last quoted line, how far ecumenical discussions will go if they begin with moral questions. For once one ventures beyond massively obvious issues such as racial injustice, such dialogue, as Richard McCormick has observed, hardly begins when it happens upon the more fundamental problem of methodology.[17] He continues:

> This is what the rather tired old discussion on situation ethics is all about. *Pace* Joseph Fletcher, it is far less concerned with Bertha's abortion than it is with the presuppositions of all of Bertha's decisions. It is both challenging and tempting to clarify the starting points for moral discourse. It is important to realize this; for if we reduce the discussion to a quibble over a few concrete norms, we miss its point and therefore its potential advantages.[18]

Since it acts as the current cynosure for popular estimation of what Christian ethics is about, the situation or contextual ethics debate can serve as a convenient referent for initial remarks on the nature of moral theology. One need not venture too far into that melee before realizing that the discussion is idle if it means championing or debunking the case for moral absolutes which can only be few and of quite limited assistance when educed to dispel ambiguities in life. James M. Gustafson's now famous essay[19] on some of these factors indicated that the entire debate was misplaced since Christian ethicists, though their starting points might differ, nonetheless encounter constants in the realm of their discipline: such factors as the primacy of charity, the role of individual prudential judgment, law as possibly revelatory, the illuminating potential of principles, and the stresses of an actual situation in the particularities of which one struggles to decide. If one neglects consideration of such factors in favor of simplistic adherence to one's own starting point, even if that be the primacy of love, the insights he offers for guiding Christian life will be even more limited than of their nature they have to be. Since human experience is polymorphic, any reflective system which aims to guide it must at least attempt a comparable range of nuance.[20] Cleaving to absolutes alone, no matter how gloriously they shine in isolation, favors the production of a clear system, striking in its intellectual appeal, but likely to prove proportionately inapplicable to the fluid, opaque nature of everyday life. One way in which the Christian ethicist attends to the varied aspects of human experience is by attempting to synthesize constants in the received tradition of Christian ethical discourse, constants which in some measure capture abiding aspects of Christian living. By recalling this to the attention of Christian moralists, Gustafson rendered a needed service. But though the contextualist debate may be misplaced it still continues. A prominent participant, Joseph Fletcher, can in one paragraph of his Situation Ethics concede the value of principles, for example, and in the next extol love, without defining it, as a panacea for all complexities.[21] One could argue that he has hopelessly clouded already difficult ethical

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[16] Walter M. Abbot and Joseph Gallagher (eds.), *The Documents of Vatican II* (New York: Guild Press, 1966), *Decree on Ecumenism,* 23, p. 365.

[17] Richard McCormick, "Notes on Moral Theology," *Theological Studies*, XXVIII (1967), 749.

[18] *Ibid.*

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[19] James M. Gustafson, "Context Versus Principles: A Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics," Harvard Theological Review, LVIII (1965), 171-202.

[20] "We are not," writes Ortega y Gasset, "launched into existence like a shot from a gun, with its trajectory absolutely predetermined. The destiny under which we fall when we come into this world--it is always this world, the actual one--consists in the exact contrary. Instead of imposing on us one trajectory, it imposes several, and consequently

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forces us to choose. Surprising condition, this, of our existence! To live is to feel ourselves fatally obliged to exercise our liberty, to decide what we are going to be in this world. Not for a single moment is our activity of decision allowed to rest. Even when in desperation we abandon ourselves to whatever may happen, we have decided not to decide. It is, then, false to say that in life 'circumstances decide.' On the contrary, circumstances are the dilemma, constantly renewed, in presence of which we have to make our decision; what actually decides is our character." The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1957), pp. 47-48. Cf. Ortega y Gasset's stress on character with Macmurray's on the quality of one's basic apperception discussed in Chapter III of this study.

[21] Cf. Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), p. 29, for example, and the source given in the following note.

discourse by packing varieties of meaning into the term love,[22] instead of attempting to confine and thereby deepen its meaning, saving it for culminating perspectives and using other terms to elaborate subsidiary factors relevant to ethical decision. In any case, either because constants in Christian moral discourse can be and are telescoped into the term love, or because one can pay lip service to factors other than love without fully analyzing their import, or because the constants in Christian moral theory, by reason of their very permanence have become too shop worn to be sufficiently effective instruments, other avenues are required to penetrate central concerns of Christian living.

An insufficiently attended route for doing so is the path of philosophy as the contextualist debate in Christian ethics has made clear. For in this discussion it is clear that the debate is wholly philosophical. It can be maintained that some presentations of contextualist ethics, as Herbert McCabe noted some years ago, are basically Cartesian in outlook, operating on a dualistic view of man, "on the view that he inhabits two worlds--a public world of observable actions . . . and a private world of really human actions, like motives and intentions and love" with no intrinsic connection between the two, and that "what we say about the public world is only a rough guide to what is really right and wrong in the private world; we can only make real moral judgments when we enter into the private world."[23] When varying positions in Christian ethics are pared to their philosophical presuppositions, or cast in their philosophical equivalents there is at least a possibility, provided such equations are not hastily drawn, of clarifying fundamental points at issue.[24] "In fact," Wassmer writes, "almost all theological disagreements find their ultimate sources in philosophical premises."[25]

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[22] Cf. John Lachs, "Dogmatist in Disguise: Joseph Fletcher's 'New Morality,' " Christian Century, LXXXIII (1966), 1402-1405. (Lachs is a professor of philosophy.)

Quite aside from the relevance of philosophy to the contextualist debate, the point of deeper import, that the great promise philosophy holds has received insufficient attention from Christian ethicists at large, remains a fact. As Gustafson recently noted in reviewing Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, whose content fell short of its title's promise:

> Christian ethics in the United States, apart from a very few giants, has been more concerned with moral commentary on yesterday's newspaper and with giving advice to the morally uncertain than it has with questions of method. Courses in Christian ethics have

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[23] Herbert McCabe, "The Cartesian Basis of the New Morality," Blackfriars, XLV (1964), 203.

[24] An observation of John Macquarrie is applicable here: "For an act of interpretation we require two parallel languages that can throw light on each other, . . . an existential ontological language, describing universal structures and experiences of the human existent, can serve as the interpretative parallel for the symbolic language of a particular revelation." Principles of Christian Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), p. 168.

[25] Thomas A. Wassmer, "Natural Law and Theology," Philosophy Today, IX (1965), 252.

> often belonged more in the college chapel than in the classroom. Observations, counsel, judgments, exhortations have been offered without sufficient self-criticism about why and how they are made. If the subject is to be included in the curriculum in religion, the approach and methods must receive more attention, for the subject matter bristles with issues that moral philosophers can tackle.[26]

In part, these observations recall McCormick's comment cited earlier on the basic difficulty of discussing moral subtleties in an ecumenical context, so that the conclusion emerges that the quest for methodology is not only of ecumenical import, but for all Christian moralists, the potential of philosophy for refining method and approach is of pressing concern as a way of lending depth and incisiveness to doing Christian ethics.

Lacking such dimension, Christian ethics is reduced to the thinness of moralistic cliches, with God or Jesus Christ "introduced as an unexplained cipher, an opening paragraph, a pious platitude, a citation from scripture, or a little bit of ideology to set the tone,"[27]--with religious terminology serving as excuse for lack of ethical analysis.

Paul Ramsey urges that there is no point in trying to compose a Christian social ethic by leap-frogging from one problem to another, without a fundamental point of view.[28] Drawing a pastoral application of this truth it may be added that while it is important for Christians of whatever denomination to unite in action against a cancerous evil in their society, it also remains true that this procedure alone cannot substitute for an articulated rationale undergirding Christian activity. Not only is the latter necessary as a means of giving reasons for the faith which inspires the Christian, but it is also necessary as a preventive against leveling Christian faith to one dimension, to just one specific humanistic concern. Important as a social issue might be, however worthy of a Christian's energies, the gospel is more than social issues or any one of them. Christians themselves vary in their gifts, can serve in a variety of ways, and while complacency is ever to be eschewed, they must not be made to feel unchristian because the particular sphere in which they spend themselves for others in Christ's name does not happen to jibe with whatever currently fashionable social concern preoccupies political rhetoric, lay or ecclesiastical. The manner in which the individual Christian becomes Jesus over again,[29] rendering homage to the Father in serving others, is too mysterious, too rich a reality to be captured in monochrome directive or the speciously facile mode of self-help manuals (cf. 1 Cor. 12, 4-31). If Kierkegaard taught Christians anything by the power of his paradoxes it should have been a distrust of any one dimensional interpretation of Christian existence. The lesson has long since been learned in New Testament studies, by the reaction against the fashion of "biographies" of Jesus which would force him into a type, a teacher simply, a social reformer, a Victorian gentleman--down through a catalogue of varied extrapolations, limited only by the reach of phantasy. In an obviously diminished parallel, what is true of the Christ is true of Christians. To the degree they strive to live their sonship toward the Father in the Son, their style of life escapes categories, especially the imposition of a single one profered as the mode of Christian existence in a given time, a mode that today might be fashioned more on the undigested findings of sociology and psychology than on penetration of God's Word.[30] As Von Balthasar says, "This life of bearing witness is as unique in Christianity and beyond rational analysis as is the mystery of Christ himself. In this aspect, the form of life of Paul and of every Christian is just as much an article of faith (part of the credo Ecclesiam) as are those concerning Christ."[31] Assuming sufficient indication of its important implications have been suggested to justify it, this excursus might be closed by recalling the point which prompted it: that the attempt to explicate a Christian ethic can serve the pastoral purpose of curtailing that misemphasis in determining the relevant style of contemporary Christian living which results from focusing attention on one, or only few, possible expressions of it. Moving from this conclusion and the others reached thus far: that ultimately, fruitful ecumenical discussion of Christian ethics, debates within that discipline, and the academic utility and survival of Christian ethics as a penetrating study demand attention to methodology and that this latter depends heavily upon the uses of philosophy, it is possible to devote concerted attention to Catholic moral theology in the hope that its improvement will benefit these wider interests.

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[26] James M. Gustafson, reviews the title mentioned (ed. Ian Ramsey) in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XXXV (1967), 289.

[27] Paul Ramsey, "Protestant Casuistry Today," Christianity and Crisis, XXIII (1964), 26.

[28] Paul Ramsey, "The Church and the Magistrate," Christianity and Crisis, XXV (1965), 139.

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[29] Speaking of an aspect of the believer's kinship with his Lord, Barnabas Ahern writes: "The fellowship of the sufferings of Christ comes from this truth: that the very Spirit which was in Jesus, charging his soul with agape and driving Him on to endure everything because He loved us, is in us, charging us with agape to go and do everything we possibly can to show our love for God and our love for men. Our union with Him and our imitation of Him is not merely a psychological adjustment of our minds to what He did. Nor must we duplicate exactly the kind of suffering which Jesus endured. The fundamental thing is that we are interiorly united, so that I am really and truly Jesus, because His Spirit is really and truly my Spirit." New Horizons: Studies in Biblical Theology, ed. Carroll Stuhlmueller (Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1965), p. 94.

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[30] "It is remarkable," Edward Schillebeeckx observes, "how Christians of today, living as they believe, in an age of biblical renewal, seem to listen less seriously and less obediently than in 'unbiblical' times to God's Word. . . . Indeed, they appear to confine their interest solely to man's experience of his own existence. But in my opinion this self-interpretation, this examination of our own human experience, only deserves to be called truly biblical and Christian when it is conducted in the light of the revelation of God's Word. . . . Outside this sphere the threat of danger is always present, either from biblicism or from some kind of self-interpretation which is not faith, but self-justification." Marriage: Human Reality and Saving Mystery (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1965), p. 10.

A convenient departure is provided in another decree of the Second Vatican Council, that concerning priestly formation. In treating of the academic preparation of students for the priesthood, having acknowledged the importance of philosophy, the decree urges conversance with contemporary philosophical investigations and recommends that

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[31] Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Church and World (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), p. 86.

> The link between philosophy and the true problems of life should be carefully pointed out, as well as the relationship of philosophy to the questions which stir the students' minds. Students should also be helped to see the connections between philosophical argument and the mysteries of salvation. . . .[32]

Further on, the decree alludes to moral theology in the following passage:

> Other theological disciplines should also be renewed by livelier contact with the mystery of Christ and the history of salvation. Special attention needs to be given to the development of moral theology. Its scientific exposition should be more thoroughly nourished by scriptural teaching. It should show the nobility of the Christian vocation of the faithful, and their obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world.[33]

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[32] Abbott, op. cit., Decree on Priestly Formation, 15, p. 451. With regard to this section, the Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, Vol. II, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder & Herder, 1968) makes some pertinent observations. "It is no longer considered desirable that the aim of philosophical instruction should be the teaching of a comprehensive system . . . but rather the development of a solid and coherent understanding of basic positions that are essential to a Christian view of the world. The three focal points are man, the world, and God. Thus the philosophical training should be: (1) essentially anthropology, in order to provide a genuine understanding of man; (2) it should give a philosophically underpinned world picture, as it emerges from modern science; (3) it should lead to the transcendence of the world and man, to the ultimate ground of being. To obtain this goal, instruction should first base itself on the philosophical heritage of scholastic philosophy, but this does not mean that it is to impart a closed system, but to make fruitful the lasting insights of the scholastic insights." To the last line a footnote adds: "The words 'perennis philosophiae principia' of the original text which suggested too much of a fixed system, were changed at the request of Cardinal Leger to 'innixi patrimonio philosophico perenniter valido,' " p. 396.

[33] Abbott, op. cit., 16, p. 452. The commentary cited in the previous note, with regard to this section remarks: "Originally the text limited itself to . . . the instruction in dogmatic theology, which is naturally to be applied mutatis mutandis to other subjects as well. At the request of many, however, particular remarks on various subjects were added in the modi: the basic point is made that all disciplines must

Both prior to the writing of this passage and since there have been studies in moral theology executed from a more adequate rooting in scripture than was usual formerly, and the centrality of charity, if it ever was neglected in the past,[34] has received ample attention as the favored focal point of texts dealing with Christian life. This is not to claim that what the Council enjoined is already accomplished, but simply that evidence exists indicating that the specific conciliar recommendations quoted have been partially executed.[35] A deeper issue is whether or not

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be placed within the perspective of salvation history. Above all, renewal is called for in the teaching of moral theology, which too frequently rested on principles of natural law and canonical norms and contained too little theology. The decree speaks of the necessity of basing moral theology more on Scripture and of deriving the demands of morality from the sublimity of the Christian vocation and Christian responsibility for the world /Cf. V. Redlich, ed. *Moralprobleme im Umbruch der Zeit* (1957); B. Haring, *Moralverkundigung nach dem Konzil* (1966)/." Vorgrimler, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

[34] As Dewart says, "The ethics of Christianity depend wholly upon the theism of charity. And our existence, our endowments, our attainments and, finally our moral status vis-à-vis God and the relation of mutual friendship between man and God--all these have always been experienced by Christians as gratuitous gifts directly received from God or, at very least, dependent on such gratuitous gifts." Leslie Dewart, *The Future of Belief* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), p. 207.

[35] As samples of such work one could refer to Nicholas Crotty, "Biblical Perspectives on Moral Theology," *Theological Studies*, XXVI (1965), 574-95; Albert Jonsen, "The Moral Theology of the First Epistle of St. Peter," *Sciences Ecclésiastiques*, XVI (1964), 93-105; C. Luke Salm, *Readings in Biblical Morality* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967); Rudolf Schnackenburg, *The Moral Teaching of the New Testament* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1965); Ceslaus Spicq, *Charity and Liberty in the New Testament* (New York: Alba House, 1965), *The Trinity in our Moral Life* (Westminster: Newman Press, 1963), *Théologie Morale du Nouveau Testament*, 2 vols. (Paris: Galbalda, 1965).

what the conciliar text mentions with regard to moral theology goes far enough.[36] As Gabriel Moran observes:

> Everyone says today that we must teach positively instead of negatively; everyone says that we must teach a morality of response to God's call; everyone says that we must center moral teaching on charity and the imitation of Christ. Speakers at catechetical workshops always say these things and we always shake our heads in agreement. Although we resolve to be positive, to be Christocentric, to be charity-oriented, it still ends up the same old thing in the classroom. What we fail to see is the depth of this problem. What we are not ready to admit is the superficiality of our understanding of both God and man. The external coordination of the commendments and charity, the introduction of contemporary applications, and the use of gospel parables are not sufficient to improve moral teaching. It is not the convincing of students of the relation of Christian mysteries and moral action that is first needed but our own seeing of that stupendous reality.[37]

Aside from the survey of contemporary approaches to teaching Christian morality they offer, these remarks are valuable for what can be concluded from their central point: that a meaningful moral theology can only emerge by making a serious attempt to understand God and man. Since the latter of these mysteries is more accessible, this study intends to examine a contemporary approach for understanding man as a clue to renewing moral theology.

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[36] There is no intention here to denigrate the conciliar text quoted which, it appears, intended no extensive treatment of moral theology but limited itself to passing mention of it. Cf. Concilium, XXV (1967) for articles which, in dependence on conciliar documents as a whole, draw inferences for renewing moral theology.

[37] Gabriel Moran, Vision and Tactics: Toward an Adult Church (New York: Herder & Herder, 1968), p. 123.

Before doing so, however, it is necessary to deal with the charge to which one is susceptible by the very use of the phrase "renewing moral theology," for it has been suggested that moral theology, if not already dead, is better left to do so, that there never was a moral theology and that we are only now beginning to build one, or in a somewhat similar vein, that it is futile to talk of Christian social doctrine as if to imply that Christians possess some secret master plan which a recalcitrant world refuses to accept.[38] Strictures of such kind force one who would write of moral theology to make his conception of that discipline clear. If it is true that St. Thomas, having laid the foundations of that science[39] (without calling it moral theology), was largely ignored, and that the congeries of tracts--in no sense a glorious coherent system--that came to be called moral theology were of ephemeral value, then the present task is less a matter of preserving than creating a moral theology.

Harsh judgments on previous moral theology, it must be recalled, are directed to a poor variety of moral theology which (for lack of a better phrase) the new moral theology is reacting against, namely, the usually multivolumed works titled manuale theologiae moralis "of which three forths is legal casuistry while the rest is presented in more or less juristic form."[40] Geared for the guidance of confessors, they were often sin centered, negative in tone, judgmental in character, true heirs to the medieval penitentials which constitute in part their literary ancestry.[41] Aside from grossly casusitic styles of moral theology, however, there was at least one other kind which presented Christian life more positively, basing itself on the thomistic framework of virtues to be practiced by the Christian in making his return to the God who fashioned and sent him forth. This must surely be spoken of with kindness, for if its language and philosophical perspective appear dated in modern light, earlier times might have found it more attractive.[42] Vis-à-vis this latter variety of moral theology, to speak of renewing it means, in part, searching out a more contemporary philosophical mode of thought and address in which to speak of the implications of the gospel for today.

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[38] Ibid., pp. 122-23.

[39] As Charles Curran notes, "There is no complete and authentic history of moral theology. Nor can there be until more particular studies are made. For the best available study of the development of moral theology of this time, see Bernard Haring and Louis Vereecke, 'La Théologie Morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin à S. Alphonse de Ligouri,' Nouvelle Revue Théologique 77:673-92 (1955). Also Louis Vereecke, 'Le Concile de Trente et l'enseignement de la Théologie Morale,' Divinitas 5:361-74 (1961)," in "The Problem of Conscience and the Twentieth-Century Christian," in Ecumenical Dialogue at Harvard, ed. Samuel H. Miller and G. Ernest Wright (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1964), p. 265, n. 10.

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[40] Bernard Haring, This Time of Salvation, trans. Arlene Swidler (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), p. 34.

[41] One of the most penetrating criticisms of legalistic ethics in a Christian context is Jean Tonneau, "Devoir et morale," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 38 (1954), 233-52; see also a series of his articles which appeared in Bulletin Thomiste, VI (1940-1942), 300-305; VII (1943-1946), 367-78; VIII (1947-1953), 87-106, 327-49, 932-68.

[42] These passing remarks are not intended as merely patronizing kindnesses to this second tradition of Catholic moral theology, nor are they meant to suggest that it holds no future possibilities. For a discussion of justice as handled by the two main traditions of Catholic moral theology, cf. Thomas F. McMahon, "Justice and Macromorality," The American Ecclesiastical Review, CLVII (1967), 289-95.

In the last analysis, the fundamental question is not whether there once was a glorious system now sundered and in need of suturing, or whether we are for the first time engaged in constructing a required rationale for defining a Christian stance toward human doing. In either case the task is herculean. For though the church is commissioned to preach the truth of Christ, she enjoys no immunity from the agonies involved in creativity when she strives to proclaim that truth powerfully, pertinently and freshly. Furthermore,

> The fact that the Church recognizes herself as the guardian of the natural law and of the law of Christ does not by a long way mean that her faithful may not to a large extent be groping in the dark and disagree with each other about how these correct principles may and must be translated into those concrete, clear and practicable imperatives which are required over and above the correct principles themselves if one is to pass from thought to powerful action.[43]

Therefore, though the label "moral theology" may not survive in the elaboration of a new theology, it does not seem hazardous to suggest that such a future theology, as is true of all modern sciences, will be divided into specialized areas if only for such purely practical purposes as easing the mastery of previous theological achievement and facilitating the founding of new frontiers. Such departmentalization will nonetheless likely preserve the mood that dominates all theology today, a theology which has learned humility once again, that it has no monopoly on truth, that it is not the sole route to the deepest understanding of man, though one rightly expects profundity of it since theology consciously strives to see man in relation to perennial truth, life and love.[44] A new moral theology will likely emulate as well current theology's vivid awareness that it must ever remain in conscious touch with the sources from which it draws nourishment, one of which is actual life, which it is also meant to serve.

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[43] Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, Vol. V, trans. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), p. 339.

Surmises Concerning the New Moral Theology

Beyond indicating its tone, to designate more specifically what moral theology (whatever it meant in the past) might mean for a new theology in the making is something that can only be suggested rather than defined. As Daniel Berrigan says, in attempting to describe the new theology in the making, "we are striving to discern an unidentified flying object, in its very flight."[45] Perhaps retaining the term moral theology itself is a liability since for some it is so fraught with unpalatable associations of marbelized legality, omniscience and deadening cautiousness as to render it an unfit vehicle for new tenor. Acknowledging this, the term is nonetheless retained here for its value as a connective with what was valid in the past method and what it might look like as a future tool.

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[44] "Given that the primary objective of the Christian message is God's epiphany in man and in the human world, it should be evident that God's countenance cannot become visible where humanity and the human face itself are twisted and distorted. . . . Now as to understanding what is really human and what is not, the Church or Catholics do not have a monopoly. Apart from all that has been said by the second Vatican Council in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church and in the Pastoral Constitution . . . about the recognition by the Church of the world's autonomy and of the civilizations and morals of the different peoples and nations, the following particular and explicit assertion has also been formulated: 'In fidelity to conscience, Christians are joined with the rest of men in the search for truth, and for the genuine solution to the numerous moral problems which arise in the life of individuals and from social relationships,'" Van Der Marck, The Thomist, XXX (1966), 338.

Moral theology in its new guise might best be conceived as a fundamental perspective, a style, a stance, an angle of vision which is worked out by the professional theologian in the hope that it might be of service to Christians who need assistance in seeking a sense of self-definition, who seek to discover who they are and why they are, as these perennial questions occur in varying ways through succeeding stages in life.[46] For all men, Christians or not, are in some way, and to the degree that they care to live examined lives, concerned with finding meaning in their particular existence. This concern, pursued in formalized, structured fashion results in philosophies which, various as they are, may be viewed basically as efforts at elaborating structures of meaning for human existence. It is this lode in philosophical tradition which has proved magnetically attractive to theology, which like philosophy is concerned with working out a structure of meaning for human striving, with the difference that it does its building within the horizon of faith. What this difference means might not always be clear to the theologian at work, or to the public addressed. For it often seems to mean in practice not that the theologian, nor the community of faith, is heir to privy knowledge from an ethereal zone, but rather, that the darkness which bounds the believer's questing is not viewed as a threatening one.[47]

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[45] Daniel Berrigan, in his foreword to Christopher William Jones, *Listen Pilgrim* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1968), p. vii.

[46] Both the difficulty and possibility of the theologian's task in this regard can be appreciated by realizing that "morality is the free personal acceptance of one's own pre-established nature, confidently coming to grips with one's own dynamic reality in all its united though multiple dimensions and precisely coming to grips also with that nature which realizes itself only when it turns lovingly to another person and when it accepts its own nature as the nature of the mystery of love. This acceptance does, however, have its history; it is not present all at once (as in the case of angels), but is temporal and becomes. This means, however, that something already 'is' at a particular moment in time and can already be described in its nature; it means that there already is

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'something realized' which nevertheless comes to its proper completion only in the completed whole of which it is but an element." Rahner,- Theological Investigations, V, 441.

[47] Partially illustrative of this kind of experience are the following lines from Jean Guitton's personal account of faith: "The Church is present as the good in the midst of the evil which contradicts her, unknown and yet well known. She is present in the form of an appeal; of a condemnation but also of a ferment, leavening the whole lump; she is present as an uneasiness. . . . To give an account of one's faith, after thought has worn itself out in discovering the most solid of motives, if it wants to be personal it will eventually end in a solitary undemonstrable movement. . . . When one is living at the centre of Catholic experience, one has an intellectual sense, an intuition which is absolute and confused. . . . Beneath all those elements of the Church which are human, irritating, sometimes mediocre, and more often than not ordinary and commonplace, I find an everyday quality--solid, dull, hard, homely, unfailing, analogous to the quality of being which characterizes the things of nature, of history

Doubtless this way of stating the difference between philosopher and theologian appears too slight. The difference between them is or was often said to lie in the fact that the theologian studies all reality *sub ratione deitatis* which is both a valid and venerable formula but suggests a definiteness of resource and surety which, in the concrete, the theologian is not always confident he enjoys, appreciating all the while that his surety is not of his own reserves but in the Spirit who inspires as suits him.[48] When one attempts to express the difference, then, between philosopher and theologian beyond the pale of admirably lapidary scholastic formulae, it is found to be of inexpressible character, an attitude or shape of attitudes which are elusive precisely because divine mysteries are what the theologian seeks to speak of and what he, like all men, dwells in.[49] If ambiguity in some or in large part is the lot of all

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and even certain people. It is a quality that cannot be lost; it is calm, radical and radiant and gives every part of the being peace and stability." *The Church and the Gospel*, trans. Emma Craufurd (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1961), pp. 268-70, *passim.*

[48] "Theology is good, necessary, and we shall never have finished studying it. Yet how second-rate theological subtlety is where real problems are concerned, when compared with the qualities of mind and heart which we will have to rely on to solve the ultimate questions of faith. At this level we priests have no advantage over the laity. Let us be to ourselves and to the layman what we are: men who seek, who ask, who are tempted and are filled with anxiety, just as they are; men who pray: 'Lord I believe; help my unbelief!' Let us not playact steadfastness and serenity of faith if we do not possess them." Karl Rahner, *Belief Today* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967), p. 57.

[49] "The mystery is of itself no merely provisional element of obscurity in a reality or proposition, to be dissipated in time, but always and essentially determinative of the necessary relationship intervening

men, believer or not, theologian or not, there is nonetheless a profound difference in how the believer, and hence the theologian views it. What that difference is, to this writer at least, is most meaningfully if only partially captured in T. S. Eliot's johannine lines which form part of a hymn to light invisible.

> Therefore we thank Thee for our little light, that is dappled with
> shadow.
> We thank Thee who has moved us to building, to finding, to
> forming at the ends of our fingers and beams of our eyes.
> And when we have built an altar to the Invisible Light, we
> may set thereon the little lights for which our bodily vision
> is made.
> And we thank Thee that darkness reminds us of light.
> O Light Invisible, we give Thee thanks for Thy great glory![50]

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between the created spirit and God. Man, made for mystery, must be such that this mystery constitutes the relationship between God and man, and hence the fulfillment of human nature is the consummation of its orientation towards the abiding mystery." Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, Vol. IV, trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), p. 49.

[50] From a chorus of "The Rock," in T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land and Other Poems (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. Harvest Book, 1965), p. 88. Rahner provides a remarkably parallel passage in the language of theology when he states that "grace is also the grace of no longer being able to be deceived about the incomprehensibility of God, of no longer being misled into thinking it only provisional. It is the grace of loving the divine darkness without reserves, the divinely-given courage to enter this bliss which is authentic and unique, and to enjoy it as the nourishment of the strong. As long as we measure the loftiness of knowledge by its perspicuity, and think that we know what clarity and insight are, though we do not really know them as they truly are; as long as we imagine that analytical, coordinating, deductive and masterful reason is more and not less than experience of the divine incomprehensibility; as long as we think that comprehension is greater than being overwhelmed by light inaccessible, which shows itself as inaccessible in the very moment of giving itself: we have understood nothing of the mystery and of the true nature of grace and glory." Rahner, Theological Investigations, IV, 56.

Cognizant of the inescapable opacity inherent in doing theology, the new moral theologian will not attempt to offer facile, mechanical solutions to complex problems, nor deceive his public by proffering it a speciously clear system, satisfying at first sight but unserviceable in the vortex of life. With all theologians he will realize that his task is essentially hermeneutical, a modest effort at helping the word of God to happen again for his contemporaries.[51] Since he is particularly concerned with Christian living of faith, he will, on the one hand realize that "men have desires and affections, hopes and fears, purposes and intentions which influence the most important actions performed. These need intellectual direction."[52] And on the other, he will remember that

> Our knowledge of human affairs on this earth is inexact and unorganized as compared with some things which we know about bodies distant many, many, light years. But there are vast multitudes of things about these bodies that astronomy makes no pretense of inquiring into. The relative perfection of its conclusions is connected with the strict limitation of the problems it deals with. The case of astronomy is typical of physical science in general as compared with knowledge of human affairs. The essence of the latter is that we cannot indulge in the selective

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[51] "As Vinet says: 'To believe in God and find oneself unable to draw from it any practical consequences is, if you will, to believe in God; it is also, however, to be without God.' Therefore, just as from the biblical point of view without witnesses there is no God, so also without a cultural vocation there can be, insofar as Christianity is concerned, no faith in God. And 'faith apart from works is dead' (James 2/26)." Gabriel Vahanian, No Other God (New York: George Braziller, 1966), p. 32.

[52] John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: a Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, Capricorn Books, 1960), p. 71.

> abstractions that are the secret of success of physical knowing. When we introduce a like simplification into social and moral subjects we eliminate the distinctively human factors:--reduction to the physical ensues.[53]

Aware that other disciplines besides his own examine the human, the moral theologian will be ready to learn what philosophical, sociological and psychological enterprises have to offer, without falling prey to reductionist tendencies which plague some varieties of these disciplines too, without attempting manipulative technique where only art will do, without ever forgetting that the last word will never be said about man since he is that mystery which rests on the eternal mystery of personhood in its fullness.[54] "In a theology participating in the dialogue with the man of today," Rahner remarks, "the question of morality is in the final analysis still the question of God, of his grace and faith."[55]

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[53] Ibid., p. 216.

[54] As John Courtney Murray says, "There is nothing more disastrous, as someone has said, than a negative theology that begins too soon. . . . The way of man to the knowledge of God is to follow all the scattered scintillae that the Logos has strewn throughout history and across the face of the heavens and the earth until they all fuse in the darkness that is the unapproachable light. Along this way of affirmation and negation all the resources of language, as of thought, must be exploited until they are exhausted. Only then may man confess his ignorance and have recourse to silence. But this ignorance is knowledge, as this silence is itself a language--the language of adoration." The Problem of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 73. Although this passage pertains to what is usually designated as dogmatics, it is equally relevant to moral theology which can have no other than a doctrinal foundation since morality is bound up with the whole of theology, that is, our understanding of God and man.--At the same time, however, it must be said that if moral theology is in difficulty today that plight is not due simply to its divorce from dogmatics (cf. the citation from Mackey in Chapter III, n. 6 of this study). As Ebeling says, after insisting on the connection of ethics with dogmatics, "Dogmatics is not keeping to its subject matter and must remain unintelligible, if the given reality which confronts our proclamation and without which the proclamation would beat the air, lack concreteness and indeed an object, is not also present

In performing his service of offering contemporary perspectives for the Christian community, the new moral theologian will realize that though his reflections necessarily take the form of generalities, he will attempt to render them more pertinent by probing the ethos of the particular society in and for which he writes, perhaps elucidating factors within it which demand explanation, development, remedial attention, caution or conscientious reaction.

> For one thing, theology has to consider the problem of ethics precisely in the . . . sense of first aid, i.e., in the sense of what the Reformers' theology comprised under the concept of the primus usus legis. For although the ethical has the prerogative of what is most immediately to hand and to that extent evident, yet we see again and again that men can be blind even

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to dogmatics as a given fact; for with its presence or non-presence the truth of theological thinking and the intelligibility of all theological statements are at stake. To that extent ethical reflection on man in the reality which concerns and surrounds him has a hermeneutical function for theology as a whole. Here, to be sure, as always in the problem of understanding, we come upon the hermeneutical circle. Theology has no other means of making intelligible what it has to say than by seeking and reaching man in the ethical reality in which he finds himself. Yet it can seek and reach him there only if it is guided by the proper theme of theology and confirms its truth precisely by in fact reaching man in his reality." Gerhard Ebeling, "Theology and the Evidentness of the Ethical," Journal for Theology and Church, Vol. II (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), 104.

[55] Karl Rahner, The Church After the Council, trans. Davis C. Herron and Rodelinde Albrecht (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), p. 101.

> to the immediate and evident. It is the business of theology also to care about the immediate and evident if need be, by bringing it to expression as such. The power of faith must show itself precisely in making us free also to such service.[56]

Highlighting the possibility of this prophetic function, far from foisting the role of Cassandra on the moral theologian, is only to suggest that he might render his scholarly service by bringing to light for Christian citizens of a given society aspects of its tone which need tending.[57] It is to suggest that the new moral theologian might do better to address himself to his particular society or country, taking its ethos, culture and indigenous character more seriously, rather than attempting to elaborate meaningful perspectives for Christians in the world at large.[58] By thus limiting and defining his audience a hitherto unexploited avenue of practicality is opened up to the moral theologian, and the truth that there is room for a variety of Christian theologies and life styles is given a path of expression.[59] For, in the proposal offered in the following pages for using John Macmurray's kind of philosophical personalism in moral theology, it is not presumed that it will suit all theologians or all Christians or that it has to.[60] Even within a given society there is room

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[56] Ebeling, loc. cit., pp. 103-104.

[57] Vahanian, having recalled that the social tasks of the Church have not been exhausted, writes: "They seem to be, of course, only when the Church can condone tasteless bread and at the same time wonder why communion has become meaningless. Christians ought to learn something from the rabbinical supervision of kosher foods. In other words, one should not lament the fact that others, such as the state or private foundations have today assumed the great cultural, political, and social tasks that the Church in the past initiated and accomplished, and from which our civilization benefited before turning its back on Christianity. The essential thing today is that Christianity should not miss its vocation by not assuming even the humblest tasks to which its adherents may be brought in spite of their faithfulness to the Church. As in the parable of the last judgment, could it not be that these were the most urgent and decisive tasks? And could it not be that their style is one that behooves the Church's involvement in the world?" Vahanian, op. cit., p. 95. Cf. Walter Kerr, The Decline of Pleasure (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962), pp. 277-78 on Eric Gill's utterly serious claim that it is a sin to eat inferior ice cream.

[58] That other disciplines do this is no deterrent for moral theology. As Durandeaux says, "The interpretive sciences can examine and satisfactorily describe the nature of human behavior; but precisely

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because their function is to interpret, their findings cannot be considered exhaustive, particularly when their findings establish patterns of interpretation. A given practice may be interpreted and explained in a competent manner and still contain some meaning which has not been dealt with. What has been defined, explained, and interpreted is only an expression of the unique phenomenon which underlies whatever is explicable, definable, and interpretable." Jacques Durandeaux, Living Questions to Dead Gods, trans. William Whitman (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1968), pp. 47-48.

[59] As Bernard Haring cautions, "If obsolete or foreign social mores are held onto or introduced, or if the earlier time-conditioned forms of customs and usages cannot be animated by love, examined and relegated to their rightful place, then the Church of a particular place will lose its ability to mold and remold genuine cultural forms of customs and usages. It is part of the newness of Christian life in the Church that it presents itself in ever new rich forms of customs, usages and culture. The Christian religion is so fertile and creative that her treasures can be found only in variety, and only in variety are all her creative possibilities fulfilled. As the splendor of the Christian life is seen in the varied lives of the saints, so too it must come to light ever anew in varied cultures and in new stylistic forms." This Time of Salvation, pp. 38-39. And as Gilby says, "Past prestige is dangerous if it leads to repetition of what was appropriate once but is no longer applicable to reach a world which has moved on." Thomas Gilby, The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 167.

[60] Lest it be thought that the relevance of ecclesiastical tradition as a source for moral theology is here neglected, what Van Der Marck says of that theological source might clarify this writer's position. "In listening to the tradition of the Church," Van Der Marck writes, "we are indeed

for more than one theology, a presupposition upon which the present study is based.[61] What John Macquarrie says, qualifying with finesse his own predilection for existential philosophy in theology is pertinent here:

> Let me say again that the existential theologian, if he is wise, does not claim a monopoly in the field of theology and does not fall into the error, so lamentably common, of saying, "This is the only way." In our fragmented culture, there is no single valid way of

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witnesses to theology and to the message of God's wonderful light shining into the darkness of our human existence, not to principles of ethics which should be valid and obligatory for all times. In other words: speaking about the tradition of the Church, which is indeed normative, we should beware of the mistake of supposing as established that this tradition contains a code of ethical rules. Though this may seem to be the case, and though this may often be thought, it is in fact untrue. To some people this may sound as a revolutionary statement, and in a way it is. For as may be seen from the discussions in recent years, e.g. about birth regulation, the prevailing opinion is that the rules and norms which govern this particular question should be taken from the doctrinal tradition of the Church in the past. The situation is not as simple as that. The statement that the tradition of the Church is essentially a theological, not an ethical one, is not revolutionary at all but in the highest degree traditional." After citing Augustine and St. Thomas as examples of this persuasion, he continues, "The opposite point of view which expects from the Church in the past a set of ethical norms basically misunderstands the sense and meaning of the tradition." The Thomist, XXX (1966), 325-26. By way of miniature application of these remarks, one might cite Gilby's (op. cit., pp. 137-38): "The sugar-intake of the medievals through their ordinary diet was less than ours; their drinking, and therefore their drunkenness, had a different quality about it. Their psychology of sex, to judge from the moralists, seems to have been more directly genital and less influenced by romantic literature. Their response to physical suffering and death was hardier. There were other variants, too, which should prevent our too flatly transferring judgments from one culture to another."

[61] Cf. Hans Kung, "The Freedom of Theology," in Freedom Today (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1966), pp. 65-108.

> of doing theology or philosophy. The most that a wise practitioner will claim is that his particular approach solves some problems and gains some insights in this time of change and confusion.[62]

With this advice as ballast against slipping into new dogmatism, what was announced as the central concern of this chapter can be resumed.

Attention to the Philosophical Base of Morality

The previous considerations on the role of a new moral theology were required as a means of defining the terrain and purpose of Christian moral theory at a time when self identity is as much a crisis for academic disciplines as it is for individuals in their private lives. Having suggested in some measure the kind of moral theology that is not worth saving, and, with deference to the achievement of past theological effort, having alluded to the kind that merits respect and perhaps furtherance, some attention can now be given to the expression of a growing consensus of scholarly opinion that it is the philosophical basis of moral theology that stands in most urgent need of remedial attention.

This emphasis marks an advance from the initial reaction against legalistic varieties of moral theology which supposed that a return to the bible would provide either the corrective to a misguided Christian morality or else fill the hiatus left by abandoning a dissatisfactory systematized Christian ethics entirely. While it is true that no kind of theology can afford to slight scripture, neither can it ever assume that biblical texts or perspectives alone will substitute for profound theological analysis. Gabriel Moran has amply demonstrated that the latter assumption ultimately stems from an inadequate understanding of the nature of revelation, a misunderstanding pregnant with disastrous effects when such theologizing is pastorally applied.[63] Pressing as pastoral issues are, a theology which would adequately meet them must be thorough, the fruit of deep scholarship.[64] Hence, marvellous as the renaissance in Catholic biblical studies has been, it cannot be asked to serve as a substitute for a new moral theology as well. For, among other reasons, the scriptures are not meant to serve us in that way. Their sufficiency is not such as to leave us mired in our intellectual sluggishness, but a challenge to us, primarily to manifest their import in our lives. This prime hermeneutical challenge which is the living of Christian life, finds its reflective counterpart (partially) in a Christian moral theory which aims to facilitate the transposition from faith to action.[65] While moral theology looks to the scriptures as a guiding beacon, a privileged witness to God's epiphany in Jesus Christ, that same theology realizes that the Christ was infinitely more than an ethical teacher.

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[62] John Macquarrie, "Existentialism and Christian Thought," in Philosophical Resources for Christian Thought, ed. Perry LeFevre (New York: Abingdon Press, 1968), p. 140.

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[63] Cf. Gabriel Moran, Theology of Revelation (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), esp. pp. 36-37 and 136-39 and Catechesis of Revelation, pp. 27-29.

[64] Cf. Karl Rahner, Theology for Renewal (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1964), p. 137.

[65] As Josef Blank says, "The ethics of the New Testament cannot ultimately be systematized, and for good reasons. To put it into the straightjacket of a system is to force it, and this will always end up in one or other form of legalism. One cannot sacrifice the theological

> It is a grotesque misinterpretation to characterize him as a social revolutionary because of what he said against the rich, or as the planner of a new social order (cf. Tolstoi) on the basis of his precept to renounce revenge, or as a communist on account of his commandment to love one's neighbour, or as a pacifist in the political sense because of his commandment to love one's enemies, or as an opponent of learning and civilization because of his attacks on the Scribes.[66]

If, in fundamentalist fashion, one looks to the dicta of Jesus for ethical guidance, even if he does not limit himself to the scanty residue of sayings that the more stringent practitioners of the Formgeschichtliche Methode will allow, he has to acknowledge that "there are many specific questions to which Jesus has given us no direct answer."[67] The very

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character to the eschatological, nor the christological to the eschatological. From the view of content, love undoubtedly has a primacy here. When Matthew states (22, 40) with finality: 'On these two commandments depend all the law and the prophets' (Mt.22, 40; cf. Mt. 22, 34-40 and Mk. 12, 28-34), the commandment of love is clearly understood as a kind of 'principle' (as Paul does in Romans 13, 9). But what do we mean by 'principle' when we apply it to love (agape)? It cannot be understood as 'norm,' or paradoxically, as Augustine did when he said that the measure of love is to love without measure. If, then, the kingdom of God, imitation, eschatology, christology, ecclesiology, Spirit, freedom and love all form inextricably the background of New Testament ethics, it is clear then, without taking all these aspects into consideration, one cannot speak of 'moral norms' in the New Testament." Concilium, XXV (1967), 13.

[66] Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching of the New Testament, p. 111.

[67] Ibid., p. 121.

expectation that he should have is perhaps indicative that having heard the word, one has not understood. For if moral theology is to take seriously the consequences of the Incarnation it cannot be so naive as to think this depends upon the availability of apposite scriptural citations.

> In fact, it is not possible to present a purely biblical theology that would at the same time be comprehensive. In any attempt to do so, philosophy will slip in surreptitiously. It would obviously be better to acknowledge that biblical exegesis supplies the first principles from which theology must always set out and to which it must constantly return, but that on the way it must take stock of all man's secular interests. Theology has a means to hand to further its interest in the domain of the secular, and that means in philosophy, which communicates with it in being a universal wisdom.[68]

In the realm of Christian ethics, the theologian with some appreciation of the history of his discipline realizes the possibility that a moral teaching which employed and fundamentally adhered to a natural law philosophical perspective as its prime tool may be said to have taken "God's incarnation much more au sérieux than any gaily gliding enthusiasm for the bible could imagine. Christ's place in morals--whether in Thomas' work or elsewhere--is not determined by quotations from scripture, but by God's incarnation itself."[69]

Taking the incarnation seriously is the fundamental task of any branch of theology that strives to fulfill its responsibility, since all theology is concerned with understanding God with man. In a sense quite otherwise that Feuerbach intended, theology does indeed mean anthropology, a science which, in the hands of today's theologian must show the man of today who and what he really is, how his existence entails much more than the animal rationale of an abstract metaphysic.[70] When Rahner, in the course of plotting the path of post-conciliar theology, comes to the question of a Christian anthropology, he urges that it be developed in such wise as to "comprehend the original unity of nature and grace, and not confine that which we call Christian grace to a realm beyond concrete existence. It must be an anthropology which will not simply leave to moral theology or pious literature the questions of interpersonal communication, of love, of the experience of the absurd, of death."[71] Applied more specifically to the province of moral theology, the importance of a Christian anthropology finds equivalent expression in the conviction "that a Christian ethic in no way makes an autonomous, human ethic superfluous, but, on the contrary, presupposes it."[72] For there is no simple way in which the whole of moral theology can be deduced from the simple fact of man's ordination to supernatural beatitude, without at the same time requiring an enormous amount of specific analysis such as that employed in moral philosophy.[73]

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[68] Francis McHenry, "Philosophy and the Renewal of Moral Theology," Irish Ecclesiastical Record, CVII (1967), 104.

[69] W. H. Van Der Marck, Toward a Christian Ethic: a Renewal in Moral Theology (Westminster: Newman Press, 1967), p. 14.

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[70] Cf. Rahner, The Church After the Council, p. 95; and Rahner's essay, "Theology and Anthropology," in The Word in History, ed. T. Patrick Burke (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1966), pp. 1-23.

[71] Rahner, The Church After the Council, p. 95.

[72] Van Der Marck, Toward a Christian Ethic, p. 39.

Appreciating this fact, Catholic moral theology has long employed natural law theory and some feel that it is worth the effort to labor still further in the natural law philosophical tradition.[74] Doubtless that venerable vein still holds promise. Without denying its validity as an approach in moral theology, it is this writer's belief that the phrase "natural law," if not the theory behind it, is so fraught with misconceptions accumulated in its passage through a history of disparate usages in the hands of various interpreters from many disciplines, that the moral theologian who employs it today saddles himself with an extremely burdensome interpretative task before he even begins to make the point he wishes to by employing the phrase.[75] In this light it seems more advisable to find alternative philosophical approaches. Quite aside from the feasibility of the natural law framework, as Charles Curran notes, "much work needs to be done in the philosophical understanding which moral theology must employ in its consideration of man and the world."[76]

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[73] Cf. William A. Wallace, The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology: a Study of Methodology in St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1962), p. 188.

[74] Cf. John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960), pp. 285-86; Wassmer, Philosophy Today, IX (1965), 250-57; Joseph Fuchs, Natural Law: A Theological Investigation, trans. Helmut Reckter and John A. Dowling (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1965) and Charles E. Curran's review of it in the Catholic Biblical Quarterly, XXVIII (1966), 353-55; Heinz-Horst Schrey, "Beyond Natural Law and Positivism," Concilium, XXV (1967), 59-73.

[75] Cf. Murray, op. cit., pp. 290-320, and the statement on p. 298: "I list these misunderstandings of natural law only to make the point that those who dislike the doctrine, for one reason or another, seem forever to be at work, as it were, burying the wrong corpse." The Wassmer reference in the above note is entirely concerned with misunderstandings of natural law.

Another writer echoing the same concern is Donald H. Johnson, S.J. who prefaces his recommendation of Bernard Lonergan's thought to fill the philosophical lacuna by noting that for such pressing ethical problems as birth regulation, divorce and private property, "a partial answer . . . is found in the current return of moral theology to its sources in Scripture and in dogma. But there is also needed a radical revision in the philosophical basis for moral teaching."[77]

Likewise, Francis McHenry, O.S.B. indicates that the renewal of theology "has two primary requisites; the renewal of biblical studies and the renewal of philosophy. The former is happily under way. But can the same be said for philosophy?"[78] After indicating some of the problems that need attention in the philosophical instrument theology has employed,[79] he observes:

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[76] Charles E. Curran, Christian Morality Today (Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, Inc. 1966), p. 133.

[77] Donald H. Johnson, "Lonergan and the Redoing of Ethics," Continuum, V (1967), 211.

[78] McHenry, Irish Ecclesiastical Record, CVII (1967), 103-104.

[79] After indicating the advantages that Heidegger's philosophy holds for theology in its emphasis on man's historicity, McHenry suggests that it falls short of adequacy in regard to the scientific treatment that the

> What has been said in regard to theology in general, applies fully to moral theology in particular. Moral theology needs moral philosophy and the philosophy of nature for scientific development; it needs metaphysics for its synthesizing ministrations. Moral theology to-day needs to reconcile universal principles that appear all too abstract to contemporary man, with the individual situation, the situation of salvation history, in which real human actions take place. Moral theology needs the true philosophy of being that respects essence while recognizing the primacy of existence. In a word, moral theology needs an ancilla that will not betray her mistress into indiscretions and yet will assume the full responsibility of her own office.[80]

In a survey of contemporary Christian ethics, devoted largely to Protestant scholars and chiefly American ones, James M. Gustafson also underscores the fact that "too little has been done on the relation of theological ethics to philosophical ethics."[81] Later in the same survey he suggests specifically that

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moral theologian must bring to his subject. "Science is always of the universal," he writes, "and were we to ignore its quest of universal principles and patterns we would have little defence against the onslaught of Situation Ethics. It was, of course, in this area that traditional moral theology excelled for the very good reason that 'traditional' meant 'scholastic' and scholasticism was, properly speaking, not a doctrine but a method based on the Greek analysis of nature as a universal source of activity. Now a method is an instrument and like any other instrument it may be improperly used; the more delicate the instrument the more dangerous its improper use. Scholastic dialectic being based on nature (which is essence as a principle of activity) becomes essentialist in tendency when over used or forced. This is exactly what happened to 'traditional' moral theology, and accounts for its need of a counter-balance in an existential dialectic to restore the sense of saving history to its entire subject matter." He is cognisant, however, of the fact that "Scholastic dialectic has no monopoly over wrongful use. Existential dialectic, too, may be over-used and forced. . . ." p. 94.

[80] Ibid., 104.

[81] James M. Gustafson, "Christian Ethics," in Religion, p. 287.

> Writings such as Stuart Hampshire's Thought and Action (1959) and John Macmurray's The Self as Agent (1957) and Persons in Relation (1961), could provide a pattern for the construction of a phenomenology of Christian moral experience. This could take the shape of an analysis of the patterns of thought and action that are characteristic of Christian moral life. From this, in turn, a constructive interpretation of how the moral life ought to be conducted might be forthcoming.[82]

Besides focusing on philosophical exploration as a means of enriching Christian ethics, Gustafson's remarks are helpful for their implication of a point made earlier: that this endeavor is neither academic nor a parochial concern of Catholic moral theology, but one which may ultimately, if only modestly, serve the cause of Christian unity.

While it is gratifying, especially in this Heraclitean era, to find some semblance of consensus as to the chief ailment of Christian moral theory, it is quite another problem to effect a remedy. For if Catholic moral theology needs a fresh philosophical partner, it is not easy to select one at a time when, as John Macquarrie observes, the "one thing we do notice about the philosophical world of today is its fragmentation. There are many different schools with very different ideas of what philosophy is all about and how it should be done."[83] In such a situation one can only choose that philosophy in which he sees a possible hospitality for Christian, and therefore genuinely human, concerns--a philosophy capacious enough to allow scope for man's desiring as homo religiosus, for his existence as a person, for his nature as doer as well as thinker, for his fascination with futurity and for his communitarian needs and aspirations. Without casting John Macmurray in the role of philosophical messiah come to rescue a distressed theological queen, his work, which he does not proffer as a system, seems sufficiently rich in creative possibilities as to recommend itself to the Christian moralist. A key reason for its appeal is his concentration on the philosophical analysis of persons in relation. One need not recall that personhood, intelligent subjectivity, has long been recognized as the most fruitful approach for theology's talk of God and his ways with man. What has come to fore recently, however, is the insight that an adequate account of the human person is not complete without taking into consideration his relational, interpersonal character, the fact that human subjectivity involves intersubjectivity as well. Vividly aware of this, Walter J. Burghardt, S.J., writes:

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[82] Ibid., p. 340.

[83] Macquarrie, in Philosophical Resources for Christian Thought, p. 127.

> Tomorrow's theology will be different from yesterday's. Paradoxically, it is already different. If any single expression can focus the difference, I suggest it is the person; more accurately, person within community. I mean person as set over against thing; truth as it touches me in contrast to truth in itself; reality in its relation to living persons rather than reality as something "out there"; interpersonal encounter in place of independence.[84]

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[84] Walter J. Burghardt, "Vatican II and Catholic Theology in America," in Vatican II: An Interfaith Appraisal, ed. John H. Miller (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 634.

It is time for that theological avenue (or cul-de-sac) which Catholic circles designate fundamental moral theology to appreciate this focus by making it integral to the structure of fundamental moral. For, as Van Der Marck avers,

> It is only when one proceeds from the basis of intersubjectivity as the meaning and the task of life that something more will come to light about the selfless generosity of God's love, the love that makes beatitudo of our intersubjectivity.[85]

Jules Toner, S.J., who does not believe that the Christian should pretend to prescind from faith when doing philosophy, sees the philosophy of intersubjectivity as pointing toward the same kind of ethics as does Christian faith. Noting how the needs of our time are forcing many disciplines to converge on the experience of intersubjectivity, he writes:

> The effort to understand this experience with all its implications about the person as person and personal life as constituted by relation with other persons has become a major interest for a number of the most sensitive thinkers of our time. John Macmurray speaks of the "form of the personal" as the emerging problem of philosophy in the new age which is evolving out of our present crisis--and in his thought personal existence is constituted by relation with other persons. It is true that this contemporary study of the experience of interpersonal knowledge and love is not strictly an ethical study, but it is true that the full meaning of this experience is not grasped without an ethical understanding of it, and that it, in turn, has many profound implications in ethics, as well as in philosophical or clinical psychology. Inevitably those who are concerned with the study of interpersonal communion are led to ethical considerations. It is time, perhaps, that all those seriously interested in ethics should be led to a study of the interpersonal communion as it is found in the "I-Thou" relationship. This contemporary concern for understanding and promoting genuine interpersonal experience is another sign of the times, another

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[85] Van Der Marck, Toward a Christian Ethic, p. 39.

> expression of the intense and conscious--even when not understood--need of our contemporary world. It is another call to the Christian moral philosopher to respond to this need and opportunity of our time.[86]

The basic reason, then, for taking the work of the contemporary English philosopher John Macmurray as the subject of this investigation is both to underscore the intrinsic importance of human reality as interpersonal and to offer this as the proximate field upon which fundamental moral theology must fix its attention. If contemporary theology must locate "more precisely where and how contemporary man can experience the existence of God to such an extent that he can genuinely and voluntarily make it a real factor in his life,"[87] no other realm of human experience, at least at present, recommends itself more overwhelmingly as a promising point de départ.

Two possible misunderstandings, or misdirected expectations regarding the content of this study must be forestalled before closing this chapter. Disappointment might arise from the general absence in these pages of discussion of concrete moral problems, and from the dominance of attention given to the human reality of personhood, without much talk of its "spiritual," transcendent side.

To take the second of these first, if transcendence is not isolated for emphatic discussion it is not because this dimension of man is unimportant but rather, to use unfashionable terminology, material and spiritual form one world, sharing an inner similarity and community. Hardly a revolutionary assertion, since "Christian theology and philosophy deems it self-evident that spirit and matter have more things in common than things dividing them,"[88] and that the community of material and spiritual shows itself first and clearest in man. Hence, a presupposition of this study is that the attempt, at least, to delve into what constitutes the genuinely human is in fact to set route toward the divine; transcendence need not be forced on stage before its cue. "This does not mean that God is by definition excluded, but it does oblige us to recognize that the morality of the believer is not the guaranty but the test of the believer's faith (Job)."[89] For, in the last analysis, what the religious man in climactic terms designates as salvation and damnation are events of profane history, for wherever men achieve themselves in freedom, they stand before God and decide their salvation. If this were not so, then their activity would not be free in the real and theological sense.[90] Since Christianity knows that man is a religious animal it appreciates that this fundamental religiosity need not, in order to be recognized, express itself according to the canons of any set tradition of moral discourse. Further,

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[86] Jules Toner, "Focus for Contemporary Ethics," Thought, XXXIX (1964), 18-19.

[87] Rahner, The Church After the Council, p. 94.

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[88] Rahner, Theological Investigations, V, 161.

[89] Vahanian, op. cit., p. 17.

[90] Rahner, Theological Investigations, V, 100.

> On no account . . . may the theological treatment of the ethical problem be restricted to what concerns Christians alone and what can only on the presupposition of Christian faith be seen to be true and binding. Rather, theology must enter into the full range of the ethical problem, and thus also into the questions which exercise and trouble Christians and non-Christians alike, and on which a certain measure of agreement must be reached even in relative independence of the difference where faith is concerned--i.e., on what must be done, however provisionally, to maintain the humanity of human life.[91]

If a fundamental moral theology succeeded only in helping to diminish the ease and frequency with which one assents to "l'enfer, c'est les autres," not only has something been done "to maintain the humanity of human life," but one is on his way toward grasping what the First Epistle of St. John presupposes: that God's gift to each of us is others.

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[91] Ebeling, loc. cit., p. 104. Cf. Rahner, Theological Investigations, IV, 366: "When we affirm as a doctrine of faith that human morality even in the natural sphere needs the grace of God to be steadfast in its great task, we recognize as Christians that such humanism, wherever it displays its true visage and wherever it exists, even outside professed Christianity, is a gift of the grace of God and a tribute to the redemption, even though it knows nothing of this. Why then should we not love it? To pass it by indifferently would be to despise the grace of God."--In another, but apposite vein, Paul Ramsey writes, "It is high time for it to be acknowledged on all sides that not every decision is a moral decision. The bearing of God's will and governance in relation to every aspect of human life cannot possibly be construed in such fashion that supposes that there is a Christian shape or style to every decision. Concerning a great many choices it has to be said that only a deliberately or inflexibly imprudent decision would be wrong, or an uncharitable exercise of prudence." Paul Ramsey, "Toward an Ecumenical Ethics," in Who Speaks for the Church (New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 135-36. Cf. the review article of Ramsey's book by Carey B. Joynt, "The Two Swords: A Conflict Renewed," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XXXVI (1968), 128-33.

As to the lack of treatment of concrete problems, the position here assumed is that the nature of the religious question today precludes the issuance of new editions of unofficial pronunciamentos on specific problems, even if coated in personalistic terms. While one may rightly expect concrete applications to flow from an ethical perspective that has any viability at all, the discovery of God which is so crucial an issue today is hardly likely to occur if one begins by hammering his head against the stone wall of moral problems,[92] instead of seeking him in what we deem his principal work, persons. The itch for answers which seems indigenous to American sensibility, prompted Walter Kerr to observe:

> Our problem is that we overvalue the productivity of the theoretically known, the merit of the useful equation. By making usefulness in the future our single talisman, we find ourselves without a present or imprisoned in a present in which nothing real can be known--a present that is empty of everything but our despair. We go to our pleasures, when we dare go to them at all, demanding that they surrender to us a kind of knowledge that is not in them. And so we kill them.[93]

Though problems press at the peripheries, what is ultimately crucial is perspectives. If the moral theologian today assumes his task to be the formulation of canned answers, he runs the risk of lacking an audience with the matching questions. If experience has not yet taught him that, he might learn from Aristotle's technique in the Nichomachean Ethics not to covet an apodicticity he cannot have; he might learn there how modest his role is and how much the meaningfulness of his viewpoint depends upon the good will of his public who, if they are to profit by him, must throw their minds into the matters in discussion, must accompany his treatment of them with an active, personal concurrence, and interpret for themselves, as he proceeds, suggestions and adumbrations of what is constitutively human. If the pastoral import of these observations needs to be made clearer still, what Gabriel Moran says in discussing the teaching of morality to adolescents can serve.

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[92] Cf. Van Der Marck, op. cit., p. 130.

[93] Kerr, op. cit., p. 244.

> Their perfectionistic striving is largely self-centered and their greatest moral danger is not sexual, as they usually think, but a phariseeism which must be overcome. We must not make the same mistake they do in thinking that Christian morality consists in overcoming nature by an anxious, soul-searching self-sufficiency. The task of the educator at this point is the creation of an atmosphere of devotion, self-forgetfulness and interest in others.
>
> To teach a morality that is personal, one must know the persons of the bible: the prophets, Jesus and Paul. In addition, one must know something of the key personalistic movements of our own day.[94]

If this study contributes fractionally to such goals it will not be fruitless.

Finally, both false hopes anticipated previously and others that might be entertained, might be quelled from the start by sharing Van Der Marck's view that it belongs to the function of a fundamental Christian ethic to see the outer edges, the human side, as it really is, with all its human implications.

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[94] Moran, Vision and Tactics, pp. 127, 129.

> Only in this way will the Christian ethic be able to fulfill its most essential task, to be a theology, to be a reflection on the God who hides himself from the eyes of those who look up to the clouds, but who wants himself to be found in the work of his own hands, the work he himself found "very good," and who desires that result not for any special reason, but just because he wants it so. Actually, our complicated world has no meaning apart from this.[95]

The Christian ethic whose desirability was underscored earlier will be one dominated by the Christian character of human reality, that is, the appreciation that what appears to be merely human communication and community, human action and interpersonal experience--in short, pure humanity--turns out to be in reality community with God and Church, acknowledgement and rejection of God, himself, involvement in a world of persons which is the form and expression of God's especial care and generosity.

The following chapter will survey some major emphases in Macmurray's philosophy, especially those which pertain to our fundamental view of reality. In recording his objections to Kant, his insistence on the primacy of the practical, the need to heed our own experience and the legitimacy of emotion, the chapter will be concerned with problems which affect our basic vision and attitude toward life. Most experience of discontent finds its wellspring there. There the source of our not seeing, though we have eyes, our not hearing, though we have ears, not understanding or hoping, though we have hearts to know Him who made us many but intends us one--in Christ Jesus, Our Lord.

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[95] Van Der Marck, loc. cit.

CHAPTER II

THE PRIMACY OF THE PRACTICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL

The Range of Macmurray's Thought

Remy Kwant suggests we read the last chapter of a philosopher's work first, to discern where he would lead us and in what way he will enrich our vision of ourselves and our world.[1] While it would serve neither the interests of clarity, nor fairness to Macmurray to present his culminating ideas without preparation for them, it might be helpful to single out a typical vein of his work which does distinguish his philosophical position and its conclusion, namely his regard for religion, a subject to which he has devoted considerable attention. Not only will this evidence Macmurray's relevance for the theologian, but it will serve to indicate the large horizon within which he conceives and defines the personal as he does in the maturest expression of his thought, the Gifford lectures on the form of the personal, delivered in 1953 and published as two volumes: The Self as Agent (1956), and Persons in Relation (1961).

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[1] Remy G. Kwant, Encounter, trans. Robert C. Adolfs (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), p. 38.

In the first of these lectures, he lamented the fact that any kind of natural theology is no longer possible.[2] Ironically, both theology and philosophy seem agreed on the point.[3] On its side, theology as a result of the ascendency of crisis theology, has so stressed the complete otherness of God that "the notion that reason could even suggest the divine becomes evidently irrational."[4] For its part, philosophy must stand by reason. The philosopher

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[2] By natural theology, Macmurray writes, "is meant, as I understand it, a theology which is based upon our common human experience of the world, and which requires no help from special experiences of a peculiarly religious kind. It must be discoverable by reason alone, without the need to have recourse to faith," John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (London: Faber & Faber, 1956), p. 18.

[3] In this observation, as should be clear from what follows, Macmurray is attributing to the whole of theology what is today commonly associated with the Barthian variety. Cf. Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, pp. 43 ff.

[4] Macmurray, op. cit., p. 18. That this mood is changing, at least in some quarters of theology, is evident from such statements as Shiner's who, in discussing Gogarten's work, writes, "It would seem that either Gogarten must admit that God is merely the name for the mystery of the future and thus grant that faith can be secularized by being completely transposed into the human experience of an immanent structure, or else he must give an account of why this power is the power of some reality behind, beyond, or in the future. The attempt to provide such an account is not mere speculation but is required by faith itself. For unless the distinction between faith and reason is to become a separation, faith's confidence that God is real in himself cannot be an arbitrary assertion but must be consistent with the rest of what is known by man. . . . What is required here . . . is an ontology that can put each dimension of being and the rationality appropriate to it in its place without creating a closed system. The aim of such an effort would be to illuminate both the distinctiveness and the interconnections of nature and history, of being and action, and to show their relation to the reality of God as it is known in the subjectivity of faith. There can be no doubt that such an effort will fail, for if God is the Creator, he cannot be divided without remainder into any kind of ontology. There will always be a 'surd,' an offensive reminder that what has been thought has not yet reached its object. Even so, a failure

> cannot admit, as premises of his argument, any special experiences, religious or other, whose validity is at all questionable. He must start from common experience at its most universal and its most ordinary; and his procedure must be by rational analysis and rational inference. At no point can he admit as evidence any experience which is radically heterogeneous with this commonplace starting-point, and which could point to no evidence in common experience to bear witness for it. Such a disparity between normal and religious experience would convict of unreality the abnormality of the latter. If there is no point at which faith and reason can meet, then it is unreasonable to accept the deliverances of faith, and atheism is the reasonable conclusion.[5]

That philosophy is so confined is due, Macmurray believes, to strict adherence to a program that starts from limiting assumptions, with the general result that the more purely objective its procedure becomes, the more inevitable is the atheism of its conclusions.[6] But however logically necessary the atheistic conclusion might be as seen from within the limited philosophical horizon presently entertained, Macmurray cannot accept it, largely because the boundaries within which modern philosophy chooses to work are not sufficiently inclusive of the realm of personal experience. Specifically, most current philosophies are heirs to a tradition which gives primacy to the theoretical point of view, taking

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to make the effort would be a denial of man's independence before God and of the enfranchisement of reason through faith." Larry Shiner, "Gogarten and the Tasks of a Theology of Secularization," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XXXVI (1968), 107-108.

[5] Macmurray, op. cit., p. 18.

[6] Ibid., p. 19.

insufficient account of the person himself who does the thinking and of that same person's nature as agent. These facets of Macmurray's thought will be attended to later. They are mentioned here simply as supportive indications of what he means by saying:

> The view that there is no path from common experience to a belief in God; that religion rests upon some special and extraordinary type of experience apart from which it could not arise--this seems to me hardly credible.[7]

In passing, Macmurray mentions that were religion the aberrant phenomenon that much philosophy assumes or implies it to be by skirting agnostically past it, one would assume that religion was a late development in human culture. On the contrary, the testimony of history shows that religion is the original, and the one universal expression of our human capacity to reflect; as primitive and as general as speech. "It is the atheists and agnostics who have been exceptional and abnormal."[8] While this observation hardly proves the validity of religious belief, it at least indicates that anyone who attempts to adequately reflect upon human experience must seriously consider the phenomenon of religion.[9] Macmurray's salient point in this connection is that if modern philosophy fails to find any support for religion in man's common experience it may be because it works within limits which exclude the evidence from its consideration; or that it rests upon assumptions, so familiar perhaps that they have lapsed from consciousness, which require scrutiny and modification.[10]

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[7] Ibid. Generally, this is Macmurray's interpretation of philosophy's estrangement from religion. It is difficult to speak globally about the mutual relationship of philosophy and theology (religion's reflective expression) since both philosophies and theologies differ. John Macquarrie refers to the boundary between both disciplines as a frontier along which different kinds of activity occur. There is peaceful trade and commerce, a certain amount of smuggling, violent warfare, or simply quiet. Cf. John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 15-16.--It is George F. Thomas' conclusion that two current forms of modern philosophy, analytical and existential, are not now dominantly atheistic or nihilistic so much as skeptical concerning the capacity of reason to prove the transcendent. "As Baumer has said, our age is an Age of Skepticism, but it is also an 'Age of Longing.' Men have been disenchanted with the idols of the nineteenth-century religion of man and are seeking 'a new transcendental faith.' If they are to be successful in finding such a faith, whether new or old or a blend of old and new, it will have to be a faith which is in accord with their experience and which commends itself to reason as consistent with all they know." George F. Thomas, Religious Philosophies of the West (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), p. 436.

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[8] Macmurray, op. cit., p. 20. Cf. also John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), pp. 156 ff.

[9] The point was recognized by Hume, Kant and Hegel and was, in part, responsible for the development of philosophy of religion. Cf. James Collins, The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). William James also realized the necessity of seriously considering man's religious experience. Typical of his ways of recalling the point for methodological reasons are these citations: "If we look on man's whole mental life as it exists, on the life of men that lies in them . . . and that they inwardly and privately follow, we have to confess that the part of it which rationalism can give an account is relatively superficial. It is the part that has the prestige undoubtedly, for it has the loquacity, it can challenge you for proofs, and chop logic, and put you down with words. But it will fail to convince or convert you all the same, if your dumb intuitions are opposed to its conclusions. If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits." And further, "Skepticism cannot . . . be ruled out by any set of thinkers as a possibility against which their conclusions are secure; and no empiricist ought to claim exemption from this universal liability. But to admit one's liability to correction is one thing, and to embark upon a sea of wanton doubt is another." William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: New American Library, 1958), pp. 72, 260.

Once he has taken his audience through his analysis of the form of the personal, scrutinizing in the process the inadequacies of past philosophical perspectives, Macmurray says more about the pointers to God that lie in personal human experience.[11] To be fully appreciated, citation of these culminating observations must be deferred in favor of brief allusion to some of Macmurray's earlier works on religion and human experience both for the light they shed on his thought in general and for their pertinence to recent discussion of the relation of the secular and sacred. In such discussions it is commonly assumed that the secular humanist's is the "plain view," impartial and "scientific" while religious views of the world are interpretations imposed upon the evidence.[12] However, both the secular humanist's "plain view" and the (ironical) acceptance of it as valid by secular theologians today are typical of an outworn rationalism.[13]

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[10] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 20. Cf. Brian Wicker, Toward a Contemporary Christianity (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 194 ff. where Wicker analyzes how Levy-Bruhl's unexamined philosophical assumptions vitiate his study of religion.

[11] Cf. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 206 ff. While grounds for theism are not the central concern of this study, it would be well to clarify the present state of such questions (since the exposition above borders this terrain) by citing these remarks of Vahanian: "The classical problematics of the Christian era consisted in a debate on the relation between faith and reason. More precisely it led to the question whether one can demonstrate the existence of a God in whom one already believes. Our present problematics is (sic) radically different. It arises from the consciousness that whatever God is, he is also a projection of one's own image. And the question to which this leads is, 'Can I assert the existence of a being whose image I myself have created?" And, quoting Durandeaux, " 'This new question reflects the fact of our living in a historical context which has become consciously post-Marxian and post-Freudian; it assumes that we have accepted the validity of a series of criticisms, and analyses of certain aspects of our religious practices and that our problem is one of discovering how we can conduct a religious endeavor which is valid in the philosopher's eyes.' " Gabriel Vahanian's introduction to Jacques Durandeaux, Living Questions to Dead Gods, pp. 11-12, 16. Cf. also Daniel Callahan, "God and Psychological Man," Continuum, V (1968), 655-72.--Especially in the passage citing Durandeaux, Vahanian approaches, from the theological angle, the same issue which Macmurray touches, except that Macmurray's point would be that the philosopher's eyes might be, and are at present, defective as well. For Macmurray's response to Freud's contention that religion is a projection, cf. Persons in Relation, pp. 152, 154 ff.

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[12] Cf. Wicker, op. cit., pp. 189-190. Macmurray effectively cramps facile use of the cliche, "the scientific point of view," by observing: "People refer quite often to what is called 'the scientific view of the world,' and the phrase is often used in contrast with 'the religious view of the world,' with the assumption that one has to choose between them. Nothing can properly be called 'a scientific view' except a belief or theory which has been reached by using scientific method, and tested by experiment or by some other method in use, in one or other of the sciences, for this purpose. One would be justified, therefore, in asking anyone who spoke of a scientific view of the world, which of the sciences is responsible for its discovery. And one could properly ask for references to the papers embodying the researches by which it was reached and the experiments or other recognized methods by which it was verified. Merely to ask such questions shows that 'science' has here got beyond its limits. A view of the world can only be philosophical. 'A scientific view of the world' might mean--and often seems to mean--the kind of philosophy that results from ignoring the limits of science, overlooking all other aspects of experience, and conceiving the world as the ideal object of scientific enquiry. Even so, the view will vary greatly as the particular branch of science in which one is particularly interested is physical, biological or psychological." John Macmurray, Religion, Art and Science (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1961), p. 20. Cf. also Persons in Relation, pp. 41-42; and Arnold Levison's critical introduction to Karl Löwith, Nature, History and Existentialism (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. xx.

The sight of religionists short-changing themselves in commerce with inadequate philosophies is not new to Macmurray. Over three decades ago, in the Terry lectures delivered at Yale University, he devoted his attention to probing religious experience. Then he argued that science has no monopoly on empiricism, that art and religion too are empirical, provided one understands that all empiricism is not necessarily of the scientific kind.[14] For facts are meaningless until they are correlated and organized and this is only possible through a process of valuation. Art and science are one-sided limitations of the religious valuation principle.[15] Hence, science and art are partial empiricisms.

> Both presuppose yet cannot deal with the group of facts which is the focus of religious valuation, and which concerns the mutual relationship of human beings and the sharing of a common experience between them. The inclusion of this group of facts, and its centrality in the religious field, makes a religious empiricism more complete than the limited empiricisms of science and art. The religious empiricism provides the synthesis of the opposite and partial attitudes of art and science, and this synthesis is necessary to the rationality of practical life. Cut loose from their unity in religion the two partial

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[13] Cf. Wicker, op. cit., p. 191.

[14] Macmurray's Terry lectures were published as The Structure of Religious Experience (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936). Relative to the point made above, cf. Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 22, 216-217; and Persons in Relation, pp. 216 ff.

[15] Macmurray, The Structure of Religious Experience, p. x.

> empiricisms oppose one another and produce an antagonism in the field of social activity which is destructive of order, freedom, and progress.[16]

Perhaps it is concentration on the term empiricism that gives the passage a Jamesian ring.[17] In any case, the claim Macmurray here makes for religion is constant in his writings. In the passage cited, he appears to mean by the empiricism of religion, art and science, their various ways of evaluating (and thereby, to some extent, transforming), types of data which ultimately derive from human experience.[18] He makes the same point equivalently in a later work, Religion, Art and Science, wherein he calls all three "modes of reflection" upon what is given, available in human experience generally.[19] In this light, art and science are modes of reflection (modes of empiricism in the previously cited passage) which partially capture human experience, while religion does so more fully because it is more inclusive of man's entire reality as personal, existing with other persons and all in relation to a personal God.[20]

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[16] Ibid., pp. x-xi.

[17] For a summary of William James' religious thought see, Robert J. Roth, American Religious Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), pp. 27-62; cf. esp. p. 35 with Macmurray's reference to empiricism above and pp. 48-49 of Roth with Macmurray's Self as Agent, p. 23: "It is always legitimate to ask, of any theory which claims to be true, what practical difference it would make if we believed it. It may often be difficult to answer this question; but if the correct answer were that it would make no difference at all, then the theory would be a mere exercise of phantasy, neither true nor false, but meaningless."--As Errol Harris says of Macmurray, "The verification of metaphysical statements, he maintains, (and here he is in agreement with James and Dewey) depends on the difference the belief in them makes to our practical way of life. A metaphysic determines a manner of living and its verification depends on the satisfactoriness, and falsification on the unsatisfactoriness, of that way of life." Errol Harris, "Thought and Action," The Review of Metaphysics, XII (1959), 457. Cf. also, Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking Press, 1967), p. 159.

[18] "But in every case these activities of transformation must start from something which is normal fact in human experience. The scientist, the artist, and the religious man--all must start from a range of experience which is common to all men everywhere; even though it is true, perhaps, that only a few have the capacities which are necessary to produce the transformation that creates religion or art or science," Macmurray, Structure of Religious Experience, p. 3. Cf. Wicker, op. cit., pp. 187-88, which expand the notion of the "sacred," forcing us to

Thus Macmurray's habitual method of examining the nature of religion is comparative in the sense that he views it in relation to art and science, and all three in relation to the practical order of human experience. The latter serves as the criterion for judging the adequacy of religion, art and science, that is, how capacious each is as a method of valuation or mode of reflection, to adequately mirror the fullest measure of human experience, notably the life of persons in relation. What each of the three are challenged to represent is the world in which we live and to which we belong.

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recognize that the church is essentially an extension, into the sphere of self-consciousness, of the human community which is constituted, in the first place, by our bodiliness and by our capacity for language.

[19] Macmurray, Religion, Art and Sciences, pp. 52-53.

[20] Cf. Wicker, op. cit., p. 57: "In the understanding of how we actually meet others we can, perhaps, begin to see the meaning of the sacred, not as a corner of the world which is privileged to be free from profane intrusion, but as the basis of the whole intersubjective situation which is the reality of our community together."

> We are elements of the world which we represent to ourselves and which in reflection we distinguish from ourselves; and all our activities are integral with the total activity of the world. Even if one of us takes the attitude of an observer, the world which he observes includes all the rest of us, with our activities, both practical and reflective. . . . Since we are as much a part of the world as the hills or the sea, and our existence is personal and problematic, it follows that the world must be such that it can produce such creatures as we are, and must contain in itself the possibility of a problematical activity like our own. Any apperception which excludes this possibility is necessarily inadequate.[21]

Against this standard religion is the expression of an adequate apperception of our relation to the world, while science, in the limited range and type of questions which it asks, questions which deal with matters of fact apart from the economy of personal life, constitutes a limited, partial, and therefore inadequate apperception of reality in its completeness.[22] In an earlier work, recently reissued, Reason and Emotion,

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[21] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 218-19.

[22] Cf. Jaki's reflections: "That various ages, peoples, cultures, and groups of believers could build on basic Christian principles intellectual and cultural superstructures that were Christian in name only is too well known to be discussed here. Much less is it remembered how quickly far-fetched generalizations start cropping up when word is received about some new discovery in science. The fallacy inherent in such procedures is not always immediately obvious, and thus an intellectual climate may easily develop in which spurious proofs are readily taken for granted. Essayists, poets, and philosophers will then do the rest by dramatically portraying the collapse of the traditional set of values and beliefs. Yet, a deeper understanding of human nature and a more thorough familiarity with physics would have showed them that the discoveries of physics leave untouched the deepest dimensions of man's existence. But it is there that man's religious orientation is anchored and not in the perishable Aristotelean spheres or in the evanescent Newtonian space or in the expansion of the universe that might be followed, who knows, by its contraction." Stanley L. Jaki, The Relevance of Physics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 424-25.

Macmurray pares the issue to its philosophical roots by frankly stating that

> The philosopher, if he is to carry out the task which he has set himself of expressing the nature of reality, cannot leave religion out of account. He must evaluate the claim which is implicit in all religious experience and reach some conclusion about its validity. It would seem that in the nature of things this is a claim upon which no compromise is possible. The philosopher must either accept the personal character of the real or he must reject completely the claim of religion to be a necessary and wholesome expression of human nature. If reality is not personal, religion is an illusion. If reality is personal, then any philosophy which describes reality as impersonal or non-peraonal is false. I cannot see that there is any conceivable alternative.[23]

Lest it be thought that Macmurray is preoccupied with religion as a panacea, or as some sort of regent over all other disciplines or experiences of life, it must be noted that he qualifies his plea for attention to the religious apperception of reality with the caveat that religion as we know it is still immature, not yet fully expressive of the universality of its intent to unite all men as in a loving family, celebrating their communion with the God who sustains all. Religion as it now exists is often divisive, failing to recognize adequately its central intent: to see the personal character of all reality and foster union among men.[24]

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[23] John Macmurray, Reason and Emotion (2d ed.; London: Faber and Faber, 1966), pp. 213-14.

[24] Ibid., pp. 213-57. Cf. also, "Christianity for the Future," in Religion, Art and Science, pp. 62-78, esp. pp. 71 ff.; and A Challenge to the Churches (London: Kegan Paul, 1941). If Macmurray's estimate of religion's role seems thin, perhaps overly or purely humanistic for severely theological taste, one might appreciate its relevance by matching

The previous cursory sampling of Macmurray's philosophy of religion, not the prime concern of this study, is offered as illustrative of the range of his thought. Religion is significant for him because, of its nature, it is eminently concerned with the personal, a concern which he believes philosophy must in its own way share. What this implies might best be seen by attending to Macmurray's reaction to Kant's critical philosophy which he uses early in his Gifford lectures as the major point of contrast and departure for charting the course of philosophy today, subscribing as he does to the truth that all subsequent philosophies have been built out of the ruins of the critical philosophy.[25]

Macmurray's Criticisms of Kant

The two major criticisms Macmurray entertains toward Kant's critical philosophy concern its coherence and its adequacy. Regarding the latter, he considers Kant's system inadequate because it fails to do justice to the religious aspect of human experience.[26] Having dismissed proofs for God's existence as illusory in his Critique of Pure Reason,

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it with Philip Berrigan's observations in No More Strangers (Techny: Divine Word Publications, 1966), pp. 163-64 and 167-68. Cf. also Bernard Lambert, Ecumenism: Theology and History, trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), p. 506.

[25] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 39.

[26] To cite Macmurray's exact phrasing, "It fails to do justice to that aspect of human experience of which religion is the reflective expression." Ibid., p. 70.

Kant leaves religion to appear as a kind of justifiable mythology, concerned wholly with another life and another world; as a sop to the weakness of human nature or a crutch to aid the feebleness of our all too human wills. Above all Kant insists that religion must never be considered as the ground of morality. It is moral experience which provides the ground of religious belief.[27] Macmurray's concern is Kant's philosophical inadequacy in so slighting religion and the formal intellectual reason for this inadequacy. This Macmurray ascribes to Kant's adoption of the "I think" as the center of reference and starting point of his philosophy; it is this which makes it formally impossible for Kant to do justice to religious experience.

> For thought is inherently private; and any philosophy which takes its stand on the primacy of thought, which defines the Self as the Thinker, is committed formally to an extreme logical individualism. It is necessarily egocentric. Whether it is logically committed to solipsism we need not inquire. It may be so. But the point here is a purely formal one. It is simply that in recognizing the existence of a multiplicity of persons, it must treat them all as identical instances of the "I think," whose differentiation is, for theoretical purposes, accidental. They must be represented as a multiplicity of "I's." But it is a primary fact of experience that for each individual person there is only one "I"--himself. He cannot address another person as "I" but only by means of the second personal pronoun "You." We may restate our criticism by saying, therefore, that any philosophy which takes the "I think" as its first principle, must remain formally a philosophy without a second person; a philosophy which is debarred from thinking the "You and I."[28]

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[27] Ibid. Cf. Clyde A. Holbrook, "The 'Death of God,' American Style," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XXXVI (1968), 123-25.

[28] Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 71-72.

In this reaction to Kant, Macmurray concentrates his principal objection to the procedure of philosophies which follow the Cartesian tradition of starting from the "cogito." Such a method finds it all too easy to ignore the fundamentally societal character of persons. This, in turn, has deleterious effects for human relationships since one's reliance on others and their call upon him is rarely integrated into the reflective system elaborated from the "Cogito," and it offers a major obstacle for theism as evidenced by Durandeaux's struggle at one point in his recent book to puzzle how Descartes' departure is operative in current problems of religious belief.[29] In light of this, it is worth attending to Macmurray's philosophical description of the shape of religious experience and why an egocentric reflective system is bound to clash with it. Though the following observations are directed against Kant, the deficiencies which Macmurray isolates for explanation apply, in his view, to the whole current of Cartesian intellectualism which is confronted with most significant data that it cannot consistently accommodate.[30]

> The form of religious experience involves the distinction between the first and second persons. The idea of "God" is the idea of a universal "Thou" to which all particular persons stand in personal relation. The question of the validity of religious belief is a question of the validity of this form. Consequently, a philosophy which does not formally recognize the distinction between "I" and "You" cannot even formulate the religious problem; and a Critique

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[29] Cf. Durandeaux, op. cit., pp. 121 ff.

[30] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 73. Cf. Wicker, op. cit., pp. 5 and 54 ff.

> of religion is thus rendered impossible. It must substitute for the second person an object which is thought to possess the characters by which we discriminate persons from things. God is then conceived as the supreme object of thought, and the knowledge of God must signify the determination of this object by means of the categories of the understanding. . . . Even if the universalization of the second person as an infinite Thou is invalid, this would not dispose of the problem. We should still have to inquire how the idea, valid or not, actually arises. For the formal distinction between "I" and "you" is not disposed of by the rejection of religion. What is generalized, legitimately or not, in the religious use of the term God, is a matter of empirical experience. It is our experience of personal relationship with one another. If we confine ourselves to the theoretical aspect of this--its aspect as knowledge, the form of the question is "How do I know you?" It is not, "How do I know that other 'I's exist?" The problem, therefore, which underlies any critique of religion is a problem of interpersonal knowledge. We may then reformulate our criticism of the adequacy of the Critical philosophy by saying that it fails to do justice to, and even to allow for the possibility of our knowledge of one another; and this failure arises because its formal conception of knowledge excludes this possibility by postulating the "I think" as the primary presupposition of all experience.[31]

Thus, difficulty in understanding others is connected with difficulty in thinking about God. At the root of both is philosophy's neglect of the interpersonal character of human existence. In Macmurray's opinion both problems are reflected in traditional philosophical method which does not assign personal reality the central role it should enjoy in the formal structure of philosophy, but is preoccupied instead, and particularly since Descartes, with man solely as thinker. In its own way, and doubtlessly unintentionally, this creates an impression of philosophy's approval of man's conception of himself as an isolated atomic unit, sufficient unto himself.[32] From such a position, even if only implicit, it is easy to move toward religious conceptions which assume the self to be engaged in the quest of individual salvation, unsupported by the bounty of one's fellows and not radically obliged to contribute to their progress.[33]

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[31] Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 72-73.

Further specifics as to why Macmurray holds that philosophy's main concern today is the articulation of an adequate way of dealing with personal existence can be appreciated by attending to the second of his major objections to Kant's philosophical system: that it is radically incoherent in its method of relating the theoretical and the practical activities of reason.[34] Most succinctly stated, this flaw in Kant's philosophy lies in the fact that the whole Kantian endeavor constitutes an argument whose conclusion contradicts its major premiss.

> This premiss is the presupposition that reason is primarily theoretical. The conclusion is that reason is primarily practical. This is the general formal incoherence which comes to a head in the attempt to solve the antinomy of freedom.[35]

Macmurray agrees with Kant that philosophy is a means of thinking the unity of human experience as a whole.[36] Ironically, this criterion is the very one by which Kant is judged deficient. As indicated already, he fails to do justice to man's religious experience. That inadequacy is now linked to what Macmurray diagnoses as an incoherence between the underlying premiss and the conclusion of Kant's whole system. Since points of Macmurray's criticism of Kant are of capital importance for understanding Macmurray's own philosophical perspective, portions of his argument merit generous citation, especially when, as do most of the following passages, they touch the province of morality. Even had Macmurray not explicitly devoted considerable exposition to judging Kant's thought as the background of his own, it would have had to be supplied since, as Arno Anzenbacher avers,

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[32] Cf. Wicker, op. cit., pp. 22 ff. on the characteristics of secular philosophy which make it difficult to appreciate the sacred.

[33] Such a theoretical ambient is operative as well in contemporary concern with the problem of belief and unbelief. Cf. Michael Novak, Belief and Unbelief: A Philosophy of Self-Knowledge (New York: New American Library, 1967), p. 24.

[34] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 63.

[35] Ibid., pp. 67-68.

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[36] It is essential to philosophy, Macmurray believes, that a means should be discovered of thinking coherently the unity of experience as a whole. He starts with Kant's work as a point of contrast to his own endeavor not simply because the critical philosophy is a watershed, but also because of the "adequacy" of it. Adequacy is here employed in a technical sense as indicating the range of a philosophy and "the extent to which it succeeds in holding together the various aspects of human experience." Since philosophy after Kant builds on the ruins of the critical philosophy, Macmurray believes that if one can pinpoint where Kant's system foundered, one might find, in the philosophical tradition itself, quite apart from the press of contemporary social concerns, what direction philosophy must take today. Regarding the quest for a pattern to unify the whole of experience, Macmurray comments, "The objection that experience cannot be a totality and so cannot be thought as a unity is beside the point, and Kant himself would surely have treated it with contempt. For no philosopher has ever insisted with greater force that the world we know cannot be a totality; yet none has ever made a more strenuous effort to achieve a systematic adequacy in philosophy by thinking the unity of experience. The unity of experience as a whole is not a unity of knowledge, but a unity of personal activities of which knowledge is only one." Ibid., p. 66.

> Thematically, the I-Thou philosophy originates in transcendental philosophy and can be understood only in relation to it. The dichotomy of existence and objectivity as carried out by Marcel, of existence and Dasein by Jaspers, of person and proper nature by Buber, etc., are intelligible only on the basis of these historical considerations.[37]

Elaborating the second of his major criticisms of Kant, Macmurray writes:

> The incoherence arises in the attempt to relate theory and practice. Now the formal principle upon which the whole critical exposition rests is the "I think"--the transcendental unity of apperception. This signifies that Kant constructs his philosophy on the presupposition that the theoretical is primary. That this is the case is shown, not merely by an analysis of the structure of the Critical philosophy, but by the fact that the problem he bequeathed to his successors is a problem of knowledge, even in the field of morality. Even for moralists who stand closest to Kant, the ethical problem is theoretical; for it takes the form expressed in the question, "How can we discriminate between truth and falsity in ethical statements?" Yet the central conclusion of the Critical philosophy is that reason is primarily practical. To the question, "How can I know that what I do is right?" Kant's answer, strictly expressed, is that I cannot since the objective of moral action is indeterminable. At most I can know how to act rightly. By implication, something similar must be said in the theoretical field. To the question, "How can I know what I should think?" the proper critical answer must be, "You cannot; what you can know is how to think rightly, in conformity with the rules which reason lays down for the employment of the understanding." Yet even Fichte, who thought to start from the primacy of the practical, failed to maintain it, and subordinated the practical to the theoretical. For though he began from the assertion, "In the beginning was the Act," it soon appeared that the "act" is theoretical, and its objective the achievement of a full self-consciousness.[38]

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[37] Arno Anzenbacher, "Thomism and I-Thou Philosophy," Philosophy Today, XI (1967), 240.

[38] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 67.

This explanation of the incoherence in Kant's system is complemented by Macmurray's analysis of how the disharmony between theoretical departure and practical conclusion shows up particularly in Kant's treatment of the antinomy of freedom. The very form in which the question of freedom is cast is determined by Kant's theoretical *point de départ*: how can we *think* freedom?

> How can we determine, theoretically, a world in which we can act freely? The answer is . . . that such a world cannot be determined by thought. Nevertheless, the real world is conceived *in terms of* the world which we *can* determine; but negatively, as a world which does not possess the particular determinateness which makes the world we know determinable; as a world which could be determined by a being not limited, as we are, by the need for a sensuous presentation, but capable of intellectual intuition. Thus the form in which Kant seeks to resolve the antinomy depends upon assuming the primacy of the theoretical standpoint. It is this which makes it necessary to conceive the problem as a relation between two possible objects of knowledge--two worlds--[phenomenal and noumenal] one of which *is* and the other *is not* determinable through our modes of cognition. It is not surprising, therefore--it is indeed inevitable--that the attempt should bring to light the underlying inconsistency and produce a palpable incoherence.[39]

The import of this analysis will be better appreciated by recalling that, in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant concluded to the impossibility of proofs for the existence of God, freedom and immortality and then, when he proceeded to his *Critique of Practical Reason*, claimed that these unverifiables were necessary *presuppositions* for human activity. As Macmurray reads him, what Kant is proposing is that it is only when we turn to consider our practical experience as agents, and not our theoretical experience as thinkers, that we discover the character of reason. That for Kant--and as a philosopher--action is more important than knowledge.[40]

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[39] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

Yet, though Kant concluded that reason was primarily practical, his system treats it as dominantly theoretical. Again, Macmurray's analysis of this issue in terms of particular concerns of the moralist is enlightening:

> The problem of action is set by the antinomy of freedom and determinism. Morality presupposes freedom. Science presupposes determinism. Knowledge is the determination of an object, but this determination is theoretical. If the object can be determined by thought, by a judgement which may be true or false, then it must already be determinate. If it were not determinate, no judgement of ours could be either false or true. Action, however, is the determination of something not in theory but in actual fact. To act is to make something other than it would have been if we had not determined it. In knowing an object we make no difference to it: in acting upon it we do make a difference to it. Now our actions, as events in the world we know, must be as completely determined as everything else. But in action we presuppose that we determine the world by our actions. The correlative of this freedom is that the world which we determine in action must be indeterminate, capable of being given a structure that it does not already possess. We can only know a determinate world; we can only act in an indeterminate world. Therefore, if we really do act, if our freedom of will is not an illusion, the world in which we act must be unknowable.[41]

From this line of reasoning Kant concluded to his doctrine of the thing-in-itself which could never be known, or more widely, to the existence of a real world which we cannot know, behind the phenomenal world which we can. The latter took care of knowledge which requires a world structured and determinate; the former attempted to supply a theoretical framework for free action. He did not wish to say that freedom is an illusion, or, to state the case affirmatively, he wanted to grant that our actions do achieve their goal. To preserve these truths he had to posit the existence of a second world from that which we know, since the world we cognize is fixed, determined quite independently of us. If he were asked how we know that we are free agents, Kant's reply would be that we do not and cannot know. In the moral field we are beyond the limits of knowledge. A morality of duty is the only conceivable outcome of this perspective, for in this style of morality, reason (which is primarily practical) supplies rules for moral action; it acts as legislator issuing laws universally and absolutely binding on all rational beings, but laws which of necessity we cannot understand. Kant could not agree that rational beings act to achieve the good "because the determination of the good as an object in time is necessarily aesthetic: it rests upon an inner conviction which cannot be verified."[42] An aesthetic standard holds the true and the good to be that which satisfies the mind. But it does not define the morally good. Following this Kantian angle of vision

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[40] Ibid., p. 54.

[41] Ibid., pp. 54-55.

> If the good, then, cannot be a determinate object at which we aim, if it is theoretically unknowable, there is no way in which we can determine the rule of right action as a means to the good. However far science may advance, knowledge brings us no nearer to an

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[42] Ibid., p. 55 (italics his). Cf. Hampshire, op. cit., pp. 244 ff.

> empirical determination of what we ought to do. We can determine rules of prudence through knowledge, and improve them as our knowledge improves. But even if they were certain, as they never can be, they would only determine the means to satisfy our inclinations, and these of course vary from one man to another, and from time to time. The rules of moral action must be rules for achieving an end which we cannot theoretically determine. How is this possible? Only by acting in conformity to a law which is determined for us by reason.[43]

Hence our reason, which is practical, issues rules for thinking and rules for moral action. Here Kant stops. Having lead us through an elaborate system which begins from the "I think" and which sustains the perspective that reason is theoretical, Kant leaves us with the final and revolutionary conclusion that reason is practical.

It is Macmurray's conviction that both his major criticisms of Kant, the incoherence and inadequacy of the critical philosophy, have a common root. In exposing it, he offers at the same time some of his basic reasons for the new turn philosophy must take. The source of the major shortcomings of Kant's system is its starting point: the "cogito," which indicates

> that any philosophy which takes the "Cogito" as its starting point and centre of reference institutes a formal dualism of theory and practice; and that this dualism makes it formally impossible to give any account, and indeed to conceive the possibility of persons in relation, whether the relation be theoretical--as knowledge, or practical--as cooperation. For thought is essentially private. Formally, it is the contrary of action; excluding any causal operation upon the object which is known through its activity, that is to say, upon the Real. If we make the "I think" the primary postulate of philosophy, then not merely do we institute a dualism

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[43] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 56.

> between theoretical and practical experience, but we make action logically inconceivable--a mystery, as Kant so rightly concludes, in which we necessarily believe, but which we can never comprehend. However far we carry the process of thought it can never become an action or spontaneously generate an action. We may formulate the dualism in different ways, as a dualism of mind and body, of mind and matter, of theory and practice, of appearance and reality, of subjective and objective, of phenomenal and noumenal worlds, but we can never abolish it. Consequently I can never know another person, since thinking about another person can never amount to personal knowledge of him, nor even to personal acquaintance.[44]

From this reading of Kant, Macmurray concludes that philosophy must take up where that giant left off. It must begin with Kant's conclusion that reason is primarily practical. Like Kant, the philosopher today must seek a philosophical form or unity pattern which will exhibit the unity of human experience as a whole in all its general aspects both theoretical and practical. What is equally significant, philosophy must learn to make its reflections from a practical, not a theoretical standpoint. That procedure might shield philosophy (and religious reflection in so far as it is dependent on philosophy) from the egocentrism and individualism attendant on holding to the primacy of theoretical reason.[45]

Macmurray on the Nature of Philosophy

With the aid of such inferences from Kantian method, Macmurray elaborates his own conception of philosophy which the following pages attempt to summarize. What he says of the nature and role of philosophy is of particular concern to the ethicist since, as the previous pages have stressed, he assigns reason a practical role, a standpoint which links him with the great ethical thinkers of the aristotelian-thomist tradition who (in their ethical treatises, if not all their works) emphasize this function of reason.[46] Hence, by mentally substituting "moral theory" for philosophy or "ethicist" for philosopher in the pages immediately following, while that equation might sometimes constitute an over-simplification, one might readily catch the relevance of most of Macmurray's remarks as methodological indicatives for the new moral theologian.

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[44] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[45] Cf. Daniel O'Connor, "John Macmurray: Primacy of the Personal," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, IV (1964), 473.

The point has been made that a Christian ethic cannot do without a human ethic and that the latter involves the uses of philosophy. To this may be joined another point mentioned earlier that the philosophy employed, among other qualifications, cannot be one which caters to the mythic conception of oneself as a totally independent individual. Though the following pages seem remote from the concerns of Christian ethics, it should be recalled that even if the Christian ethicist be one who fails to appreciate fully the importance of philosophy to his endeavor, he cannot escape the influence, at least, of the contemporaneous philosophical mood. Hence it is not at all surprising to find religion and Christian activity described, contrary to the New Testament, as sheerly individualistic pursuits when philosophy for its part assumes, expands and purveys comparable misconceptions from its quarter. During the nineteenth century, for example (to use the favorite whipping boy of intellectual history) individualistic thinking reached such a pass that a theory could seriously be proffered claiming that society came into being through a decision of free individuals. At the same time, manuals of moral theology, without any reference to man's social being, claimed that the first self-evident principles of the theoretical intellect and the first principles of morality were given to the individual.[47] Alluding to more recent manuals (Prummer's and Merkelbach's), as well as to conventional conversation about moral matters, Van Der Marck notes that in both arenas intersubjectivity is ignored or only peripherally acknowledged instead of being pursued as pivotal.[48] Bearing such practical consequences in mind, the following pages will appear less remote from the purpose of moral theology.[49] Since perspectives, ethical and philosophical, are of supreme importance they rightly command prolonged attention.[50] As Michael Polanyi says, "Our vision of the general nature of things is our guide for the interpretation of all future experience. Such guidance is indispensable."[51]

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[46] Cf. John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 246 ff. and 267 ff.; Gilby, op. cit., pp. 127 ff., 169 ff.

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[47] Kwant, op. cit., p. 1. In his recent work on Freud, Rieff writes, "Consider the theory that has dominated our understanding of relations between man and society since at least the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In the sociological tradition, the self is society individualized. The smallest unity of scientific analysis is the individualized social self. Freud did not abandon this position, which dominates all the social sciences. Nevertheless, by concentrating on all the painful vicissitudes of socialization, which begins for every human being by virtue of his birth into a family, Freud has opened the way to a revival of romantic theorizing about that polite fiction of our historic Western binge of inwardness, the socialized individual self." Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: The Uses of Faith after Freud (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 203-204. Cf. also Wicker, op. cit., pp. 45-46 on Locke, and Murray, We Hold These Truths, pp. 310-11.

[48] Van Der Marck, Toward a Christian Ethic, pp. 49-50.

Both his view of philosophy and its central concern (the form of the personal) are capsulized in the simplest formulation Macmurray can find for his thesis: "All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action is for the sake of friendship."[52] Here action, practice, experience are given primacy over reflection or theory. Action is further specified by friendship, the realization of personal mutuality, as its goal. Attending to the first of these points--the primacy of action over reflection--will serve to indicate Macmurray's view of philosophy.

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[49] It should also be noted that Macmurray, a personalist philosopher long concerned with social and religious questions, sees only an accidental difference between theology and philosophy. This distinction he believes has its roots in history; and the two disciplines will eventually be reunited when the historical factors which caused their separation have been removed. Cf. Religion, Art and Science, pp. 71 ff.--John Macquarrie observes, "The emergence of a powerful school of existentialist theology, springing from the side of kerygmatic theology itself, gives reason to hope that the divorce between theology and philosophy is ending, and that fruitful relations are being resumed, though no doubt on a different basis from before," Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p. 256. While not equivalent to Macmurray's view of the essential homogeneity of philosophy and theology, Macquarrie's point is interesting as a parallel.

[50] On all the points mentioned in the last two paragraphs, see Chapter IV of this study, especially notes 1 to 7.

[51] Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 135.

[52] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 15.

It is not difficult to appreciate that all human activities involve an interplay between thought and action, that characteristically man solves practical problems by taking thought and that, at least in their origins, his theoretical activities stem from practical requirements. What commands less general assent is that man's theoretical activities also find their meaning and significance in the practical. One of Macmurray's major theses is: "The truth or falsity of the theoretical is to be found solely in its reference to the practical."[53] Hence, theoretical activities not only originate (ultimately) in practical experience, but find their meaning there as well. This does not mean that the reference of theoretical to practical activities is always direct or obvious, nor that reflection can or should always be weighted by reference to the practical. Neither does it justify a pragmatic theory of truth. As Macmurray observes,

> The disinterested pursuit of truth may be, and, I am convinced, is in fact, a condition of the practical efficacy of reflection. The inner life of the spirit is not merely technological: it is not condemned to a servitude to practical ends which are set for it

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[53] Ibid., p. 22.

> without its knowledge or consent. The essential reference of theoretical to practical activities does not involve the control of theory by practice. It consists even more significantly in the control of practice by theory.[54]

As Harris notes, this is the keynote of Macmurray's doctrine. For in his view, action is what persons do and what makes them persons is their capacity to know what they are about. Their activity is characterized and determined by their knowledge. Activity independent of knowledge is not action, but either mere physical event (e.g., an apple falling from a tree) or organic process. Action is possible only for persons and they are primarily and essentially agents. Consequently, any theory of knowledge must proceed from the standpoint of action and the agent, not from that of reflection and the subject.[55]

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[54] *Ibid.*, p. 23. By way of application of Macmurray's view, cf. Stuart Hampshire's remarks: "Moral instruction . . . is not so much a strengthening of the will, and an appeal to principle, but rather a habituation that turns a man's interests and intelligence in the right direction, leaving him with a true, but perhaps unstated, conception of what human life should be like. By reference to this habit of exact discrimination he assesses every situation before him. . . . A man's interests direct his perceptions, and his perceptions pick out the facts that are relevant to his interests." "I therefore try to ensure, by reflection, that the terms in which I present possibilities of action to myself are terms that I have myself freely chosen and confirmed as the appropriate ones, and that they have not been . . . imposed on me without my actively questioning them. The choice implies that I am constantly reviewing alternative conventions of thought, and that I am always open to the suggestion of new possibilities of classification." Hampshire, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-13, 214.

[55] Harris, *loc. cit.*, p. 451. As will be clear from subsequent exposition of Macmurray's thought, this is not to deny that the enterprise of philosophizing is itself theoretical and reflective.

In discussing the necessary relation of theory to practice, Macmurray wishes to stress that the former cannot be totally unrelated to the latter and that it is always legitimate to ask, of any theory which claims to be true, what practical difference it would make if we believed it. "It may often be difficult to answer this question; but if the correct answer were that it would make no difference at all, then the theory would be a mere exercise of phantasy, neither true nor false, but meaningless."[56]

Philosophy is a theoretical activity in which the application to the practical is often indirect and remote throughout, and has to be lest it obsess and thus hamper the thinker. "But it is also in philosophy that the ultimate reference of theory to practice is most decisive and far-reaching."[57] This is especially so when it challenges our habitually provincial horizon. As Stuart Hampshire says,

> The criticism of the narrow limits of a man's habits of thought, the suggestion to him of other ways of classifying feelings or persons, may not be directly related to any specific actions of his. Yet such suggestions may still fall within the domain that is naturally called the domain of morals.[58]

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[56] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 23; cf. also p. 221.

[57] Ibid., p. 23. "Every literate man can be said to have an ontology, if this means that every man, who is capable of stating the intentions behind his overt behaviour, has a range of reference, more or less limited, to the entities that would sometimes enter into his practical intentions," Hampshire, op. cit., p. 205; cf. also p. 149 on the "penumbra of a larger intention."

[58] Ibid., p. 208.

For such change of thought opens the way to exploration of new possibilities and attempts for new discriminations in ordinary actions, and for relating one action to another in a form of life.

Since philosophy is related to action and action is inherently particular, the question that philosophy poses is inevitably involved in historic reference. It is so in a twofold way. Within the discipline of philosophy itself there is accretion of theory and reaction to previous philosophical theory. As a consequence, full understanding of a philosophical theory demands understanding in some degree the practical history of the era of its origin.[59] Philosophy is historic in a second sense in that it is itself part of social process, it responds to new situations,[60] transformations in society, whence it takes ever fresh starting points for reflection. In an unsystematic way a reflective person does this as he lives within an era, so that it might be truer to life and to the nature of philosophy to hold that any way of life implies a philosophy, rather than saying that a philosophy is a way of life. While this view has the advantage of meshing philosophy with life, it remains true that philosophy is a reflective exercise and hence its formulations, like all reflection, necessarily lag behind experience. Though this hiatus is unavoidable, what can be tended to are the questions which philosophy as a discipline poses to itself. For

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[59] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 24.

[60] As Randall, op. cit., p. 295, remarks after underscoring the importance of Aristotle's formalism, "Formalism is the easiest beginning for any intellectual movement, as it is also the natural ending, when thinking has become institutionalized, and as we say 'academic'--that is, specialized, divorced from any concrete subject matter or any living issue. This occurs when the problems themselves are inherited, as well as the intellectual tools and methods: in the West, the classic example is fourteenth- and fifteenth-century terminism, as well as our own twentieth-century formalisms."

> philosophy aims at a complete rationality. But the rationality of our conclusions does not depend alone upon the correctness of our thinking. It depends even more upon the propriety of the questions with which we concern ourselves. The primary and critical task is the discovery of the problem. If we ask the wrong question the logical correctness of our answer is of little consequence.[61]

It is the press of this issue which moves contemporaries to break with tradition in so many areas in our society--in religion, morals, politics, economics and the arts.[62] Such developments as phenomenology, logical empiricism and existentialism manifest new modes of philosophy which sever conscious continuity with philosophical tradition in an effort to respond to current experience of life rather than neglect current crises in favor of neat consistent maintenance of previously elaborated philosophical systems.

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[61] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 21.

[62] Ibid., p. 26. Cf. Hampshire, op. cit., pp. 237-38, "An abstract ethics that gives a list of the essential virtues and of the powers exercised in them, is empty and almost meaningless without the details of behaviour and expression in which the changing ideals of justice, friendship, knowledge, and social usefulness are, and have been, incorporated. As the only aesthetic theory that can now be critical and enlightening is at the same time a history of changing ideals of art that points a way to the future, so the only critical ethics is a story of ideals of human excellence that at the same time points a way to the future of these ideals. It is unreasonable to reject all metaphysical deductions of the virtues, and to insist on the facts of conventional forms of appraisal in ordinary speech, without also tracing the historical development behind these facts."

In Macmurray's view existentialism and logical empiricism represent opposite and inadequate reactions to the breakdown of philosophical tradition.

> Both rest upon the decision that the traditional method of philosophy is incapable of solving its traditional problems. But whereas the logical empiricists discard the problems in order to maintain the method, the existentialists relinquish the method in wrestling with the problems. So the latter achieve a minimum of form; the former a minimum of substance. The logical empiricists are content to elaborate the subtleties of formal analysis. . . . The existentialists, determined to grapple with the real problems--and their sensitiveness to the darkness of human despair leads them to discover the emergent problem of our time--find no formal analysis that is adequate to the task. They are constrained to quit the beaten track; to wallow in metaphor and suggestion . . . , albeit an aesthetic expression, for their discoveries.[63]

While Macmurray agrees that philosophers cannot merely keep to the old ways he is not satisfied with the major philosophical modes currently proffered as substitutes. Phenomenology is a method, sometimes useful, but still simply a device, and philosophy must retain both form and content.[64] The latter concerns serious problems created and defined by the nature of human experience. Any method which slights these weighty matters to devote itself solely to method cannot be adequate as a new philosophy for it dwells at the peripheries, ignoring crucial problems. For this reason logical empiricism is inadequate as well, despite the benefit of its warnings to use language carefully.[65] It tends to become so preoccupied with method as to find itself in the position of seeking problems which its method could solve, rather than wrestling with those problems which need solving.[66] In a roughly parallel way, one is reminded of moralists who deal with problems which admit of some solution instead of seeking aid for the hurt at the root of questions people are asking. /

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[63] Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 27-28.

[64] As Richard T. Murphy observes, "Philosophy itself depends upon insights and commitments which may be, if not strictly non-philosophical, pre-philosophical. . . . Principles of method contain strictly metaphysical implications and presuppositions and . . . consequently, a purely phenomenological description cannot constitute by itself an adequate method of philosophic inquiry. Phenomenological

Existentialism, while it rightly sees the center of gravity of philosophical issues in personal experience, fails to appreciate the necessity for philosophy, as an intellectual enterprise, to seek clarity and exact definition.[67] One might add, that a philosophical approach which leaves us mired in absurdity, as some varieties of existentialism

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description, in our opinion, must culminate in a strictly metaphysical reflection." "A Metaphysical Critique of Method: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty," in The Quest for the Absolute, ed. Frederick J. Adelmann (Boston: Boston College, 1966), p. 175.

[65] Cf. Hampshire, op. cit., pp. 243, 245-46.

[66] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 28.

[67] Cf. Murray, The Problem of God, pp. 102 ff. and 118 where the technique of the philosopher as godless man of the Theater is described.

do, hardly assists its public who, presuming they are interested enough to pursue philosophy are probably equally alive to the haze of absurdity which clouds human existence. To inform such a public that the absurdity they sense is more pervasive than they had believed and to let that stand as the conclusion to one's intellectual probing of experience is of dubious assistance practically and perhaps indicative of lack of thoroughness in delving the polyvalent character of human experience.[68]

Macmurray's concluding estimate of existentialism and logical positivism can be given in a sentence,

> even though, like all such judgements, it must need qualification in detail. Existentialism has discovered, with sensitiveness of feeling, that the philosophical problem of the present lies in the crisis of the personal: logical empiricism recognizes it as a

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[68] "Modern man does not need to be told about the ambiguity of ethics. That point has been brought home convincingly enough (cf. Simone de Beauvoir). Perhaps there are still a sheltered few who can speak of the moral law as a catalogue of absolute principles. For most, however, the relativity of all commandments has become virtually a dogma. Christian theology will accept the idea of relativity not chiefly on cultural-historical grounds but because of its own idea of agape that came to expression in Jesus' relation to the law. The answer to the ambiguity of ethics is not, however, the exhortation of existentialism to have courage to live with a bad conscience. The answer is rather like Tillich's idea of a 'transmoral conscience.' The point beyond morality, however, should not be an abstract, unfocused reference to the divine grace or the 'ground and power of being,' but instead to the concrete personal appearance of Jesus of Nazareth as Lord and Savior. The moral conscience is transcended by the absolute loyalty of a person to Jesus Christ as Lord." Carl E. Braaten, "The Lordship of Christ in Modern Theology," Dialog, IV (1965), 267. For a caricature of theologies fascinated with angst and an indication that theology's "existential encounter" seems on the wane, cf. Harvey Cox, On Not Leaving it to the Snake (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 17.

> crisis of logical form and method. Both are correct, and both are one-sided. The cultural crisis of the present is indeed a crisis of the personal. But the problem it presents to philosophy is a formal one. It is to discover or to construct the intellectual form of the personal.[69]

What he means by "the intellectual form of the personal" requires some explanation. Basically it designates a unity-pattern, a paradigm, a conceptual category which philosophy can employ to capture as best it can, as well as to explore, the world of persons. Hence, the intellectual form of the personal is his way of defining what philosophy should examine (the world as personal) and how it should, or has to, go about doing so (through the use of an intellectual form or probe). Since he believes philosophy should aim at precision, it needs such an intellectual, logical form or unity-pattern as a tool. He sees as the two outstanding unity patterns employed by past philosophy: (1) the form of the material, or the substance or mathematical unity-pattern, and (2) the form of the live organism, or the organic unity-pattern.[70] Both are inadequate in in their ability to include and do justice to personal reality. For illustrative purposes, the inadequacyof the mathematical unity-pattern can be indicated briefly. If a philosopher chooses this as his basic category for referring to reality he will succeed in unifying or grouping some aspects of the world under its cover, but will leave some most important data unclassified. Add to this the consideration that the philosopher is proceeding from a theoretical point of view (the "cogito") and it is easy to see how he will split reality in two, matter--which is covered by his mathematical unity pattern, and mind which eludes that pattern. He ends up with a dualism, while failing to do justice to the realm of the personal since he attempts to conceive the Self on the analogy of the material world.[71] While he admits that modern existentialism is perceptive in its insights regarding personal reality, Macmurray thinks it lacks the intellectual rigor and definiteness philosophy should have--what past philosophies achieved through use of some logical form (or unity-pattern) for synthesizing the whole of experience. Though past unity-patterns were deficient, what philosophy was attempting to achieve through them is still part of its task. For this reason Macmurray classifies existentialism with the schools which have discarded form in

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[69] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 29. For an analysis of Macmurray's division of European philosophies into those which retained the form but no substance, and vice versa, cf. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, pp. 255-57.

[70] Cf. Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 33 ff. and 94 ff.; O'Connor, loc. cit., pp. 465 ff; and, Ora R. McManus, "The Concept of the Personal in the Writings of John Macmurray" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., 1967), pp. 38 ff.--As O'Connor notes (p. 465, n. 3), explicating Macmurray's thought, "the term (substance) is taken here in its typical seventeenth-century sense in which self-sufficiency and independence were stressed. Aristotle's term (which we translate as 'substance'), since it stresses the dynamic and teleological, would be closer to what Macmurray calls 'organism.' " Macmurray's criticism

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of the organic unity-pattern is omitted here both because it eludes summation and would unduly delay the approach to those aspects of Macmurray's thought deemed relevant to this study.

[71] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 33.

order to maintain the substance of philosophy's traditional problems.[72] Hence he seeks an intellectual form of the personal, one which will avoid the meanderings and primarily suggestive, rather than definitive technique of existentialism, and yet one which will be elastic and capacious enough to capture, as much as reflection can, what is true of personal experience, neglected in past philosophies generally, despite the admirably disciplined way in which they synthesized aspects of reality through unity-patterns which proved inadequate for reflection about persons and their experience.

The unity pattern which Macmurray employs is what he calls the "form of the personal," which is not a definition and does not yield a philosophical system, but is rather a point of view whose validity can only be demonstrated by using it to examine problems with which philosophy must deal.[73] To pursue the form of the personal as one's philosophical unity-pattern involves two requirements: first,

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[72] Responding to this categorization of existentialism, Macquarrie writes, "But while it is true that the existentialists derive some of their leading insights not from reason but from such states of mind as are found in the 'limit-situations' of anxiety, guilt and death, we must beware of exaggeration, and remember that the earlier Heidegger made a careful formal analysis of the structures of human existence, while Jaspers has come to lay increasing stress on the place of reason." Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p. 256.

[73] "Unlike many of my contemporaries," Macmurray writes, "I have no objection to system-building; I consider it, indeed, in its proper place, a necessary part of the philosophical enterprise. Most systems of philosophy, indeed, are the product not of the genius of the original thinkers to whom they are ascribed, but of the industry of their commentators. But there are system builders among the great philosophers. Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel are examples. Their function is to give a definitive and systematic expression to a process of thought which has

> The Self must be conceived, not theoretically as subject, but practically, as agent. Secondly, human behaviour is comprehensible only in terms of a dynamic social reference; the isolated, purely individual self is a fiction. In philosophy this means . . . that the unity of the personal cannot be thought as the form of an individual self, but only through the mutuality of personal relationship.[74]

Adhesion to these two guiding requirements affords a logical representation of the fact that reflection is grounded in immediate experience, primary knowledge, and that the primary knowledge we have is of other persons.[75] Macmurray's epistemology, which will be discussed shortly, is summed up in the expression "the primacy of the practical," a phrase which dramatically accentuates his basic thesis that the Self as thinker is dependent on the Self as doer. Further, as will subsequently be elaborated, the Self as doer is dependent on other persons.

In attempting to overcome dualisms by thinking from the standpoint of action (understanding that for Macmurray action is distinctive

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been unfolding itself over a period of history. At the beginning of such processes stand the pioneers, thinkers like Pythagoras or Descartes, whose function it is to reject current presuppositions and to establish a new point of view, with new assumptions. The process itself, which unites these two extremes, consists in the gradual discovery of the implications and consequences of the new point of view. The present work is a pioneering venture. It seeks to establish a point of view. Its purpose, therefore, is formal and logical--to construct and to illustrate in application the form of the personal." Self as Agent, pp. 12-13.

[74] Ibid., p. 38.

[75] Cf. Robert O. Johann, "The Return to Experience," The Review of Metaphysics, XVII (1964), 319-39.

of persons), he hopes to elaborate a reflective form of the personal which will adequately mirror human experience. In doing this he frequently has recourse to the terms "negative" and "positive" as labels for polarities of human experience. For example, he will say that the Self in reflection is the negative of the Self as agent, or that the negative mode of doing is thinking.[76] He uses them to describe motivational responses between persons as well. Repetition of these terms can suggest a mathematical approach to reality, or a dualistic one, both of which he strenuously rejects.[77] However, even his critical reader realizes that whether or not Macmurray worries too much about an adequate logical form to represent the personal, and even if he has not chosen the happiest pair of terms to describe polarities of personal experience, what counts are his philosophical insights into the reality and interrelation of persons.[78]

After showing how philosophy has neglected the personal and its need to concentrate on it now, Macmurray attends to various aspects of human existence, action for example, to demonstrate what differences emerge when these are conceived from the standpoint of the Self as doer instead of thinker. What usually becomes apparent is that an adequate explanation cannot be given of any aspect of personal existence so long as the Self is considered in isolation and from the theoretical point of view. This endeavor takes up most of Macmurray's, The Self as Agent. In the companion volume the inadequacies of considering the Self atomistically are supplied with their needed correctives by consideration of Persons in Relation.

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[76] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 132.

[77] Cf. D. D. Raphael, "Critical Study," (an article/review of The Self as Agent), The Philosophical Quarterly, IX (1959), 267-77.

[78] In his study of Macmurray's "form of the personal," Ora McManus, op. cit., p. 255, notes that "the term 'positive' really stands for the ontological category of mutuality, and the term 'negative' stands for the capacity of the self to abstract from this full personal situation and to reflect upon its experience. He combines these two characteristics of the personal with his understanding of the purpose of reason, that is, reflection for the sake of the practical, and finds in this general activity the distinguishing pattern of the personal life."

The remainder of this chapter will deal with Macmurray's insistence on the realm of experience as the locus of reality, since the heart of his philosophy lies in his contention that no reflective knowledge is meaningful unless it can be verified by experience, and that all knowledge is for the sake of action. This moves the principle of realism from the private to the public forum and lays the groundwork for a realistic philosophy of the personal, for ultimately it is the experience of people that determines the correctness of a speculative formulation.[79]

The Primacy of Experience

"The question of man," Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote, "lies hidden in epistemology."[80] In Macmurray's epistemology, immediate experience is of primary importance, a fact which follows from his understanding of philosophy's purpose, which is to reflect the unity of immediate experience and to express it in words. Obviously one cannot hope to succeed in this for, to use Macmurray's terms, no unity-pattern can reproduce wholly the unity of immediate experience. Difficult as the task is, however, it at least sets one in the right direction, the field of investigation, even though all one can attempt to do in focusing on immediate experience is to arrange reflective symbols in a relational pattern, hoping in this way to mirror the concrete activity of immediate life.

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[79] Cf. McManus, op. cit., p. 208; and John Henry Newman, Grammar of Assent (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., Image Books, 1955), ch. 9, pp. 270-99.

[80] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, trans. Bernard Noble (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 15.

To clarify the purpose of investigating Macmurray's reflections on immediate experience in this section, their relevance to his thought can be stated from the start. A person thinks, not a disembodied mind. But a person can be and become a person only in communion with other persons. "Only in relation to other persons does that capacity for personal response, which is what makes me a person, have any meaning. Other persons, however, are available not in the realm of thought, but only in the realm of action and direct experience, only, indeed, in the realm of everyday."[81] Hence, since concern with personal reality carries the concomitant necessity of considering the field of immediate experience, the latter demands attention.

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[81] Johann, *loc. cit.*, p. 321, where Johann reflects on Macmurray's central thesis.

Immediate experience is inexpressible, impossible to define or describe since it is by definition experience which has not been thought about. It is, therefore, a presupposition of our thinking, not something that can be an element in our thought. Knowledge is not the result of thinking, nor, equivalently, is retreat into the purely speculative the means of knowing the world. Rather, Macmurray's general principle is, "All thought presupposes knowledge,"[82] and knowledge is ours in immediate experience of living. Thought or reflective experience (Macmurray uses these phrases interchangeably) captures only aspects of what is known in our action. But immediate experience is a unity; in it there are no parts.

> Nothing in it is really separate from anything else. Its parts . . . flow into one another and belong together. Its aspect as knowledge, for instance, is not a separable part of it. It is unified with and coextensive with feeling and action. It is our consciousness in living rather than our consciousness of living. In immediate experience we know anything by being interested in it, by desiring it, by loving or hating it, and above all, by doing things with it. . . . These basic aspects of experience--cognition, conation and feeling--are fused into a single whole in the living experience.[83]

The "whence" of all our knowledge, of the truth of our judgments, is the realm of immediate experience. What we can express about this realm (which includes our emotive response to reality) by way of thought is limited, partial and incomplete. Thought is not self-contained but filters our partialities from, and seeks its verification beyond itself in lived experience. Verification is primarily a return from thought to action, "in order to find in the immediate experience of concrete activity a justification for accepting the conclusions which have been reached through the manipulation of ideas in the thought-process."[84] Thought alone cannot guarantee its own conclusions. "If we limit the term knowledge," Macmurray writes, "to that 'logical certainty' which is the result of theoretical demonstration, we should have to confess that there is not and cannot be knowledge, and so relapse into a complete scepticism."[85] Commenting on Macmurray's conception of verification McManus observes:

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[82] John Macmurray, Interpreting the Universe (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), p. 15. As Bernard Lonergan says, "The business of the human mind in this life seems to be, not contemplation of what we know, but relentless devotion to the task of adding increments to a merely habitual knowledge." Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 278.

[83] Macmurray, Interpreting the Universe, p. 22.

> To test the conclusions of thought experiments must be performed. Although the failure of the experiment disproves the truth of the theory, its success, according to Macmurray, does not prove the truth of anything. At one moment it looks as though Macmurray is exceeding the logical positivists in demanding verification for every conclusion, but when verification seems to have taken place he refuses to accept it. But this is in keeping with his belief that generalization is a primary source of error. He argues that if you accept a theory because it has been verified with an experiment, a generalization is made which itself requires testing. It would imply the assumption that success would always ensue on the performing of the given experiment. But such a conclusion cannot be guaranteed.[86]

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[84] Ibid., p. 74.

[85] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 168.

[86] McManus, op. cit., p. 35. Scientists today, if Michael Polanyi be taken as representative, agree that physical theory is based on assumptions and that "objective experience cannot compel a decision

At the heart of Macmurray's epistemology is the view that neither thought nor experiment can guarantee truth. If a guarantee is at all possible it belongs to immediate experience to provide it for a guarantee cannot be the result of reflective activity.

> What then is the purpose of verification? It provides a link between thought and action and therefore a basis for rational belief in the conclusion. It is reasonable to accept a theory when the evidence in its favor is greater than the contrary evidence. No theory, however, can withstand the evidence of immediate experience.[87]

This applies not simply to scientific theory, but to all thought, philosophical and religious as well. Extended to these latter, verification consists in the satisfactoriness of the life experience it helps to produce. As Macmurray puts it:

> Religious doctrines are as problematic as scientific theories and require like them a constant revision and a continual verification in action. Their verification differs in this, that it cannot be experimental, since they are not merely pragmatic; they can be verified only by persons who are prepared to commit themselves intentionally to the way of life which they prescribe.[88]

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either between the magical and the natural interpretation of daily life or between the scientific and the theological interpretation of nature; it may favour one or the other, but the decision can be found only by a process of arbitration in which alternative forms of mental satisfaction will be weighed in the balance," Michael Polanyi, Science Faith and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 28. The limits of verification by scientific experimentation were also underlined in J. Bronowski's address to the 16th annual convention of the National Science Teachers Association in Washington, D.C. (March 29-April 2, 1968).

[87] McManus, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

[88] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 223.

For the genuinely religious man, then, recourse to experience would mean that the world is not something thought, but something he lives.[89]

Immediate experience, which can only be approached by indirection, description and contrast with reflective experience, besides including that which can be expressed in thought, is also emotive and allied to the infinite.[90] To take the latter point first, for Macmurray the unity or wholeness of immediate experience and the meaning of its "infinity" are closely related concepts. In the act of living, in which all aspects of living, action, feeling and awareness are fused, the unity or wholeness of immediate experience becomes evident. Varied powers coalesce in this single unified action. Though aware of these varied dimensions of action we cannot fully express them, for we could only do so through reflection which is, from the start, incapable of fully explicating the wholeness of action. Nonetheless, from an appreciation of the completeness of immediate experience there does arise the idea of describing it as infinity.

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[89] Cf. Durandeaux, *op. cit.*, p. 141. "To exempt oneself," writes Durandeaux, "from a given form of criticism means to refuse to try to make a practice a serious matter. Paraphrasing Francis Jeanson in support of my main contention, I maintain that there is no such thing as a select Christian practice distinct from pagan practices; all there are are human practices of lesser and greater degrees of isolation, all of which claim to possess concretized and deified values and ideals. There is a practice which is simultaneously a requirement; it exists and does not exist, it must be created and is struggling every day to materialize, that is, it is struggling to produce a man who is not the mystified product of his own making," pp. 139-40. The exact words of Jeanson are quoted on pp. 158-59, n. 64: "There is no such thing as a Christian ethics, distinct from human ethics. There are human ethics of lesser and greater degrees of isolation, all of which claim to possess concretized and deified values and ideals. There is an ethics which is simultaneously a requirement; it exists and does not exist, it must be created and is struggling to produce a man who is not the mystified man of his own products."

[90] Macmurray's distinction between immediate experience (=primary knowledge) and reflective experience (=thought), is paralleled, in large part, by Polanyi's distinction between tacit knowing and explicit knowing. Polanyi writes: "Things of which we are focally aware can be explicitly identified; but no knowledge can be *wholly explicit*. . . . Tacit knowing is more fundamental than explicit knowing: *we can know more than we can tell and we can tell nothing without relying on our awareness of things we may not be able to tell.* Things which we can tell, we know by observing them; those that we cannot tell, we know by dwelling in them. All understanding is based on our dwelling in the particulars of that which we comprehend; it is Heidegger's *being-in-the-world*. Indwelling is also the instrument by which comprehensive entities are known throughout the world. . . . Our growing familiarity with ubiquitous indwelling brings about the unquestioning acceptance of the paradox that all knowledge is ultimately personal." Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, pp. x-xi. Cf. also Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967), p. 19.

> The term is, of course, a negative term, because it is the reflective expression of something which cannot be given in reflection. The thing itself is more positive than anything else we know. It is in a special sense "the real." It is simply that something which is the same in all immediate experience, which includes it all, in which all determination and difference appears and to which everything belongs. It is only through the inadequacy of reflection that the infinite seems to be beyond everything that we can think or do, so that it seems to be the result of adding more and more until we are breathless with the effort. The infinite is the universe in immediate experience. It is given always and everywhere in the finite.[91]

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[91] Macmurray, Interpreting the Universe, p. 33. As McManus indicates, this work of Macmurray's is chiefly epistemological. What he designates as "immediate experience" in this work, he calls primary knowledge in his later writings. By primary knowledge, he means, as will be explained more fully later, knowledge experienced in action. Since he considers action as distinctly personal, and the personal life distinguished by mutuality with other persons, the primary knowledge we have is of other persons. The life of friendship is our chief source of significant knowledge. Our surest knowledge is personal knowledge, all other kinds of knowledge being derivatives of it. Cf. McManus, op. cit., pp. 184, 200. For a summary of Macmurray's position regarding primary knowledge, cf. Self as Agent, pp. 128 ff.

As Augustine said long ago, God is nearer, more related to us, and therefore more easily known by us, than sensible corporeal things.[92] "The infinite is . . . given always and everywhere in the finite," the path to whatever the self is seeking: to insight, beauty--God--is the narrow and direct path straight through our human realities, through our labor, our disappointments, our friends, our game legs, our harvests, our subjection to time.[93] Thus, Macmurray's view of the infinite in immediate experience is relevant to a true spirituality,[94] and to current discussion of the experience of God's presence or absence.[95] It is possible that failure to experience the Transcendent may be due to an Apollonian imagination--a Cartesian facile intellectualism that thinks form can be given from the top of the head alone, without contact with the particularities of immediate experience.[96] Macmurray's stress on this realm is especially necessary when men are too quick to pronounce God dead, forgetful that God, as Mies van der Rohe said, is in the details.

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[92] Cf. De genesi ad litteram l. v. c. 16. In an evocatively similar vein, W. H. Auden writes, "I am sure it is everyone's experience, as it has been mine, that any 'discovery' we make about ourselves or the meaning of life is never, like a scientific discovery, a coming upon something entirely new and unsuspected: it is rather, the coming to conscious recognition of something which we really knew all the time, but, because we were unwilling or unable to formulate it correctly, we did not hitherto know we knew. . . . To all experiences, other than purely sensory ones, the maxim credo ut intelligam applies." Auden's preface to Dag Hammarskjöld's Markings (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. xiii.

[93] Cf. William F. Lynch, Christ and Apollo: the Dimensions of the Literary Imagination (New York: New American Library, 1963), p. 23.

[94] As Vladimir Solovyev says, "A false spirituality is a denial of the flesh; true spirituality is the regeneration of the flesh, the rescue of it, the resurrection from the dead," The Meaning of Love, trans. Jane Marshall (New York: International Universities Press, 1947), p. 55.

[95] Cf. Frederick Copleston, "Man, Transcendence and the Absence of God," Thought, XLIII (1968), 32. Dewart suggests as a fundamental principle of ethics, "that the moral self-fulfillment of man is intrinsically connected with his ontological self-realization rather than with his affective reaction to reality as an object set off from him. The ontological perfection

Since thought cannot capture the wholeness of immediate experience, but only aspects of it, the unity of experience as a whole is not a unity of knowledge, but a unity of personal activities of which knowledge is only one.[97] In Macmurray's view, what philosophy tries to do is to give

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of man, his free and self-creative coming-into-being, overflows into moral perfection because man does his existing in the presence of God. What man makes himself to be, therefore, places him in a certain existential situation in relation to God. Man's purposiveness and striving, thus, reside in his seeking creatively, not to be happy, but to be. The Christian doctrine of grace can be totally integrated with this idea if we keep in mind that the free self-creation of man takes place in the presence of God not only insofar as it constitutes man's final achievement, but also insofar as it constitutes his constant, present being. . . . Man's present self-creation takes place in the presence of God as communicating himself to man. Thus, in opposition to Scholasticism this concept of morality stresses the creativity and the presentness of morality, but in opposition to certain contemporary philosophies it stresses that the present self-creation of man takes place in the presence of God, so that we are judged according to what we make of ourselves, not in the sense that our final achievement is measured by an ideal standard, but in the sense that what we do make of ourselves does make a real difference to our moral relations with God." Dewart, op. cit., pp. 32-33, n. 23. (Only the first instance of underlining added.)

[96] Cf. Lynch, op. cit., p. xiv.

[97] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 66.

meaning to the infinite found in human experience as a whole. It is an attempt to express reality, for the real is that which is given in immediate experience. Yet, since philosophy is a reflective activity, its ability to do so will be limited from the start since all reflection delivers, brings to expression, only part of the real, and always subserves the real. Having underscored the primacy of immediate experience, Macmurray's contention is that philosophy, rather than assuming that the Self is primarily a knowing subject, should recognize that the Self's subjecthood is a derivative and negative aspect of its agency.

> This corresponds to the fact that most of our knowledge, and all of our primary knowledge, arises as an aspect of activities which have practical, not theoretical objectives; and that it is this knowledge, itself an aspect of action, to which all reflective theory must refer.[98]

Hence, in his philosophy Macmurray attempts to think from the standpoint of action, from the vantage of the Self as doer, agent, rather than the Self as thinker. Further, against the assumption that the Self is an isolated agent, he sets the view that the Self is a person, and that personal existence is constituted by the relation of persons.[99] This latter emphasis on mutuality will receive more attention later. Of immediate interest are the consequences of opting for the primacy of the practical (and concomitantly for the view of the Self not as thinker but agent, and for the priority of the "I do" over the "I think"). As Macmurray himself expresses it:

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[98] Ibid., p. 12.

[99] Ibid.

> The effect of transferring the centre of reference to action and at the same time its justification, is that man recovers his body and becomes personal. When he is conceived as agent all his activities, including his reflective activities, fall naturally into place in a functional unity. Even his emotions, instead of disturbances to the placidity of thought, take their place as necessary motives which sustain his activities including his activity of thinking.[100]

As is evident from this passage, in Macmurray's view rationality is not restricted to thought--emotion too is rational. This assertion can only startle those gulled by the still prevailing myth of sheer objective knowledge as paradigmatic of what is true, with the attendant canard that the physical sciences are the prime purveyors of this passionless bounty.

Emotional Reason

Aside from distinguishing man from the world of organic life, reason, in Macmurray's view, is the capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves. Reason is the capacity whereby a man stands in conscious awareness of the other.[101] This definition includes both emotion and intellectual knowledge. For feelings are specific; they arise from awareness of a particular situation and are therefore cognitive. Since the purpose of reason is to overcome the difficulties encountered in life, it is primarily the capacity to act and only in a secondary and derivative sense the capacity to think, that is to say, pursue a merely theoretical intention.[102] That reason has for so long been construed primarily as the capacity to theorize is due largely to the theoretical rather than practical orientation of Western philosophy which equated the good life with the theoretical life.[103] Macmurray, however, emphasizes that it is in the experience of living that man must look for meaning in life, and that within this context, experience, maximum meaning comes from considering persons in relation (realized in friendship). From this experience of "You and I" in relation he develops his theory of action. For him, the theoretical life is too narrow a category to capture the good life, life as meaningful.

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[100] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 12.

[101] Reason is, thus, the capacity to behave in terms of the nature of the object, i.e., objectively; it is the capacity to behave not in terms of our own nature but in terms of our knowledge of the world outside us. Cf. Reason and Emotion, pp. 18-20. McManus, op. cit., pp. 214-15, n. 11 indicates that William Lynch, in Images of Hope, in effect argues that the emotional relationship to reality is primary. Lynch refers to the imagination as the faculty which enables us to live contextually and in so doing resolve conflicts by realizing possibilities. Referring to Bernard G. Murchland's article, "The Prophetic Principle," Commonweal LXXXIV (1966), 171-75. McManus equates Murchland's prophetic principle with Macmurray's emotional reason as a necessary counterweight to the institutional, that is, to intellectual reason. McManus, op. cit., p. 217.

Life is activity; mere thinking is not living. Though thinking itself is an activity, it is an activity which is only real in its reference to activities which are practical.

> Now, every activity must have an adequate motive, and all motives are emotional. They belong to our feelings, not to our thoughts. At the most our thoughts may restrict and restrain, or direct and guide our actions. They can determine their form but not their

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[102] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 26.

[103] Ibid., p. 27.

> substance. Even this they can only do by rousing emotions which check or alter the primary motives. Thought is always subsidiary to activity even when we are not directly aware of it. The rationality that appears in thought is itself the reflection of a rationality that belongs to the motives of action. It follows that none of our activities, not even the activities of thinking, can express our reason unless the emotions which produce and sustain them are rational emotions.[104]

It is odd that emotions are so commonly dismissed as "just feelings," while no one seems equally as ready to dismiss thoughts as "just thoughts." Thoughts in themselves are neither true nor false but are deemed to be either by referring them to something outside the thinker against which they might be classified or tested. The same is true of emotions, or feelings. They are not to be dismissed for being what they are--feelings--but they are deemed rational ~~feelings~~ or irrational according to the object or situation to which they refer.[105] "We can acknowledge, therefore, without any difficulty, that feelings can be rational or irrational in precisely the same way as thoughts, through the correctness or incorrectness of their reference to reality."[106]

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[104] Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, pp. 23-24. As McManus notes, "Macmurray not only argues that emotion is rational but that it is the basis of rationality. By this he means that intellectual activity is subsidiary to the emotional. . . . /This/ follows logically from his epistemological position that immediate experience is the primary source of knowledge. Such knowledge is primarily emotional for it is in the feeling of the experience that one is made aware of the object of concern. The intellectual knowledge that is had arises out of the emotional experience. It is dependent on the emotional reaction and is therefore subordinated to it. It is the emotional life which is the core and essence of human life. The reason why the intellect is subordinate is because it is instrumental. It is a means to better living. It can direct and guide activity but it can never determine the substance of activity. This properly belongs to the emotions." McManus, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

[105] As he insists (in Reason and Emotion, pp. 25-26) this is not simply a question of "making emotions decent" by putting them on a par with intellectual reason. For Macmurray the emotional life is the primary source of rationality. Reason is primarily an affair of emotions and the rationality of thought is derived from it. Thus, the development of human nature does not primarily take place in the growth of the intellectual life,

Furthermore, the beginning and the end of an act are defined by an agent's *feeling*.

> We may describe the one as a feeling of dissatisfaction, and the other as a feeling of satisfaction. Feeling is necessary to provide a motive for action; because the mere awareness of a situation, however clearly it determines the object as such and such, as matter of fact, provides no

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but in the emotional life. *Ibid.*, p. 50. Cf. Sidney Callahan, *Beyond Birth Control: the Christian Experience of Sex* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1968), p. 11: "In considering control and morality, the Church has gone wrong (in its sexual teaching and practice particularly) because it has either not known the force of the hidden factors shaping man, or . . . despised it, opting for a completely rational ideal. Emotion and reason have been as severely severed as were the old concepts of body and mind." Cf. Macmurray's essay, "The Virtue of Chastity," in *Reason and Emotion*, pp. 116-44.

[106] "Both our feelings and our thoughts have their symbolic expressions; an assertion of fact which I make is an expression of my thought just as an assertion of value is an expression of my feeling. If it can be also a correct or incorrect description of an object, why may not the expression of my feeling for an object be a correct or an incorrect valuation of the object? And if an expression of feeling is emotive in the sense that it is an attempt to make other people feel as I do, is not the expression of what I think, in precisely the same sense, an effort to make other people think as I do? No relevant difference between the two modes of reflection is to be found unless it be this, that to verify a valuation I must commit myself in action by making it my end. Sometimes, indeed, I must stake my happiness, my reputation or even my life on the experiment; and if I find I was mistaken there may be no possibility of trying again." Macmurray, *Self as Agent*, p. 202. Cf. Carl R. Rogers, "Toward a Modern Approach to Values: the Valuing Process in the Mature Person," in *The Causes of Behavior*, ed. Judy F. Rosenblith and Wesley Allinsmith (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966), pp. 23-30.

> ground for action. Equally a mere feeling, unrelated to an awareness of the situation as matter of fact, could not issue in action, but at most in a reaction to stimulus. If the feeling is not referred to the situation it cannot provide a motive. . . . In general, a feeling of dissatisfaction characterizes a situation as unsatisfactory; and so provides a motive for initiating an act to change it; while the successful removal of the unsatisfactoriness by action terminates the action. For when the result of the acting is felt to be satisfactory there is no more to be done. The action is complete; and the agent withdraws from action into reflection. Feeling, then, when referred to an object, is valuation; and the most general discrimination in valuation is the acceptance or rejection of a possibility in action.[107]

Having stressed immediate experience (the primary knowledge inherent in personal action) over thought, and thus the priority of the Self as agent over the Self conceived as thinking subject, Macmurray is here elucidating further ramifications of these shifts in emphasis as they pertain to action. Our primary knowledge of the world, what accrues to us in life experience, contains in unity both apprehension and valuation, the latter emotive in its quality.[108] "The world is known primarily as a system of possibilities of action; and without valuation action is impossible," for action is choice, implying "the realization of one of a number of possibles and the negation of others."[109] Valuation is the motive power responsible for selecting as we do in action the one course from the several available. If valuation were lacking there would be no action and without action there is no knowledge.[110]

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[107] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 190.

[108] Cf. Thomas J. Owens, "Scheler's 'Emotive' Ethics," Cross Currents, XVI (1966), 143-52. This article is reprinted, with others on Scheler, in Philosophy Today, XII (1968), 13-20. Cf. also, Manfred S. Frings, "Max Scheler," Philosophy Today, IX (1965), 85-93.

[109] Cf. Hampshire, op. cit., p. 163: "I have to go into action of some kind, even if it is only the minimal action of muttering to myself, if I or anyone else is to be sure what I do definitely think."

> If now we withdraw from action, and so from all practical intention, we abstract from the activity of practical valuation. The world is then apprehended, in terms of this abstraction, as an existent manifold of events. This manifold constitutes the given for a mode of reflective activity which seeks to understand the world as matter of fact, and this activity excludes any positive valuation.[111]

Without valuation, then, man would be a mere spectator. Even in this mode of existence there would be selection of what is attended to, since it is impossible to attend to all that is there. The key point however is the realization that only persons know, in any proper sense of the term, and act with knowledge. And they know, and develop their knowledge, as much through their capacity for feeling as by using their senses.[112]

Though more of Macmurray's analysis of the omnipresence of valuation (or motivation), which has its source in man's emotional constitution, could be cited, it should be sufficiently clear that thought itself neither is, nor can be, dissociated from man's passional nature.[113]

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[110] Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 190-91. Cf. Levison, op. cit., pp. xxii ff.

[111] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 191.

[112] Ibid., p. 126.

[113] As a "more philosophical argument establishing the validity of emotional reason," McManus offers the following: "All life is activity. But every activity must have an adequate motive and since motives are emotional, it follows that the activity of man must be expressed emotionally. Therefore emotion is at the basis of man's activity, i. e. rationality." McManus, op. cit., p. 64.

The ideal of a mode of reflection as a pure activity of thought which is unaffected by feeling; which is cool, passionless and completely disinterested, seeking truth for its own sake, with no eye to practical advantage for the seeker or for anyone else is simply fictitious. This type of passionless reflection has been identified with reason, an identification which is both groundless and arbitrary. Macmurray locates its source in the persistent influence of the Stoic tradition with its characteristic dualism between reason and the passions--a distinction originally instituted to support a particular ethical theory. While this kind of reflection is of course rational, since it is a mode of personal activity, and reason is the differentia of the personal, it has no unique claim to rationality, and it is indeed not the primary expression of reason. The proper term to describe it, Macmurray believes, is not "rational" but "intellectual."[114] Macmurray's protest against dichotomizing emotion and reason to the denigration of the former merits attention for its relevance to morality.

> In contrasting reason with emotion we are under one of the strongest influences in our Western tradition--the Stoic dualism of Reason and the Passions, with its prejudice against being emotionally involved in the results of our actions. When this practical dualism becomes theoretical by the substitution of a theoretical for a practical intention, we generate the modern dualistic attitude in which reason is the unemotional and purely logical activity of the mind which produces knowledge; while emotion is the source of error through the prejudice which is inseparable from it. From this comes the ideal of a purely objective rationality, unaffected by emotion, which intends the truth,

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[114] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 192.

> the whole truth and nothing but the truth; in contrast with an emotional activity where desires provide the motives for activities which terminate in their satisfaction. This is one aspect of the pervasive dualism of modern thought. Schematically it is a dualism, in this incarnation, of intention and motive. We contrast two forms of behaviour; the one rational or objective, the other subjective and emotional. The first has an intention, but no motive; the second a motive but no intention, since the motive fully accounts for the behaviour which flows from it as a cause determines its effect. Strangely enough, the "objective" activity is the activity of the logical mind--of the Self as subject; while it is the activity of the objective (or empirical) self which is called "subjective."[115]

The denigration of emotion in favor of the supposedly objective logical mind remains alive in what is usually called the scientific state of mind which is assumed to be the exemplar of reason dissociated from emotion. Yet, the achievements of reason as intellectual depend upon reason as emotional. Michael Polanyi, for one, working from within the field of science itself has amply corroborated the point, though it seems impossible to disillusion the layman of his stereotyped view of scientific endeavor as characterized by ultra-detached, logical--indeed nearly mechanical--thought processes.[116]

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[115] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 32. Cf. also Self as Agent, p. 198.

[116] In addition to those works of Polanyi's previously cited, see: "Scientific Outlook: Its Sickness and Cure," Science, CXXV (1957), 480-84; "The Creative Imagination," Chemical Engineering News, XLIV (April 25, 1966), 85-93 and "The Potential Theory of Adsorption," Science, CXLI (1963), 1010-1013.--It is worth noting, in passing, some of Freud's misapplications of what he understood to be "scientific method" to personal existence, antithetical as they are to Macmurray's (and Polanyi's) views. The following excerpts are from Philip Rieff, Freud: the Mind of the Moralist (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1961). Rieff writes: "Psychoanalysis is the triumph in ethical form of the modern scientific idea. It is characteristic of modern science that nature, the

Macmurray's conception of reason as both emotional and intellectual provides a useful instrument for recapturing the wholeness of Western man who, in his overvaluing reason as intellectual alone has expected too much of it, and become so disillusioned with its shortcomings in supporting, and justifying the values he needs to live by.[117] Reason

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object of knowledge, is seen as withdrawn and definitely unlike the way we experience it. . . . Freud carried the scientific suspicion of nature into ethics. It was as if, after all the pronouncements of theology and philosophy, after all the indications of experience, we had scarcely begun to understand ourselves." p. 75. Rieff sees Freud's definition of therapeutic intervention as equivalent to "the rationalist aim of reason vanquishing the passions." p. 76. Following the cerebral path of intellectualizing all experience (p. 93) of the person, and "adhering to the rationalist faith in science as truth" (p. 111), Freud "dared to assume that everything could be explained" (p. 128). See pp. 128-29 where Rieff discusses the unsuccessful attempt once thought possible to "carry out determinist explanation in physics on a scale comparable to that Freud attempted in psychology." (Underlining added.) Finally, "Freud's end, processionally and valuationally, was to outwit tradition for the sake of a personality type unknown to history thus far, the psychological man--man emancipated by rational analysis from commitments. . . ." (p. 240.)

[117] As Jaki points out, in his allusion to Pascal's *Pensées*, their main effort was to show how shaky were the tenets forged by seventeenth-century *libertins* from the scientific discoveries of Pascal's day. "To hear Pascal say it, the basis fallacy of the 'scientific' materialism and atheism was that it ignored much of what it took to make a whole human person. . . . If one was to understand man, argued Pascal, this wholeness had to be of overriding concern. Not that Pascal wanted, by putting the emphasis on man, to draw attention from the twofold infinities that science was just beginning to open up before the truly bewildered man of his day. In fact, hardly anyone wrote more impressively of those frightening infinities. But he was quick to point out that only the *libertin* ought to lose hope and cry out in despair. . . . This terror was a heavy price the *libertin* had to pay if he wanted to be consistent. Such a *libertin* had no choice but to ignore the fact that immense spaces are merely quantitative relations of matter, and whatever their numerical magnitude, they fall far short of the greatness of . . . man. . . . All bodies together, and

conceived as intellectual alone ultimately blights hope, shrinks the scope of man's desiring, is too short an arm to circle the reach of his aspiration. Man's self-transcendence is not confined to his intellectual life, but belongs to his emotional life as well, since reason, long appreciated as his distinctive attribute, is both intellectual and emotional. His capacity for emotional transcendence enables man (not without reflection, of course) to alter or confirm his initial reaction to persons, to things, to situations. The essence of emotional transcendence is to know how to enjoy the presence of persons (and things as well) for themselves and not to exploit others or narcissistically revel in the Self by means of the object. Emotional self-transcendence enables the person to escape the confining fetid air of self-enclosed existence to enjoy the other persons, objects, values existent in the world, their home as well as his. By recognizing the emotion of reason, that this too is rational response to immediate experience, one regains the potential of emotional energies unashamedly. If emotional responses are not infallible, neither are one's thoughts. Both might need correction and find it in their coherence with the practical criterion of persons in relation in concrete history.[118]

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all minds together, and all their products, are not worth the least prompting of charity." Jaki, op. cit., pp. 425-26. Cf. also John E. Smith, Experience and God (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 5-7.

[118] "We get great richness from social intercourse, the sharing of experience, the growth of understanding, and the benefits of other people's more or less parallel experience, and so on. In fact, the whole richness of civilization is largely due to this very sort of thing. We can't be alone

Theological Applications

Those reflections of Macmurray selected for attention here are important for removing obstacles to one's discovering meaning in human existence and as correctives to specifically theological misemphases. While it is true that awareness of the limits of conceptual knowledge and of the uncertainty of our traditional philosophical and "scientific" certainties do not by themselves lead us beyond these limits to existence in faith, it is also true that faith cannot avoid considering the possibilities of knowledge and doubt because Christian faith itself is the result of conversion, liable to relapse into doubt.[119] Hence, one of the values of Macmurray's emphasis on immediate experience, and the limits of our ability to capture it reflectively, recalls one to a realistic appraisal of our situation as human beings, dependent epistemologically on the convivial experience of interpersonal existence and not solely on processes of verification pursued in solitary intellectual exploration--an ideal canonized in scientific and philosophical methodologies based on Cartesian assumptions.[120]

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in things and be very clear on what happened to us, and we . . . can't be alone and be very clear even on what is happening in us very long-- excepting that it gets simpler and simpler, and more and more primitive, and less and less socially acceptable." Harry Stack Sullivan, "The Illusion of Personal Individuality," Psychiatry, XIII (1950), 326.

[119] Cf. Löwith, op. cit., p. 124; and Charles W. Swain, "Doubt in Defense of Faith," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XXXVI (1968), 109-17.

[120] Cf. Connor J. Chambers, "The Progressive Norm of Cartesian Morality," New Scholasticism, XLII (1968), 374-400.

Macmurray's stress on the primacy of the practical is such that it calls man to a wider realm than the constricted confines which constitute mental life. He calls man back to the region whence his intellectual life draws nourishment, the primary knowledge had in experience where man in the living of life responds emotionally and intellectually, to other persons. More of what Macmurray has to say of the radical mutuality of personal existence will be explored in the next chapter. What has been stressed thus far, however, is Macmurray's exposition of the person's dependence, in immediate experience, on reason as emotional and that emotional reason is the driving force for the activity of reason as intellectual.

This too is redolent with implications for contemporary religious problems. For, might not difficulties concerning religious belief arise from neglect of experience, from a cultural ambient which emphasizes reason as intellectual to the neglect of reason as emotional? Might not epistemological views which remain confined within the theoretical perspective, neglecting the realm of interpersonal experience as the criterion of validity of truth for man, account in part for contemporary religious crises?

The Judaeo-Christian tradition considers the presence of God as having been known experientially.[121] All knowledge for the Israelites, who did not engage in philosophical knowledge understood as a mere postulate of pure reason, was acquired experientially and the knowledge of God did not escape this law. If the contemporary Catholic finds this hard to appreciate might it not be due to a background of over-cautious fear of enthusiasm as a threat to objective doctrine, objective sacramentalism, and objective piety, which holds itself aloof from the vagaries of the experiential.[122] A theology that would take adequate account of religious experience requires a view of man which allows contemporaries to see with Newman that man is, after all, not a rational animal, but a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal.[123]

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[121] Cf. Albert R. Jonsen, "The Decalogue: Command and Presence," Thought, XXXVIII (1963), 421-46.

A genuinely practical theology cannot forget that there is no possibility of devising a simple machinery of the mind in terms of which to explain the varieties of human conduct.[124] Theology too, in all its branches, must return to experience. In doing so, however, it must remember that the importance of religious experience in Christian life must not be understood as some sort of self-contemplation. A conception of religious experience that would blind us to the world of relationships in which we exist would be the most deceptive of illusions.[125] Rather religious experience must be construed in a truly catholic way. It must involve openness to one's inner and outer experience and be sensitive to the reactions

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[122] "This was," as Kilian McDonnell writes, "an objectivism so sophisticated in its defense of the non-personal, the fact in itself unrelated to historical order, that it made the possibility of personal piety more than usually difficult. This objectivism, which, of course, played and still rightly plays an important role in Catholic theological thought, pushed the concept of grace back and away from the world where man lives and feels and experiences. . . ." "I Believe that I Might Experience," Continuum, V (1968), 675-76.

[123] Ibid., p. 677. In his Functional Asceticism (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1966), Donald L. Gelpi too calls for attention to these neglected dimensions of concrete personal existence as a corrective to the rationalistic style of thought emanating from what he designates as nominalistic dogmatic, moral and ascetical theology. The practical effect of this style of thought is "the effort to define the meaning of sanctity theoretically, abstractly, and apriori by appeal to approved ascetical formulas and to impose that definition rigidly and absolutely upon the personal lives of each individual Christian, regardless of his personal, individual needs and concrete situation" (pp. 65-66).

[124] As Gelpi observes: "Just as speculative nominalism leads to a deliberate policy of intellectual isolation and to the protective withdrawal

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of the Church from any contaminating contact with the world of profane and secular thought, so too ascetical nominalism leads inevitably to a rigid and artificial distinction between a life which is 'religious' and dedicated to the ritual performance of certain specified holy actions and one which is 'secular' and 'profane.' . . . Unfortunately, the tragic consequence of conceiving only certain sanctioned practices as certainly holy and religious is that one inevitably comes to regard all other actions, even good, legitimate human ones, as being at best suspect and at worst positively 'secular.' The 'unsanctioned' becomes equated with the 'tainted,' and the process of holiness becomes identified with the systematic withdrawal from anything which does not bear the purifying blessing of authority. The legalism of a purely deductive moral theology which is the hallmark of nominalism is translated at the ascetical level into a spirituality based almost exclusively upon external observance." Ibid., pp. 67-68. Cf. Alfons Auer, Open to the World: an Analysis of Lay Spirituality, trans. Dennis Doherty and Carmel Callaghan (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), p. 264, for an awareness of the primacy of concrete experience and the limits of theoretical clarity in spirituality.

[125] Cf. McDonnell, loc. cit., p. 684. Kenneth Keniston well describes the misconception of experience as narcissistic when he writes of a generation of college students "in its quest for 'kicks,' for an intensification of present, private experience without reference to other people, to social norms, to the past or the future. . . . Parallel with this goes the search for self within the self rather than in society, activity or commitment, and a belief that truth can be uncovered by burrowing within the psyche. The experience sought is private, even solipsistic; it involves an indifference to the beckonings of the wider society." In "Social Change and Youth in America," in The Challenge of Youth, ed. Erik H. Erikson (New York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1965), pp. 208-209. It should be clear that Macmurray's use of experience is the very opposite in its emphasis, for the experience he values highest is that of ever widening friendship.

and feelings of others as well as open to other realities of the objective world.[126] A conception of religious experience which ignored such an orientation would make of Christian life some kind of solipsism, utterly unrelated to him who "emptied himself, taking the form of a servant" (Phil. 2, 7).[127]

Summary

Before proceeding to other significant aspects of Macmurray's thought pertinent for theology today, it would be well to draw together those highlights of his thought presented thus far. With the realization that moral theology, to speak significantly of contemporary man, believer or not, needs to heed philosophy, a discipline long employed by theology to catch the temper of man's contemporary self-image, this chapter began by offering some glints of the climactic reach of Macmurray's philosophy, namely, his view of religion. This procedure was deemed advisable for, although theology as the second Vatican Council suggested, must consider contemporary philosophy, that discipline like most today is fragmented and pursued from widely different points of view. Unlike many varieties of philosophy today, Macmurray's looks favorably upon religion and sees it as comprehensive in its concern for men as persons, always a part of human history and particularly imperative for modern man.

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[126] In general, religious experience as here conceived is in the direction of that value orientation which Rogers sets as the climax of his list of signs of personal growth and maturity. Observing his clients he finds that as they make significant progress, "Perhaps more than anything else, the client comes to value an openness to all his inner and outer experience. To be open to and sensitive to his own *inner* reactions and feelings and the reactions and feelings of others, and the realities of the objective world--this is a direction which he clearly prefers. This openness becomes the client's most valued resource." Rogers, *loc. cit.*, p. 29. On the need for educators to cultivate right sensibility in their pupils see C. S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), p. 24.

[127] All biblical citations in this study are from *The Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha*, Revised Standard Version, ed. Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

From the corpus of Macmurray's writings, some salient criticisms of other types of modern philosophy were drawn, indicating both their inadequacies and the source of them. Some overriding conclusions drawn from those reflections were these: that philosophy, as was said of theology in the first chapter, has to be conscious of its modest role. Like theology, it is a mode of reflection on human experience and is therefore limited in its power and scope, only partially successful in capturing the wholeness of human experience. To recall another point from the first chapter, there both philosophy and theology were viewed as similar endeavors to the extent that they are dominantly concerned with elaborating structures of meaning for human existence. Conscious of this shared interest, a theology in the making looks to contemporary philosophy for ways to speak freshly of matters of faith. In doing so it must be aware of the short-sightedness of some varieties of modern philosophy.

Macmurray specifies some significant defects of the latter which arise from cleaving to the theoretical point of view, to the neglect of man's experience as agent, dwelling in immediate experience of communion with other persons. Defects which flow from such a starting point in philosophy (defects which are reflected in religious practice and theology as well) are a misguided rationalism which tends to equate authenticity with skepticism, and to exaggerate concern with the Self as an isolated individual, questing its identity in the realm of the unreal--in the realm of theory divorced from contact with the field of experience whence all knowledge of any kind finds its fecund source. Small wonder, having imbibed the effects of such philosophical traditions, and theologies that at least partially shared them, that believers have difficulty reconciling sacred and profane, or in discovering the meaning of grace, or the presence of God in their lives today. Such pastoral problems need the aid of an adequate theology for their alleviation, and theology in turn needs the aid of fruitful philosophical perspectives. Here Macmurray's pinpointing of the root inadequacy of emergent philosophical alternatives to past philosophical tradition is helpful.

He helps by showing the inadequacy of the cogito as a starting point for philosophy and the consequent inability of such a departure to do justice to the whole person. The importance of man's emotional nature and the interpersonal character constitutive of his nature are notable facets of human existence slighted in such an approach. To escape a cornered existence, modern man needs wider horizons than the egoistic point of departure allows, the confined limits of the isolated self in which hope cannot breathe. He needs to return to the realm of experience, to action conceived as it has to be if it is human action--interpersonally.

Macmurray's insights in this regard will be examined in the next chapter, and are offered to provide what human hermeneutical power they can to the fact that we cannot live, survive, or enjoy salvation without divine grace, but that bounty--it must be recalled--is mediated by other persons.

CHAPTER III

THE ACTION OF PERSONS IN RELATION

Characteristics of Action

T. E. Eliot's hollow men, like Dante's trimmers lingering in the vestibule of hell, suspended in inertia, parody the human--at most they are moved, they do not perform. Shells of men, they accomplish neither good nor evil and are condemned precisely because they negate their humanity by being non-doers. There is a continuity between the shades described by these poets and the dominant themes of Macmurray's philosophy discussed in the last chapter. His insistence on the fallacy of yielding primacy to the theoretical is motivated in part by the practical consequences that flow from the narrow conception of the Self as thinker. When given primacy, this self-image isolates us from the real world, keeps us wrapped up in ourselves, insulated against openness to experience. It leads to the view that intellectual knowledge, the activity of thought, is the highest good. It fosters a conception of ourselves as spectators of life, for in reflection we stand apart from all else, even apart from our own body which then becomes an object to us. Pushed to its extreme, this self-image readily reveals its inadequacy, for no matter how long one remains in reflection, no matter how many alternatives one weighs, or how beautiful the quality of one's thoughts, of themselves they will never become action. With Hamlet everyone experiences how easily the native hue of resolution becomes sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.

Important as reflection is as an adjunct to experience, as a means of reaping fruit from experience and of bringing more to the actual living of life, to conceive of the self-in-reflection as the most comprehensive notion of the self is to ignore some of the most important aspects of personhood. For our freedom is a quality of action, our ability to choose is exercised only in action, our capacity to determine, to shape the future is effected only in action, good and evil are qualities of action (only derivatively applicable to thought), and charity itself is incarnate only in the deed. The Word became flesh.

What Macmurray suggests is that we shift the center of our thinking about ourselves from a conception of the self as thinker to that of the self as agent. Obviously this shift is a mental one, a change of departure in our thinking. Philosophy is necessarily reflective, but nonetheless it is not required to theorize from the standpoint of theory. Just as the astronomer can invite us to consider the solar system from the vantage of an observer on the sun, the philosopher can invite us to reflect on our experience from the standpoint of action. Doing so, Macmurray believes, has many advantages because action is a more inclusive concept than the idea of thought, which is exclusive. We always have to go into action of some kind, however minimal the action be, to be sure what we do definitely think. In Macmurray's words, "when we act, sense, perception and judgement are in continuous activity along with physical movement."[1] But thought excludes overt bodily activity and moves away from perceptual and sensuous elements as it becomes increasingly abstract or "pure."

> Action, then, is a full concrete activity of the self in which all our capacities are employed; while thought is constituted by the exclusion of some of our powers and a withdrawal into an activity which is less concrete and less complete.[2]

Macmurray considers thinking and acting not as contraries, an impression that can arise from his labeling thought "negative" and action "positive." In his usage, the terms positive and negative are complementary terms. In actual life thinking and acting are, in Macmurray's view, ideal limits of personal experience,[3] and neither is achieved in its purity by finite persons. The names gives to the ideal limits may be given by extension to the aspects of the self's activities, and we may speak of action as the positive and thought the negative mode of rational activity. He chooses to concentrate on action because it includes knowledge and, moreover, the knowledge which is included within action is primary knowledge: experiential, immediate, directive for action, practically certain and "presentational." It is this primary knowledge that the last chapter emphasized in iterating the importance of immediate experience. All other knowledge is derivative from the knowledge that informs action. Hence, Macmurray calls all knowledge which reflects upon the primary knowledge had in action secondary knowledge. In contrast with the characteristics of primary knowledge, secondary knowledge is: reflective, hypothetical, indirectly related to action, logically uncertain and "representational."[4] Reflective knowledge is concerned to achieve a theoretically more adequate determination of knowledge in action.

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[1] Macmurray, *Self as Agent,* p. 86.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Macmurray does say that acting and thinking are exclusive contraries, *considered in the abstract*, but adds immediately, "in actuality they are ideal limits of personal experience; and 'acting' is the positive, while 'thinking' is the negative limit. . . . The concept of 'action' is *inclusive*. As an ideal limit of personal being, it is the concept of an unlimited rational being, in which all the capacities of the Self are in full and unrestricted employment." *Ibid.*, p. 87.

Thus, by concentrating attention on action, which includes primary knowledge, and hence on the model of the self as doer, Macmurray makes an initial move to counter egocentricity, the solitariness of the self in reflection, setting man firmly in the world which he knows. Further qualifications will be required eventually to restore him to his proper existence as a person in a community of persons in relation.[5] One last preliminary remark is in order and that is to recall what was indicated earlier, that Macmurray restricts the term action to rational action so that only persons may be said to act.

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[4] O'Connor, loc. cit., p. 478.

[5] The progression of Macmurray's thought is much like Polanyi's in this respect, that Polanyi sees personal knowledge as primary, and all other knowledge, especially our knowledge of the infra-human filters out distinctively personal elements. Language itself reflects this; as one describes the organic and the material world, he progressively eliminates distinctly personal elements; language becomes more "precise," "objective," as the speaker refers to realities beneath man, and (conversely)

In light of these anticipatory considerations, what this chapter proposes to examine are two prime aspects of Macmurray's thought: action and the formal characteristics of personal relationship. Both are related and

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hazier as he approaches the personal world. (Cf. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. 69 ff.) This leads to the impression that we know the infra-human first and better than the personal world, forgetful that we learn of the infra-human only through the personal, and that we speak of the infra-human by abstracting from the personal world. Indications such as these should point up the fallacy of adhering to an infra-human model to guide thought and language of the personal world, as happens with Freud whose scientific imagery, Bruner writes, "is marked by the necessity of classical mechanics. At times the imagery is hydraulic: suppress this stream of impulses, and it breaks out in a displacement elsewhere. The system is closed and mechanical, at times electrical, as when cathexes are formed and withdrawn like electrical charges. The way of thought fitted well with the common sense physics of his age." Jerome S. Bruner, "Freud and the Image of Man," in Rosenblith and Allinsmith, op. cit., p. 22.--As Lynch writes: "We have taken it too much for granted that anyone with sense can and must, for very life's sake, understand the laws of physical objects in physical space--but that it requires a higher and a later wisdom to understand the laws of persons operating in human psychic space. A number of philosophers have dared to suggest the very reverse of this priority: that the knowledge of things human and personal is the primary model for every other form of knowledge. They had said this to counter a certain kind of positivistic mentality, but were themselves interpreted as mystics who could not produce evidence for their whimsy. Now the tide is turning. The clinically competent people are beginning to supply us with new and positive evidence for the priority of the knowledge of the human over the knowledge of objects." William F. Lynch, Images of Hope: Imagination as Healer of the Hopeless (New York: New American Library, 1966), p. 185.

important for understanding human experience, and therefore for moral theology.[6]

Macmurray's analysis of action will be examined first, following his own methodology which consists in thinking of action from the standpoint of the self as agent and spelling out factors of human experience which are included in action. However, this analysis is carried out with reference to an agent self existing in isolation, so that while it overcomes the theoretical departure of past philosophy, it does not overcome its egocentricity. What will emerge from this analysis is that action, distinctively personal, is impossible for the self, even considered from the agent point of view, without the presence of an Other who is also agent.[7] When this conclusion of the discussion of action is attained Macmurray then takes as his thesis that the self not only requires an Other who is also agent if there is to be any action at all, but that the self exists in dynamic relationship with the Other, has its being in this relationship, and that this relationship is necessarily personal. Elaborating this thesis constitutes Macmurray's main effort towards determining the formal characteristics of personal relationship. That done, by considering apperceptions of the Other as less than personal, there emerge differing views of morality and of society consequent upon the fundamental apperception one entertains regarding the character of the Other with whom he exists in dynamic and defining relation.

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[6] The importance of Macmurray's philosophical orientation for moral theology can be appreciated by heeding what Mackey observes: "In any adequate philosophy of man . . . there is no absolute distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. It will contain not only the brute facts about life in this world but also a description of what life in the world ought to be like if man would only act in the best interests of his own powers on the material that is presented to him /cf. Macmurray's views of communal apperception of reality toward the end of this chapter/. Conversely, my knowledge of what I ought to do at any particular time comes to me from a combination of my awareness of abilities that need to be exercised for my own fulfillment and my knowledge of the opportunities that my environment offers me. Because this absolute distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge cannot be admitted, and can in fact never be found, it is a mistake to say (as is sometimes said in an attempt to explain why a 'new moral theology' is necessary in the Roman Catholic Church), that up to now, at least in recent centuries, practical moral theory was divorced from dogma or speculative theory of doctrine, and that moral theology suffered as a result. An examination of the theology of these centuries will reveal on the contrary that both moral and dogmatic theology suffered from parallel defects. The main mistakes were made in the expression of our views about God and about man's destiny in union with him, whether these were found in texts of moral theology or of dogmatic theology." J. P. Mackey, The Grace of God, the Response of Man: a Study in Basic Theology (Albany: Magi Books, Inc., 1967), p. 68.

Macmurray lays the foundation for a theory of action by considering the general modifications which have to be made in traditional philosophical theory when one adopts the standpoint of the agent rather than the thinker. Subsidiarily, such a theory of action will in fact contain a theory of knowledge.

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[7] The term "Other" which will appear often in this chapter expresses, minimally, everything apart from the Self. As Macmurray's analysis proceeds, it becomes apparent that the Other when conceived as either material or organic is inadequate and that the Other has to be conceived as personal. So conceived, one can grasp one of Macmurray's general principles that the correlative of the Self is the (personal) Other. My understanding of myself as a person, my growth as person, depend upon my understanding of and relationship with other persons (=in generalized form, the personal Other).

> Since the "I do" which is the absolute presupposition of all our experience, contains the "I know that I do" as a constitutive aspect of itself, we can lay down at once a negative criterion for the truth of any philosophical theory. The "I do" is indubitable. It is presupposed in the act of denying it: its contradictory is, therefore, self-contradictory. It follows from this that any theory which either explicitly or by implication denies the "I do," that is to say, denies that there is action, is false. This negative principle has a very wide range of application. It disposes at once of any theory that implies that the world is fully determinate; for to assert this is precisely to deny the possibility of action, though not of course, the possibility of activity. The "I do" is not problematic.[8]

A corollary of this is that whatever is necessarily implied in the possibility of action is itself certain. The possibility of knowledge is so implied and consequently the possibility of knowledge is not problematic and therefore any purely skeptical theory is false. Many implications lie latent in the guarantee that there is action. Macmurray brings them to light by first defining action as a unity of movement and knowledge.[9] To elucidate this definition and forestall misunderstanding, the following considerations are required.

> 1. Unity in the definition must be taken seriously.
>
> Movement and knowledge are inseparable aspects of all action, not separable elements in a complex. To represent action as consisting of a cognition which is the cause of a movement is to misrepresent the unity of action radically. We relapse into the mind-matter dualism if we analyse an action into two events, the one subjective and the other objective, which stand in causal relation. This is not merely untrue to experience; it is a logical monstrosity.[10]

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[8] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 127.

[9] Ibid., p. 128.

[10] Ibid.

Thought moves nothing. Though it is possible to analyze an act into a number of elements which compose it, each of these elements is itself an act and therefore a unity of knowledge and movement. This regress through successive corridors of the mind can go on indefinitely. What requires recall, however, is that what is distinguishable theoretically is not necessarily separable in fact; for to distinguish elements in a whole theoretically is merely to limit one's attention to an aspect of what is presented. To eliminate misunderstanding of this kind, Macmurray proposes to call knowledge and movement _dimensions_ of action, a metaphor intended to convey the indivisible unity of knowledge and movement in action.

2. Regarding the terms _movement_ and _knowledge_, neither must be construed objectively. "Movement" does not mean an observed displacement in space and "knowledge" does not mean an ascertained truth. Rather the two terms represent a theoretical analysis of the "I do" into the "I move" and "I know."

> "Movement" here refers to our experience of moving ourselves; "knowledge" to the awareness of the Other which "informs" this moving. We might rephrase it thus: "When there is an acting there is a moving and a knowing, and the indivisible unity of these constitutes the acting."[11]

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[11] _Ibid._ Cf. Rahner's reflection: "The practice of good intention or the purification of motives cannot, after the psychotechnical training of attention, consist in thinking as frequently as possible of a supernatural 'motive' when doing some external action. Quite apart from the fact that such a procedure . . . can have most harmful psychological effects on one's nerves, this _accompanying_ thought is in any case far from being a motive or good intention. . . . These thoughts and these explicitly

What demands special attention is the fact that the term "knowledge" is here used in its primary significance, from which all other usages are derived by qualification.

> Knowledge is that in my action which makes it an action and not a blind activity. It is "objective" awareness; or rather awareness of the Other and the Self in relation. It is not "knowing that," neither is it "knowing how;" neither is it "knowledge by acquaintance," for it is acquaintance. We use the term "know" in this primary sense when we say that we know our friends and are known by them. If it is objected that knowing implies certainty and that the term should only be used, at least in a philosophical context, to express certainty, I reply that this is what we are doing. . . . All reflective judgements are hypothetical and have an element of logical uncertainty in them; but if I say that I know someone I cannot be mistaken. If the statement is false then I am lying.[12]

3. The definition of action also has to be seen in terms of Macmurray's tenet that all personal activities have the form of a positive which includes its negative. This framework here applies as the form of

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formulated . . . attitudes . . . if they have no mutual connection springing from the nature of things, then in spite of all possible psychotechnical efforts in practising good intentions, this motive will remain simply unconnected and alongside the action, like a mere thought-ballast. . . . It may also happen that such a merely conceptual effort even actually prevents the action being done in an objectively good way out of its motives and prevents the motives which really influence it from being purified." Karl Rahner, "Some Thoughts on 'A Good Intention,' " Theological Investigations, Vol. III, trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1967), 119-20.

[12] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 129. Cf. Ignace Lepp, The Ways of Friendship, trans. Bernard Murchland (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 18: "Encounter with another, by virtue of his otherness, is as a matter of fact the central event in the life of most men." Lepp also stresses that this communication with others "is always and necessarily of the emotional order," (ibid.). This is corroborative of Macmurray's main emphases that our surest knowledge is had in the realm of the interpersonal, and that this primary knowledge involves the emotions.

the unity of movement and knowledge in action. The negative is knowledge which constitutes action by its inclusion in movement--which is the positive dimension. If the two dimensions of action (knowledge and movement) are distinguished and considered each alone, the form of a positive which includes its negative will apply to each of them.

(a) Moving will include its own negative, viz. a resistance to movement (not rest, the mere absence of movement). Designating resistance as the negative of moving is not intended to suggest unimportance. Resistance is a negative which constitutes the positive, moving, for the active resistance to movement is a condition of the possibility of one's moving.

We may borrow here from science the distinction between "kinetic" and "potential" energy, which indeed is derived from the personal experience of moving, by abstracting from its personal completeness. The experience "I do" is an experience of expending energy. In its positive mode, as "I act," this expenditure of energy expresses itself positively in bodily movement. In its negative mode, as "I think" the energy is still expended, but it is self-negated; I myself provide a resistance to the tendency of cognition to "pass over" into action, which negates the tendency, so that the energy remains "potential." That thinking does involve an expenditure of energy is shown by the fact that it can produce bodily fatigue.[13]

(b) Knowledge, again it is a question of the primary knowledge in action (not reflective knowledge, thought), is likewise constituted by its own negative.

Knowing in action is possible only through an active ignoring of most of what is presented, that is to say, by a selectivity of attention. I

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[13] Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 129-30.

> can only ignore what I am aware of, and the elements in the situation are apprehended. So we find ourselves saying at times that we were "unconsciously" aware of a thing when our attention was concentrated on something else. These unnoticed elements in the situation however play an essential role in the determination of our action. We see them and respond to them, without noticing them.[14]

In discussing Macmurray's thought on the primacy of immediate experience (=the primary knowledge had in action, which is here under discussion) the point was made that feeling, emotion is rational. It is a response to reality out of which cognition emerges. What is now added in this consideration of knowing in action is that knowledge--which is cognitive consciousness--depends for its possibility upon the inclusion within it of a non-cognitive or motive consciousness.

> This indeed is the basis of habit; and habit is a necessary constituent of any actual action. Habit is conscious behaviour, or response to stimulus which involves awareness. But in human behaviour, save in abnormal conditions such as somnambulism, it can only be present as a negative element in action. This organic consciousness is, then, the negative aspect in the constitution of personal consciousness.[15]

As usual with Macmurray, "negative" here serves as a complementary term. Hence, designating organic consciousness as the "negative aspect" of personal consciousness is tantamount to considering it the indispensable grounding which supports personal consciousness.[16] All actions depend upon a system of habitual responses to stimuli, and the formation of habits is the necessary basis of every action. Habit is thus a generalized response to situations. While calling it the negative aspect of our action, Macmurray holds that without it, action cannot take place. It is the negative aspect of action, then, in the sense that action goes beyond it, since action is fully personal, and therefore intentional. If action is purely habitual it is compulsive and the agent is not immediately responsible for it.

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[14] Ibid., p. 130.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Cf. Rahner, again in the course of discussing the "good intention" recommended in Christian living, "It has been said . . . that anyone who wants to do what is right and obligatory merely for supernatural motives will do and achieve very little. Inclination and love for something--and

Following his definition of action and his explanation of it, Macmurray appends further considerations, some of which are especially important. The first of these is that time is the form of action, and that it is logically prior to space, the form of thought. Without going into all the details with which Macmurray supports this assertion, sufficient indication of what he means is still possible.

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also that motivation which is inherent in things themselves, and this even in the pre-moral sphere (such as hunger and thirst, fear, the urge to imitate, the impulses belonging to the realm of the corporeal and the sexual, etc.)--are in general necessary also for the higher achievements of the moral order. For they exist because God has willed them, and this is why they make sense. Since, moreover, they are elements of the one whole man, these things also have a purpose for the whole and hence also for the 'higher' man. Hence, just because it is false to say that the higher is simply a suspicious sublimation of the lower--just because it is false to say that the spiritual and moral achievements of man are merely more complicated variations of one's primitive desire--it is not necessary to deny that even the highest achievements and motivations have, and may have, their substructure. There is no harm in admitting that one may possibly pray better, . . . after a cup of tea than without it." Theological Investigations, III, 124-25.

Movement, it will be recalled, is a dimension of action, Actual movement involves time, is immersed in time, whereas in reflection the successiveness present in actual movement disappears and all its moments are apprehended simultaneously. Hence, from the standpoint of the self as thinker, time is spatialized and represented by a line, path or track. Such representation of simultaneity constitutes a determination of time, and itself suggests that time is logically prior to space.

> This logical priority of time is clearly recognized if we recall the distinction between positive and negative activity. The negative mode of "doing" is, we have said, "thinking." Thinking does not involve an actual movement, but only a permanent tendency to pass over into movement which is continuously negated. It has therefore no spatial factor, but only a temporal one. The "I do" is necessarily temporal, for all doing takes time. But the "I think" in its actuality is _only_ temporal. Space remains purely virtual, as the possibility of realizing what is thought in a practical activity.[17]

From indications of this kind Macmurray concludes that time is the form of action and space the form of thought.[18] Time cannot be apprehended in thought but only symbolically represented, and the primary symbol for doing so is spatial. Time can only be experienced in action.

> In such experience of time, the characteristic structure is a distinction between past and future. When the agent moves his action continues. At any point in this continuing movement he is aware of the distinction between past and future. The past is what has been done; the future what has not been done but remains to do. That part of the movement which is past is already actual, the part which is future is not actual but only possible. In general, therefore, the

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[17] Macmurray, _Self as Agent,_ p. 132.

[18] "That time and space are mere forms, and in themselves nothing, needs no argument," _ibid._

> past is the field of actuality, the future is the field of possibility. The present is simply the point of action. Now to be actual is to exist; consequently the past is that which exists, and the future that which does not exist. It is not that which will exist, for the action may not be completed, or it may complete itself in an unanticipated manner; and in any case the future never comes. When what is now future comes to existence, it is no longer future but past.[19]

The significant conclusion of this consideration is that it is the agent (=person) who generates the past by actualizing a possibility. Doing so constitutes a practical determination. Therefore to act is to determine, and the agent is the determiner. For a person to act is to determine, to make actual what is, apart from his acting, merely possible.

> Theoretical determination is the negative of this, and is contained within it as the specific awareness of what has been practically determined by the agent. We may therefore define acting as determining the future. The past is then that which has been determined, and is, in consequence, completely determinate.[20]

The implications Macmurray draws from these observations are interesting in themselves and pertinent for moral theology. The first of them concerns free will, and the denial of it, determinism. Free will is implied in the very conception of action, for the agent is the determiner. To deny free will is to deny the possibility of action. According to the previously quoted negative criterion of truth which Macmurray enunciated, any theory which denies the possibility of action is false. At the present moment of discussion it becomes clear that an implication of the "I do" is that I am free and that to deny freedom is to assert equivalently that no one ever does anything--that action is impossible or never occurs. Freedom is a problem for thought, and in the perspective which Macmurray has opened for us, it is evident that thought can only deal with that which is determinate, that is, with the past. Whereas to act is to determine the future; the past is already determinate.

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[19] Ibid., pp. 133-34.

[20] Ibid., p. 134.

> Knowledge, then, in its primary form, is the theoretical determination of the past in action. The freedom of the agent then, so far from being incompatible with the possibility of knowledge is the ground of that possibility. The Agent, in action, generates the determinate as the object of knowledge. The falsity of determinism lies simply in the dogma that the future is already determinate. But if this were so there would be no future; the future would be already past.[21]

Implicit in these remarks are clues, supportive of a future oriented moral theology which will be pursued subsequently. What should be noticed in the immediate discussion, however, is that Macmurray is able to overcome the Kantian antinomy of freedom by abandoning the standpoint of the self as thinker in favor of the self as agent. What has to be added, however, as Macmurray himself indicates, is that this succeeds only in solving some of the problems, albeit misplaced ones, that arise from maintaining the primacy of the theoretical. A further consideration is that even the self as agent does not exist in isolation, but with other agents in the same field of action.[22] Hence, though the agent acting is he who determines the future, his freedom is not unlimited, because of the presence of the other agents.

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[21] Ibid., p. 135.

[22] As Van Der Marck observes, "All human action is surely intersubjective . . . and good or evil . . . but surely there is nothing to prevent us from giving an especially close look at the freedom of human action--its

Secondly, limitations on the agent's freedom also arise from the fact that in determining the future, the agent determines an environment which itself provides a limitation to his own further action.[23] Macmurray calls this the principle of the irreversibility of action, and therefore of the form of action, which is time.[24] For, as stated, action is into the future and creates a determinate past. In the process, what has been determined remains forever determinate; what has been done cannot be undone. Action is irreversible. The fact that time is irreversible is only the abstract or formal way of stating this. It is an immediate implication of the very form of doing, whether active or reflective.[25]

The characterization of space as the form of reflection and time as the form of action has still more implications. It dramatizes the connection

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spontaneity, its personal character, the fact that it proceeds from man himself--and so distinguishing freedom within the totality of that action as one particular aspect of action, in the same way in which we speak of a man as an individual and a person, although we know very well that man is essentially intersubjective and forms part of a certain community." Van Der Marck, op. cit., p. 42.

[23] "Human action, in spite of all sorts of real and concrete aspects of relationship to particular persons in a particular situation, has also the aspect of proceeding from the individual concerned as an individual. Now this is what is meant, in a long ethical and moral theological tradition, when human action is called free." Ibid., p. 43.

[24] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 135.

[25] Ibid., p. 137.

between action and time, for real time is constituted by the distinction between past and future; action lies between, into the future and generating the past. To say that space is the form of reflection highlights both the fact that thought, in order to consider it, must spatialize time; and that time so considered in reflection is not real time. For thought can only deal with the determinate and must capture time in a linear symbol, which is legitimate enough of course, but nonetheless renders time unreal. When in thought we "render" time by space, we then easily conceive of ourselves as observers gliding through to a future which is already determinate. Adapting an example of Macmurray's might make this clearer. I can imagine myself at any point in time or space, as living in colonial America, for example. If I do so while actually living in twentieth-century America, I must think the time that has elapsed since then as future, relative to my imaginary existence in eighteenth-century America. But this future is, I am aware, already determinate, and I know some of its determinations (from the study of history). I think it as future, although it is really past. In this way there arises for reflection, a distinction between past and future in the past. By analogy with this I may project myself in imagination into the future, to the "end of time," if I choose, and here too I must think what is really the future as if it were already past. This must mean that I think the future as already determinate; and some of its determinations I may be prepared to specify, theoretically, by predictions. In this way there arises the notion of the future as already determinate; and the notion that all time (not just time as reflection can play with it) is already determinate, that is, already past. For time as a determinate sequence of events is necessarily past time; it is indeed the conception of the past, and the distinction of past and future in it is the relative distinction which arises by a theoretical selection of a point in time as the present. Clearly this is possible only theoretically; and if it is taken otherwise it implies that the Self exists as subject (spectator), but not as agent.

> Theoretically I can select any point in time I please as the present, and call what came before it the past and what comes after it the future. But as agent the present is determined for me. It is the "here-and-now," my only point of action, for I can act neither in the past nor in the future. And even in reflection I can only think here and now; and my ability to place myself in thought at any point in time I please depends on the fact that all points of time are represented here and now, for my reflection, simultaneously. Now an order of simultaneity is spatial. In so far then as time is a given order within which events can be assigned to determinate positions, the time is past time, and the determination is a theoretical determination. A determinate future is not a real future. The real future is the indeterminate which is determined in action, and in being determined becomes the past. The physicist's time is not real time; it is time represented as past without a future.[26]

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[26] Ibid., p. 139. Cf. Augustine: "From what we have said it is abundantly clear that neither the future nor the past exist, and therefore it is not strictly correct to say that there are three times, past, present and future. It might be correct to say that there are three times, a present of past things, a present of present things, and a present of future things. Some such different times do exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see," (XI, 20). And, "It is in my own mind, then, that I measure time. I must not allow my mind to insist that time is something objective. I must not let it thwart me because of all the different notions and impressions that are lodged in it. I say that I measure time in my mind. For everything which happens leaves an impression on it. . . . It is the impression that I measure, since it is still present, not the thing itself. . . . When I measure time it is this impression that I measure," (XI, 27). St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 269, 276.

In the course of Macmurray's reflections offered thus far, time has been linked with action, with the real world (as contrasted with the realm of thought), in which the future is determined by action. Academic as these considerations might appear at first, they are of considerable importance for a period when men are both fascinated and frightened by the future[27] and when a primary task proposed for sociology is to aid people to view the future as a way of life.[28] Macmurray's grounding rationale for the interconnection of human action and futurity is crucially important for moral theology since the latter is concerned with lived Christian faith, a faith which is radically future oriented.[29] Should it neglect the eschatological dimension of faith, moral theology easily misjudges its main concern, and finds itself urging conformity to patterns whose only distinctive characteristic is that they are passé. In that direction, moral theology would descend to the level of physical sciences which, according to Macmurray, are able to chart patterns of continuity, but are helpless to deal with genuine initiative.[30] By contrast, Macmurray's views provide a vehicle for spelling out the implications of a faith which maintains that God has placed in man's hands the responsibility for shaping the future, and that the meaning of the future is expressed and revealed in Jesus Christ. Macmurray associates all determination with the past; the past which arises as the by-product of human action, and sees freedom as a necessary implicate of action which looks to the future. This perspective offers a way of manifesting the transcendence of man over the merely determinate and matter-of-fact, the basis of his ability to introduce novelty in the world. Macmurray's emphasis on man as agent likewise points up the futility of introspective preoccupation with one's "official" motives which, more often than not, accompany rather than really inform action.[31] It recalls to men in an age of psychologizing that orientation towards persons and towards things in themselves, is a surer path to moral maturity than preoccupation with unmasking of self.[32]

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[27] Assessing the mood of Christians, Daniel Berrigan wrote recently, "How tired are the 'people of God'! How afflicted with acedia and fright, with fear of height, and fear of depth, and fear of breadth! How ill-tempered and cozened into ill-timed expression of same! How very near despair and how far from hope!" Berrigan, loc. cit., p. viii.

[28] Cf. Alvin Toffler, "The Future as a Way of Life," Horizon, VII (1965), 108-15; and The Dynamics of Change, ed. Don Fabun (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

[29] Cf. Jurgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and Implications of a Christian Eschatology, trans. James W. Leitch (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 16.

With these indications of the range of application of Macmurray's thoughts on action, attention may now be given to still other implications of action as he sees it--the proposition that action is choice.

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[30] Cf. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 219-20; and Robert O. Johann, Building the Human (New York: Herder & Herder, 1968), p. 99.

[31] Cf. Rahner, Theological Investigations, III, 126-27.

[32] On the technique of "unmasking" by advocates of new moralities cf. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. 230 ff; The Tacit Dimension, pp. 58-59. Also, Rieff, Freud: the Mind of the Moralist, pp. 120 ff. and C. S. Lewis, Christian Reflections, pp. 53-54 on the hidden authority of "new" moralities.

Action is a choice of one possibility which negates the possibility of all the others, which latter become past possibilities, no longer actually possible.

> To do anything is to do this and not that. After it is done I may wish I had done something else, but I cannot do it. What I have done remains actual and I cannot undo it. Action is thus the actualizing of a possibility, and as such it is choice. It is important to notice that this means precisely what it says. It does not mean that an action is preceded by a choice; nor that a mysterious "act of will" somehow connects a theoretical selection with a physical movement. This is only an attempt to construe the mystery of action from a dualist point of view.[33]

This does not deny the possibility, and often the necessity of reflection prior to action, the process of deciding among alternative courses which is the proper one to pursue. What Macmurray wishes to stress, however, is that this is only a theoretical, not an actual choice as is evident from the fact that the action so selected "in contemplation" may not in fact be executed.

> The actual choice is the doing of the action; and action is choice whether or not this preliminary reflection takes place. There can, undoubtedly, be no choosing apart from reflection; but this need only be that primary reflection which is in action, as one of its dimensions.[34]

From the tenet that action is choice there arises still another consideration, the distinction between right and wrong is inherent in the nature of action itself. "Knowingly to actualize one of a number of possibles, and in doing so to negate the others, is to characterize the act that is so performed as right and the others as wrong."[35] Just as choice is in the doing of an action, so too it is the doing of the action which distinguishes between right and wrong, not a theoretical judgment which may or may not precede, accompany or follow the doing. For Macmurray, the belief that we can only do what is right by first knowing what is right to do and then executing it is an assumption.

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[33] Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 139-40.

[34] Ibid., p. 140.

> It implies the very principle which Kant was so rightly concerned to deny, that the good can be determined as an object in time. For it presupposes in ourselves two capacities to neither of which we can lay claim--theoretical infallibility and practical omnipotence. If I am to do what is right by first deciding what it is right to do in the circumstances in which I must act, my moral judgement must be infallible. If not, I may be mistaken, and if I then do what I judge mistakenly to be right, not merely have I done wrong, but I could not have done otherwise. But this is not all. Suppose we grant to ourselves this infallibility of moral judgement, what follows? I know absolutely, before I act, what I ought to do. If I then seek to do it, I may fail. Circumstances over which I have no control may intervene, and I discover, in the event, that what I have done is not what I set out to do. Again I have not done what is right; and again I could not have done it. . . . In some sense, therefore, if we can act rightly it must be without a prior theoretical determination of what it is right to do. The discrimination of right and wrong in action must be prior to and not dependent upon the theoretical discrimination of the truth or falsity of a judgement.[36]

This is as far as Macmurray can go toward showing that right and wrong are inherent in action in The Self as Agent.[37] Even in thinking from the standpoint of the agent, he can go no further because he has not yet brought other persons into the account. In other words, while overcoming the theoretical departure of traditional philosophy (the cogito), by substituting the practical viewpoint (the ago) he has not yet overcome its egocentricity.

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[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., pp. 140-41.

[37] The terms "right" and "wrong" here have no specifically moral connotation (cf. ibid., p. 136, n. 1).--An interesting consequence flows

Nonetheless, fully cognizant of this shortcoming, it is instructive to attend to the limitations that arise from considering the self in isolation. The solitary self, even when considered as agent, cannot provide the possibility of action. For the solitary self can only mean the self abstracted from the real world, withdrawn into self, in other words--the self in reflection. In Macmurray's polar terminology, this is the self in self-negation, the negative aspect of self, or the self as subject. The standpoint of the solitary self is necessarily the theoretical standpoint, in

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from Macmurray's views that (1) action has the primacy over thought, and (2) that the distinction between right and wrong is inherent in action. It follows that the primary standard of validity is the ethical one, the epistemological standard being derivative. As he says expressly, "If the concept of 'pure thought' is derived from the concept of action by exclusion, then thought, so far as it is actual, falls within action and depends upon action. Action is primary and concrete, thought is secondary, abstract and derivative. This must mean that the distinction between 'right' and 'wrong', which is constitutive for action, is the primary standard of validity; while the distinction between 'true' and 'false' is secondary. In some sense, though not necessarily directly, it must be possible to distinguish between 'right' and 'wrong' before distinguishing between 'true' and 'false', and so without reference to the truth or falsity of a judgement, and to derive the latter from the former. In other words, a theory of knowledge presupposes and must be derived from, and included within a theory of action," ibid., p. 89.

which action is not possible.

> The reason is that we have abstracted from the presence of the Other, and therefore from the possibility of resistance in action; and . . . it is the experience of resistance in action that establishes the distinction of Self and Other. Without an other there can be no self. Without a resistance there can be no action.[38]

As initially stated, and presupposed throughout this analysis, Macmurray understands action as distinctly personal, action of a person. Hence when he says that (personal) action requires resistance (and support) he has indicated requirements for action that can only be supplied by a personal Other.[39] But when the self is considered in isolation he is considered apart from other persons. Similarly, he has claimed that action is activity in terms of the distinction between right and wrong, a distinction inherent in the nature of action. For an isolated self, right and wrong are impossible for the reason that action itself is.

It is possible, of course, to supply the isolated self with a general Other, less than personal, non-rational and inorganic, in short a material world. This conception of the Other Macmurray calls the "continuant" in contrast to the agent self. Alone in a material world, the self would have an element of resistance to support action, but such an environment fails to provide the possibility of action. For,

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[38] Ibid., p. 142.

[39] Cf. "Every encounter /of man with man/, whether friendly or hostile, whether benevolent or indifferent, is in some way, unconsciously or consciously, a struggle of power with power. In this struggle decisions are made continuously about the relative power of being, actualized in all those who are involved in the struggle. . . . Such struggles start in the life of an individual in the moment of his conception and go on up to the moment of his last breath. They permeate his relations to everything and everybody he encounters." Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Book, 1960), p. 87. Cf. also Johann, Building the Human, pp. 59-62.

> the resistance of the continuant is a negative resistance, and the support it provides is a negative support. It provides for the possibility of movement, but not of action. For though the resistance limits the possibilities for the agent it still provides no ground for discriminating between the possibilities which remain open. Within the limits of his freedom the agent can still do as he pleases, and whatever he does will be right because he does it. He has the means of action, but no ground of action; for the material environment as such does not serve to discriminate between possible objectives.[40]

For Macmurray this example illustrates the general principle that the self and the Other are correlative. If the Other be conceived in purely material terms then the Self must be similarly conceived. If instead of a material setting, the self were set in an organic milieu, that is, if the self is considered as an organism in an organic environment, something more than movement becomes possible and this something more is called behavior. Nature will provide stimuli to which the self can respond, but action is still impossible.

> For at most the knowledge of Nature will reveal a plurality of possible activities, some easier, some more difficult, some pleasurable and some painful. But this still provides no ground of discrimination. At most the agent could "follow the line of least resistance," and this excludes the determination of an objective. If we say that natural teleology prescribes an objective, the preservation of life and the avoidance of death, we are brought up short by the fact that the agent knows that this is an impossible objective. Death is unavoidable; consequently any choice of self-preservation as objective of action is inherently irrational. The biblical story of the Fall is quite correct

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[40] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 144.

> in linking the knowledge of good and evil with the knowledge "Thou shall surely die." The solitary agent for whom the Other is an organic environment can only behave as an organism, responding to environmental stimuli. He cannot act: he could at most know the complete futility of all his behaviour through an objective consciousness which accompanied, but was not integrated with it.[41]

The concluding lines of this picture of the self in the face of a simply organic Other provide existentialism with one of its recurrent themes; to Macmurray this signifies that existentialism has not overcome the conception of the self as simply organic.

Having indicated the inadequacies of material and organic environments as counterparts to the self, and bases of (personal) action, Macmurray is left with the conclusion that the possibility of action depends upon the Other being also agent, and so upon a plurality of agents in one field of action.

> The resistance to the Self through which the Self can exist as agent must be the resistance of another self. The distinction between right and wrong depends upon a clash of wills.[42]

In short, only the relation of persons in action makes action possible. Having reached this conclusion it is now necessary to overcome the egocentricity of philosophical tradition by considering the self in relation to other agents.

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[41] Ibid., pp. 144-45.

[42] Ibid., p. 145.

Persons in Relation

Macmurray can now substitute "person" for "self" since person fulfills the same function from the standpoint of the agent as the term "self" does in traditional philosophy which takes the theoretical viewpoint. Having gone as far as he could in considering the person as agent in isolation, he must now supply further details of personal existence. Thus far he has shown that the mark of the personal is rational action which includes and is constituted by rational knowledge. But in analyzing the conditions for action a further dimension of personal reality came to the fore, namely that a person requires the existence of other persons. Personal reality is constituted by the relations between persons.

The early chapters of Persons in Relation concentrate, for simplicity's sake, on two persons, mother and child, to trace the course of individual human progress from its beginning in total dependence on a personal other toward the point of maturity--existence in interdependence with other persons. Superficially, this account seems similar to the kind found in books of modern psychology, but Macmurray is interested in this concrete relation of mother and child from a philosophical point of view. It enables him to demonstrate that we are persons by virtue of our relation one to another, that human behavior carries always in its inherent structure a reference to the personal Other. Unlike Freud, for example, Macmurray's use of the child's experience is intended to demonstrate that the form of the child's experience is dependence on a personal Other; and that this form of experience is never outgrown, but provides the ground plan of all personal experience, which is constituted from start to finish by relation to the Other and communication with the Other.[43]

This original reference to the other, clearly seen in the child-mother relationship, is of definitive importance from the philosophical point of view for it is the germ of rationality.

> For the character that distinguishes rational from non-rational experience, in all the expressions of reason, is its reference to the Other-than-myself. What we call "objectivity" is one expression of this--the conscious reference of an idea to an object. But it is to be noted that this is not the primary expression of reason. What is primary, even in respect of reflective thought--is the reference to the other person. A true judgement is one which is made by one individual--as every judgement must be--but is valid for all others. Objective thought presupposes this by the assumption that there is a common object about which a communication may be made.[44]

By employing a genetic account as his vehicle, Macmurray can bring such philosophical observations into sharp relief. It is easy to forget the fundamental relational character of the person, but by employing the mother and child relationship as a paradigm, Macmurray can show that what we first discriminate is the personal Other. There then comes the discrimination of a world of other persons (the family circle, for example), organisms and material objects. In the child's eyes the mother remains the personal center of all these other realities subsequently discriminated.

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[43] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 154.

[44] Ibid., p. 61.

Further, the child takes time to learn the non-personal character of the cat and his toys.[45] Further still, in discriminating himself from the Other it is always as belonging to the Other, the person of the mother, or the family circle. The gradual exercise of his capacity to discriminate the Other constitutes the negative aspect of the child's personal development. The positive aspect is his development as a personal agent. Using the mother and child paradigm, Macmurray sees in the dynamic relationship between the two a pure form which he calls the rhythm of withdrawal and return which constitutes the universal and necessary pattern of personal development. It can be employed in its empirical functioning in the child's growth to maturity, but it is a universal pattern of all personal relations.

The Rhythm of Withdrawal and Return

In the case of the child, the rhythm of withdrawal and return takes the empirical form of his relation to his mother. Her routine of feeding and otherwise caring for the child displays this rhythm in a quite literal sense even. There is a union in common life of mother and child, a communion of You and I, whose existence in mutual life is constitutive for each of them, with the difference, of course, that the child exists in total dependence on the personal other. As the child's capacity for awareness increases, the rhythm of his mother's care for him establishes itself in his consciousness as expectation, based upon memory and so provides the beginnings of knowledge. Through the prosaic routine established within their relationship, the child learns to know the Other as the repetition of the same, a lesson which underlies all recognition of order and form. Learning to wait involves pertinent experiences bearing upon the development of motivation. The child's recognition of a need is negatively motivated, that is, it stems from anxiety over some discomfort. He learns to overcome this with a positive attitude of confidence, trust that the expected, the care of the Other will come in due time. Waiting for the expected alleviation of his discomfort involves the development of imagination and phantasy, in the expectation of relief, and anticipation coalesces with the actual satisfaction when it comes. This succession of anticipation and satisfaction, with the images accompanying both, institutes the primary distinction between imagining and perceiving.

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[45] "Our knowledge is anthropomorphic in the sense that whatever we attribute to the Other must be included within the full characterization of ourselves. When we distinguish between persons and material things, the characteristics we attribute to things are a selection from the characteristics we attribute to a person." Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 117.

However, the state of positive motivation, containing and dominating the negative, depends upon the constant fulfillment of the child's expectation at the proper time. For expectation is but a prediction based on experience and constantly verified. But the unexpected may happen; the prediction may not be verified, with consequent damage to the basis of confidence and security. If response to his cry is too long delayed, the negative motivation of the child (which can fundamentally be designated, fear) is no longer subordinated to the positive (love). In the earliest stages of our life this reversal of the natural dominance of the positive is occasional and accidental. It foreshadows, however, a periodic reversal which is necessary and inevitable in passing from one stage of growth to another. The child must learn, stage by stage, to do for himself what has hitherto been done for him. But at all the crucial points, at least, the decision rests with the mother and therefore it must take on the form of a deliberate refusal on her part to continue to show those expressions of her care for him that the child expects. Of course this refusal of hers is an expression of her care. But the child's stock of experience is too slim to appreciate this--which he interprets as meaning the breakdown of their relationship. When the personal other does not respond, he is thrown back on himself. The constants in his world of experience are no longer verified, his ancitipations have not been realized. So he faces what is for him the ultimate threat to his existence--isolation from the Other by the act of the Other. Consequent on this, the motivation system of the child is thrown in reverse and the negative polarity, anxiety--if it were to become permanent--despair, gains the ascendency over the positive (trust, confidence). The way out of his impasse is for the child to make an effort toward restoration of relations, but all depends on the response of the Other. He can only be rescued from despair by the grace of the other, by a revelation of her continued love and care which convinces him that his fears are groundless.[46]

These highlights of Macmurray's delineation of the rhythm of withdrawal and return as evidenced empirically in the mother and child relation are offered as preparatives to appreciate his description of the pattern of withdrawal and return as a pure and necessary form applicable to all personal relations.

> The rhythm of withdrawal and return is the full dynamic expression of the form of the personal, as a positive which includes, is constituted by and subordinates its own negative. It is a succession of positive and negative phases which, taken together, constitute the unity of personal experience. The negative phase, therefore, depends upon and is subordinate to, the positive and the whole activity can only be defined through the positive. The negative . . . has meaning only by reference to the positive, and is therefore, as a phase of activity, for the sake of the positive. The withdrawal is for the sake of the return; and its necessity lies in this, that it differentiates the positive phase by enriching its content. Without the negative there could be no development of the positive, but only the repetition ad infinitum of an undifferentiated identity.[47]

This form describes the development of the original unity of persons in relation, the unity of common life. Both the You and the I are constituted, as individual persons, by the mutuality of their relation, for the mutuality of personal relation is what determines its form. The development of the individual person is, consequently, the development of his relation to the Other. The rhythm of withdrawal and return is the dynamic expression of the form of the personal. For personal individuality is not an original given fact, but is achieved through progressive differentiation of the original unity of the You and I.

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[46] The previous summary is drawn mainly from Persons in Relation, pp. 86-90.

[47] Ibid., pp. 90-91.

> If this sounds paradoxical, it is yet a commonplace in some of its manifestations. We all distinguish ourselves, as individuals, from the society of which we are members and to which we belong. The paradox is the same: for we at once assert ourselves as constituent members of the society while opposing it to ourselves as "other-than-I." So the child discovers himself as an individual by contrasting himself, and indeed by wilfully opposing himself to the family to which he belongs; and this discovery of his individuality ~~is~~ at the same time the realization of his individuality. We are part of that from which we distinguish ourselves and to which, as agents, we oppose ourselves. In this--which is, indeed, simply another manifestation of the form of the personal--we may find the answer to many of the questions which puzzle the moralist; the existence of conscience, for example, of responsibility and the moral struggle; or, more generally, of the capacity which is possessed by the person, and only by a person, to represent his fellows--to feel and think and act, not for himself but for the other.[48]

These implicates of personal existence, and others which will follow, as Macmurray indicates in the last sentence of this passage are central to morality because they locate and illuminate the primary data with which morality is concerned.

Morality is not concerned with abstract directives, nor with a kingdom of prescriptions unanchored in the real world, nor with things, but with the constitutively human and how it may prosper. It is interested in the personal realistically considered, which means the interpersonal, because of the structural mutuality of the person with other persons. Like it or not, we are our brothers' keeper. Unless the constitutive relational character of the person toward other persons is thoroughly appreciated, morality runs the risk of becoming egocentric and individualistic and in this primary sense untrue to, if not violently opposed to what we are. Genuine morality realizes that norms for human existence are expressed in that very existence, or shares Sertillanges' definition of dynamic morality as the science of what man *should be* in function of what he *is*; and what he is is a person, a term that does not signify a sealed stasis, but is more the designation of an intersection of relations to other persons.

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[48] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

Macmurray's way of designating the dynamism of personal existence in the form of the rhythm of withdrawal and return highlights the fact that the patterns of personhood discernible in the mother and child relationship are ground patterns. The *terminus a quo* of the personal life is a helpless total dependence on the personal Other, and the *terminus ad quem* in not utter independence, but a mutual interdependence of equals.[49] His use of the mother and child example to illustrate the route *a quo* is not to be understood in a deterministic perspective, a reversion to the past to discover unchanging archetypes for all further existence. He does discover patterns there, but they are not static ones, but instead illustrate the shape of a dynamism (the rhythm of withdrawal and return). It must be understood that he does not view, to use his terms, the domination of negative motivation over positive (anxiety over trust) in some childhood experience of disappointment as fatal or final. Rather, in his view, this pattern will occur again and again throughout life, and with its recurrence in all personal relations come renewed opportunities to overcome fear of the other (which is often illusory, like the child who protests that mother does not love him any more) by approaching the other in trust. Thus, his use of the rhythm of withdrawal and return, whether applied to motivational or to cognitive aspects of interpersonal relations in their development, has no hint of determinism.[50] One way he has of stating this is, "the overcoming of the negative always remains problematical."[51] That is, my overcoming fear of the other, or my distrust or suspicion of him, can fail, but it is a failure that I am capable of overcoming. The scope of initiatives latent in Macmurray's view of the person and his progress becomes evident in the following significant passage:

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[49] *Ibid.*, p. 66. "Equals" here does not mean the suppression of each person's refreshing individuality, or that all are (unrealistically) presumed to be of equal ability, possessed of the same tastes, etc. Cf. p. 158 and Lepp, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

> Persons are agents; and the relation of persons is a relation of agents, and in general is a conditio sine qua non of action. Without the support of resistance there can be no action; and the resistance must, as we recognized, be the resistance of a personal Other. Consequently, both the relation itself and the rhythm of its development are not merely matter of fact, though necessarily including matter of fact. They are matter of intention. Thus the negative phase, just as much as the positive, falls within the relation and presupposes it even while negating it. My withdrawal from the Other is itself a phase of my relation to the Other. The isolation of the self does not annul the relation; but refuses it. And since the relation is practical--since it is a relation of agents--the refusal is a

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[50] On the justification of using the mother-child example for philosophical purposes, see the emphatic passage in Macmurray's Persons in Relation, pp. 106-107.

[51] Ibid., p. 90.

> practical activity which intends the annulment of the relation which it presupposes. There is a radical contraction in action. Since any personal relation enters into the constitution of the persons whom it relates, to annul the relation is to annul oneself, and to achieve the intention could only mean to destroy oneself along with the other.[52]

Hence to be a person is to be constituted for mutuality with other persons, and at the same time, this constitution is not a fait accompli but must become actual, in intention which informs action. Here lies the heart of all morality. While these aspects of Macmurray's analysis are fresh in mind it is opportune to indicate briefly their importance for moral theology. In the light of his analysis, the centrality of the love commandment in the New Testament is appreciated not as an arbitrary prescription along with counsels to patience or forbearance, but as in line with our very constitution and its development. "To annul the relation is to annul oneself . . . along with the other." Since personhood is matter of intention as well as matter of fact, this is within our power to attempt and, from the theological point of view, the root of all sin. In Reason and Emotion Macmurray states this explicitly:

> To understand the nature of the personal we must get behind the dualism of mind and matter, and the demand for isolation in the individual self which sustains it. (We might note in passing that this demand for isolation expresses the opposition of the individual will to its dependence upon the personal reality in which it exists and is, therefore, the essence of what the theologians call "sin.")[53]

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[52] Ibid., pp. 91-92.

[53] Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, p. 218.

In the context Macmurray provides it is easy to grasp that sin is not the contravening of an arbitrary divine decree, but the attempt to counter the human grain as God has fashioned it. Hence, both the meaning of grace, as well as the meaning of sin, come to light in the context of love precisely because love is the actualization of the mutuality of interpersonal reality. It is by explicating the dimensions of interpersonal relations, both on the plane of the human, as well as interrelating human to divine relations, that man's religious and ethical resilia are disclosed. In God's revealing of himself to us God shows us what we are as well.[54] Our mutuality with him is the fundament of our mutuality with other persons (cf. Mt. 25, 40). Seeing that this is true of divine-human relations as attested by the Scriptures, it should not surprise us that whatever be their character, our personal relations make us what we are. They constitute both our being and our self-consciousness, for all knowledge of persons is by revelation.[55] I can know you only if you choose to reveal yourself to me. Since the I and the You are constituted by their personal relations, it follows, in Macmurray's words, that

> I know myself only as I reveal myself to you; and you know yourself only in revealing yourself to me. Thus, self-revelation is at the

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[54] Cf. Rahner: "For, the fact that God himself is man is both the unique summit and the ultimate basis of God's relationship to his creation, in which he and his creation grow in direct (and not in converse) proportion." Theological Investigations, III, 43.

[55] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 169.

> same time self-discovery. . . . One can only really know one's friends and oneself through one's friends, in a mutuality of self-revelation.[56]

Obviously, much remains to be learned concerning personhood, but of the stock of knowledge now in possession concerning this richly mysterious reality, no aspect demands more attention than mutuality. One of Macmurray's strongest passages dramatizing this facet of ourselves is cast in a consideration of the requirements for an individual that he might act well. If any one passage from Macmurray's writings is to be isolated in this study as the most essential and relevant expression of his thought for moral theology, in this writer's estimation, it is the following:

> That my end should be good and my chosen means effective are then conditions for my freedom in action. But they are not sufficient conditions. For I am not alone in the world; there are other agents, and if they will not allow me to do what I desire to do I cannot do it. Moreover, there are few things which I can desire to do, and none that are of personal significance, which do not depend upon the active cooperation of others. We need one another to be ourselves. This complete and unlimited dependence of each of us upon the others is the central and crucial fact of personal existence. Individual independence is an illusion; and the independent individual, the isolated self, is a nonentity. In ourselves we are nothing; and when we turn our eyes inward in search of ourselves we find a vacuum. Being nothing in ourselves, we have no value in ourselves, and are of no importance whatever, wholly without meaning or significance. It is only in relation to others that we exist as persons; we are invested with significance by others who have need of us; and borrow our reality from those who care for us. We live and move and have our being not in ourselves but in one another; and what rights or powers we possess are ours by the grace and favour of our fellows. Here is

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[56] Ibid., p. 170. Cf. Henri J. Nouwen, "Report on the Possibility and Desirability of Love," National Catholic Reporter, (April 10, 1968), 7-8.

> the basic fact of our human condition; which all of us can know if we stop pretending, and do know in moments when the veil of self-deception is stripped from us and we are forced to look upon our own nakedness.[57]

As the next chapter will suggest, when this platform is adopted as the departure for elaborating the implications of a Christian life style, it is possible to improve one's appreciation of grace and his understanding of justice, to mention but two aspects of Christian life which past moral theology did not always consider with sufficient nuance. Macmurray's perspective is enlightening in such concerns because of its consistent emphasis on the fact that as intentional beings we cannot be centered on ourselves. Our situation is not such that we find first in ourselves, in our so-called interiority, the fullness of meaning and value and that, next, our giving of meaning in the world and in encounters with other human beings are an effusion of our interior fullness. Rather, divorced from the world and from other persons, there is only emptiness in ourselves.

With these indications of the theological relevance of appreciating the mutuality of persons for their meaningful existence, attention can be drawn to further specifics of Macmurray's analysis of how this affects action. In the earlier discussion of his thought on action some factors had to be omitted because the mutuality of persons was, for clarity's sake, withheld. The opportune moment has now arrived to supplement the earlier discussion of action which was defined as a unity of movement and knowledge. Here the notions of movement and knowledge will be expanded by considering, respectively, motivation in personal relations, and then intention (the knowledge element in action).

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[57] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 211. McManus, op. cit., p. 201, says of this passage, "Perhaps better than any other passage this reveals Macmurray's approach to reality. He will not permit the isolation of the individual from his human situation for the sake of a metaphysical analysis."

Patterns of Motivation in Personal Development

In his delineation of the rhythm of withdrawal and return as evidenced in the mother and child relation, Macmurray concentrates on the ground pattern of personal behavior which emerges in the child. In particular he isolates the basic "original" motives of love and fear, as the positive and negative polarities of motivation, understanding that these terms are poles, simplified expressions of a range of sentiments or affective energies that find their culmination in either of these designations. In supplying cautions concerning his usage of the terms love and fear, Macmurray relies on his doctrine of the rationality of emotion. While "love" and "fear" are necessary to identify motivational polarities, this labeling should be accompanied by a word of caution.

> Our language for the identification and discrimination of motives is both poor and imprecise. This is not perhaps so great a defect as might appear at first sight. When we distinguish clearly between the motives and intentions of our actions, we find that our distinguishable motives are relatively few and extraordinarily persistent. The behaviour which they motivate, on the other hand, is highly complex and diversified. But this complexity arises chiefly from the fact that we act with knowledge, in terms of the world outside us, so that the form of our behaviour is determined by the variety and complexity of

> the situations in which we act. Moreover, we are normally unconscious of the motives of our actions, because our attention is focused upon the intention which determines them. It is only when action is thwarted or inhibited, when the motive is prevented from functioning in bodily movement, that it is reflected back upon itself, as it were, and so thrust into explicit consciousness as an emotion. So it comes about that we have occasion to speak of love and fear mainly in a complex situation where they force themselves with some violence upon our attention as emotions which disturb the normal attitudes and activities of our lives. This, no doubt, is why we tend to think of them as abnormal states of mind, and to contrast them with the cool "unemotional" attitudes which we associate with "rational" behaviour. This is a mistake; for a cool feeling is just as much a feeling as an excited one, and no activity, rational or irrational, practical or reflective, is possible in the absence of a motive. The reason why any strong emotional excitement tends to make us act wildly and "irrationally" is not that emotion is "irrational" or "non-rational" but simply that by invading consciousness it distracts our attention from the situation in which we must act, and turns it inward upon our state of mind. Yet for this very reason it is easier to identify our motives when they are excited and so thrust upon our notice. When we identify the positive and negative poles of personal motivation as "love" and "fear" respectively, we are speaking of them not as perturbations of consciousness but as they function in behaviour to determine the direction in which we expend our energy.[58]

Another caution concerning these terms is that Macmurray does not mean them to designate organic impulses to which "love" and "fear" are frequently applied. Rather, in his use of these terms, the character which distinguishes love and fear is the reference to the personal Other. They motivate the behavior of communication, which is why they are called personal motives, and express needs which can be satisfied only by another person's action. The behavior which they motivate is therefore incomplete until it meets with a response from the Other; the very occurrence of a response, and the style of the response, depending upon the Other. So the distinctive character of personal behavior, from the vantage of motivation, is mutuality--which is what is meant by saying that the person is constituted by the relation of persons. The reference to the personal Other is constitutive for all personal existence.

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[58] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 67-68.

Using the terms positive and negative to designate love and fear motivations respectively, Macmurray refines the role of mutuality in action. In positive motivation, the reference to the Other is direct; in negative motivation it is indirect. Love is for the other, while fear is fear for oneself in the face of the Other. Since mutuality is constitutive for the personal, it follows that I need you in order to be myself. My primary fear is that you will not respond to my need and that in consequence my personal existence will be frustrated. Fear as a personal motive, is at once fear of the Other and fear for oneself.

Fear inhibits action, and therefore freedom which is the capacity to act. When the negative polarity of motivation dominates, I am in the moment of withdrawal (in Macmurray's schematization of the rhythm of withdrawal and return). For positive motivation to gain the ascendency, I must overcome fear which forces me into myself. This might entail my recognition that the fear I entertain is illusory. Even should this not be the case, though I withdraw, through fear, from personal relation, I still depend upon the latter--my action depends upon the cooperation of the Other. The practical necessity of existing with others, at least cooperating with them, forces me to return from withdrawal, but it may be a return (or reconciliation) which does not fully succeed in overcoming negative with positive motivation. If, for simplicity's sake, the example of the child's relation to his mother be employed, it is evident how negative motivation gives rise to dualism as a habit of mind.

The child, under the illusion that mother does not love him, remains wrapped up in egocentric motivation, while at the same time he is faced with the practical necessity of cooperating with his mother. So long as his fear is not overcome, he cannot give himself freely to her in the fellowship of mutual affection. Negatively motivated as he is in this situation, his attitude in cooperative action with his mother will be either submissive or aggressive. In the first case, he will cooperate, conform to placate his mother whom he fears so as to win her favor and services, but in compensation for this submission will create for himself a secret life of phantasy where his own wishes are granted.

> And this life of the imagination in an imaginary world will be for him his real life in the real world--the world of ideas. His life in the actual world will remain unreal--a necessity which he will make as habitual and automatic as possible. What importance it has for him will derive from its necessity as a support for and a means to his real life, which is the life of thought, the spiritual life, the life of the mind.[59]

James Thurber's short story, "The Secret Life of Walter Mitty," provides a graphic example of this pattern in adult life. A dissatisfactory relationship with his wife prompts Mitty to cooperate submissively, but he seeks consolation in imaginative deeds of heroism.[60]

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[59] Ibid., p. 103.

[60] Keniston, loc. cit., pp. 215-16, in his sketch of the drift of American youth away from public involvements and toward a world of private and personal satisfactions, provides another application of Macmurray's analysis.

Negative motivation can likewise take the form of aggressive behavior in which the rebellious child will seek to gain by force or cunning what is not freely given to him by the Other. In this case he will carry over the conflict of wills into the world of actuality, and seek power over the Other.

> He will use his imagination to discover and exploit the weaknesses of those on whom he is dependent, and to devise techniques for getting his own way. . . . His real life is the practical life, the life of action as the use of power to secure his own ends by his own efforts. The life of imagination is unreal in itself, and has value for him only as a means to success in the practical life.[61]

Both modes of behavior are ambivalent, having the same motive and the same ultimate objective--fear for oneself in relation to the Other, and the defence of oneself against the threat of the Other. No individual, of course, conforms fully to either of these types of negative or egocentric behavior. Macmurray views them as extreme limits between which fall the actual dispositions of human beings. Even more importantly, he does not consider these negative dispositions, which pertain not simply to the child's behavior but to all personal relations at all stages of life, as unalterable.

> In principle, what has been learned can be unlearned; and empirical experience offers us many examples of the transformation of character, sometimes by a gradual change, sometimes by a sudden and dramatic conversion. The rhythm of withdrawal and return does not cease with the achievement of organic maturity; it is the permanent form of the life of personal relationship. The transition from the withdrawal to the return repeats itself indefinitely, and each time it is made

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[61] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 104.

there is a possibility that it should be made successfully.[62]

An especially interesting observation he makes concerning the rhythm of withdrawal and return as applied to motivational patterns is that both types of negatively motived response, submissive and aggressive, since they are negative, involve unreality. Both vitiate mutuality.

> They carry over the illusion of the negative phase of withdrawal into the return to active relationship. They motivate a behaviour in relationship which is contradictory, and, therefore, self-defeating. For the inherent objective--the reality of the relationship--is the full mutuality of fellowship in a common life, in which alone the individual can realize himself as a person. But both the dispositions are egocentric, and motivate action which is for the sake of oneself, and not for the sake of the Other; which is, therefore, self-interested. Such action is implicitly a refusal of mutuality, and an effort to constrain the Other to do what we want. By conforming submissively to his wishes we put him under an obligation to care for us. By aggressive behaviour we seek to make him afraid not to care for us. In both cases, we are cheating; and in both cases the Other is compelled to defend himself against our deception, even though it is a self-deception. Self-interested relation excludes the mutuality it seeks to extort. If it succeeds in its intention, it produces the appearance of mutuality, not the reality. It can produce, at most, a reciprocity of co-operation which simulates, even while it excludes, the personal unity which it seeks to achieve.[63]

These remarks are especially pertinent as explanatory of the inadequacy of a morality based solely on justice. In such a system, the paradigm of balance of claims and rights, the ease of cooperation among persons predominates. While matters discussed under this rubric are important, justice is insufficiently capacious to serve as the primary vehicle of a morality that would adequately comprehend the nature of persons.

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[62] Ibid., p. 105.

[63] Ibid.

Since Macmurray uses "positive" and "negative" as complementary terms, it follows that both kinds of motives are operative in all personal action.[64] Though fear is of its nature inhibitory, the most positive action must contain an element of negative motivation if it is not to be completely thoughtless and reckless. The awareness in action of the possibility of making a mistake, doing the wrong thing, is an obvious expression of the usually implicit presence of negative motivation. The presence of positive and negative motivation in the realm of personal relations, between You and I, represents the fact that the fulfillment of my purpose depends not merely upon me, but also upon you; so there is always the possibility that my call for help may not meet with your response. My success depends upon your motive and your intention.

No action can be motivated purely by fear, for it would inhibit action totally. Fear paralyzes. Action which is negatively motivated is defensive, egocentric. Action which is positively motivated has its center of reference outside oneself in the Other--is heterocentric. "This distinction between egocentric and heterocentric action becomes paramount when we consider the subordination of motive to intention."[65] A mother's care for her child necessarily includes a negative--anxiety lest her child hurt itself, or be hurt. Should the child be in danger, the mother acts to rescue him, and in the act of doing so her feelings are those of fear and anxiety. Yet her action is heterocentric; her fear is for her child. As this example indicates, the emotion felt by the agent at the moment of action is not necessarily the motive of his action. This is one reason why we are so likely to be mistaken about our motives, while the judgment of others is often more correct than our own. For others must judge our motives from the character of our behavior, but we tend to judge them by the feeling of which we are conscious.[66]

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[64] As he explains, "It is for this reason that we have described the original motivation of the personal as bipolar, and 'love' and 'fear' as the positive and negative poles of a single motivation. . . . Action contains two elements--or, as we phrased it, has two dimensions--movement and knowledge. Consequently, it is deliberate, while reaction to stimulus is impulsive. The motivation of action, therefore, must contain an inhibiting element which prevents the immediate habitual response, provides a counter-acting impulse to reflection, and allows the apprehension of the situation to determine what we do." Ibid., p. 70.

Thus far, love and fear have been considered as "original" motivational polarities whence arise three typical dispositions in behavior: one positive, loving mutuality in fellowship, and two (submissive and aggressive) stemming from the dominance of negative motivation in one's cooperation with the Other. From the interrelation of positive and negative motives in personal responses, however, there derives a third "original" motive.

> As we have identified the first two by reference to the emotions of love and fear, we can identify the third by reference to hatred, but with the same caution. In some respects it might be better to use the term "resentment" instead of "hatred;" though in that case we should have to replace "fear" by "anxiety," and "love"

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[65] Ibid., p. 71.

[66] Ibid., p. 72.

> by caring--since the term "charity," which would be the corresponding word, has been debased in usage.[67]

Macmurray calls hatred derivative because it presupposes love and fear as operative motives. "It originates in the frustration of love by fear, through the mutuality of the personal relation."[68] When one's action, expressive of love, does not meet with response, he is frustrated. In principle, the You and I relation which makes us persons is such that if You act positively to me, so offering to enter into friendly relations, and I reject your advance, I threaten your existence in an absolute fashion.

> Consequently you necessarily resent my action; and if the relation is unavoidable then your resentment becomes hatred--a persistent motive in your personal relation to me; not, of course, we must remember, a persistent emotion which you feel toward me.[69]

Surprisingly, as an original motive, Macmurray sees hatred as inevitable in all personal relations though, like the other ground motives, only as a component of a complex motivational pattern, not necessarily dominant, and subject to the control of intention. Hatred is inevitable,

> because it is impossible that you should always be able to respond to me in the way that my action expects. This is why forbearance and forgiveness are necessities of positive personal relationship.[70]

If such forbearance is not forthcoming, rejection of personal relationship (of one person taking the initiative in another's regard) enforces a reciprocity of negation. In so far as I threaten your personal fulfillment, you can only reciprocate by threatening mine.

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[67] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[68] *Ibid.*

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[70] *Ibid.*

> Hatred, therefore, is the emotion by which we can identify the motive of mutual negation in the personal relation. If it completely escapes from intentional control it issues in murder. For this reason we contrast love and hatred as opposites rather than love and fear. Both have a direct reference to the Other. They sustain a positive and a negative relation of persons respectively. Yet the opposition of love and fear as contraries is more fundamental. For a negative relation of persons is a practical contradiction. It is a relation which is at once maintained and refused, and which is therefore inherently self-stultifying.[71]

A positive relation of persons must contain and subordinate a negative element. Hatred instead signifies an inversion of this motivation in which the negative element is dominant and subordinates the positive. Hatred is a motive of self-frustration. Since the "You and I" relation constitutes both the "You" and the "I" as persons, relation to the "You" is necessary for my personal existence. If through fear of "You," I reject this relation, I frustrate my own being. Finally, Macmurray suggests, though mutuality of hatred as the motivation of a negative relation of persons is clearly an evil, hatred itself, as an original and necessary motive in the constitution of the personal "is perhaps what is referred to by theology as original sin."[72]

What should not be overlooked in this summary of Macmurray's description of motivational patterns underlying behavior, is that mutuality is an operative factor not only in the quality of responses between people, but modifies discrimination within the individual as well. That is, how one conceives of himself, his attitude toward himself, is also correlated with his discrimination of the Other. My fear of the Other not only affects the quality of my responses to him and to other persons, but also affects my discernment of where the real lies, where I will look for a zone of peace in my existence. A fearful attitude will prompt me, if I am submissive, to seek comfort perhaps in fancy, in a world of imagination to which I will flee as to a refuge from the moil of human interaction, to which I contribute as minimally as possible. If I am "religious" in bent, my "spiritual life" will shield me from personal contacts which, from my angle of vision, are scarcely more than a drain upon forces which I had as lief spent in cultivating the interior life, alone with a god so completely mine alone that he could hardly be the same God to Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and the Nazarene who preached a Father whose largesse of love excluded no one.[73] Obviously, such a caricature is hardly manifestive of true religion which St. James thought should prove itself in caring for the downtrodden.[74] It is the working, in a religious context, of an habitual mode of behavior acquired in the process of personal development. In concentrating on the ground plan of all personal behavior, Macmurray brings to light the pattern of motivation which underlies the process of habit-formation.

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid., p. 75.

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[73] Cf. Henri De Lubac, The Splendour of the Church, trans. Michael Mason (Glen Rock: Paulist Press, Deus Books, 1963), pp. 107-108 on the snare of "pure inwardness."

[74] Cf. Jas. 1,27. As Dewey avers, "When the self is regarded as something complete within itself, then it is readily argued that only internal moralistic changes are . . . of importance in general reform. Institutional changes are . . . said to be merely external. They may add conveniences and comforts to life, but they cannot effect moral improve-

Since personal development involves the formation of habitual modes of response, one can appreciate both the fact that he can (in principle) modify the style of his response as well as the still more basic fact that all habits are learned. Each skill mastered becomes the automatic basis of a higher skill. When one is mastered, by shifting his attention from the skill learned, the person passes beyond it, forming still more complex operations. Thus habits become habitual by a shift of attention which passes beyond the elementary to the formation of still more complex habits which are supported by the former. Therefore, the system of personal habit has a hierarchical structure, and the more highly developed habits rest upon and presuppose those which we learned earlier.[75]

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ments. The result is to throw the burden for social improvement upon free will in its most impossible form. Moreover, social and economic passivity are encouraged. Individuals are led to concentrate in moral introspection upon their own vices and virtues, and to neglect the character of the environment. Morals withdraw from active concern with detailed economic and political conditions. Let us perfect ourselves within, and in due season changes in society will come of themselves is the teaching. And while saints engaged in introspection, burly sinners run the world." Quoted in Robert J. Roth, "Naturalistic Ethics: Problem of Method," The New Scholasticism, XL (1966), 307.

[75] Cf. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 58, 108.

Despite this ever increasing complexity of acquired habits, however, the ground pattern--the original form of personal motivation underlying the process of habit formation--remains the same. For this reason it is important to appreciate the motivational substructure in personal life. The implicit objective of this motivational pattern, as of all personal action, is the achievement and maintenance of a fully positive relation to the Other; in other words, of a personal reality in relation, through the subordination of the negative to positive motivation.[76] Adopting this perspective, the ethician would recommend attention to one's fundamental motivational pattern as the most effective approach toward overcoming sinful habits. In other words, the fundamental character of one's relation towards others would seem to be the key for discovering and extirpating roots of vice. Macmurray's view of the personal character of all motivation (i.e., _my_ motivation, in its _primary_ quality derives from _my attitude_ toward the _personal Other_) underscores the validity of the pastoral counsel to work for the good of others as the best method of overcoming that narcissism which lies at the root of most sins. It is the path of indirection, but effective nonetheless because it goes to the root of what we are. Our virtues are not private trophies, nor our vices blots on a private escutcheon, but modifications of ourselves that ultimately derive from our conception of, and our conduct towards others.

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[76] _Ibid._, p. 108.

The Other whom we discriminate, and as a consequence discriminate (conceive of, form an attitude towards) ourselves, does not long remain a single other (the mother, in the example employed previously). In maturing we become aware of many people. Thus, the tension within us between affection and hostility may find release by distribution. Positive motivation may find expression in my relation to one member of the group, and negative in relation to another person in the group. But this release by way of distribution does not solve my fundamental failure to overcome and contain negative motivation with positive. All I have done is to divide the personal Other, the world of persons with whom I dwell, into friends and enemies.

> So long as there is an unsubordinated residue of negative disposition in any person, he needs something in the Other against which it may operate. Yet since the unresolved hostility is an element of unreality in himself, it introduces an illusory element into his friendships and his enmities alike. For a common hostility makes the bond of friendship appear to be closer than it is; and the enmity is not aroused by its object but projected upon it, and has its origin elsewhere.[77]

Hence, I cannot console myself that I am a loving person when the intent of my friendship at least does not extend to all men, but is saved for the few, while the others are classified as enemies.[78]

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[77] Ibid., p. 110. Cf. Paul (in 2 Cor. 6, 11-13): "Our mouth is open to you, Corinthians; our heart is wide. You are not restricted by us, but you are restricted in your own affections. In return . . . widen your hearts also."

[78] In a similar vein Niebuhr observes, "Even if perfect mutuality could be attained within the family circle, the family may still remain a means of self-aggrandisement. . . . The truth is that every immediate loyalty is a potential danger to higher and more inclusive loyalties, and an opportunity for the expression of a sublimated egoism. The larger social

With these addenda to his consideration of the types of disposition which arise through the interplay of positive and negative phases in the process of personal development, and which tend through habitual repetition to become characteristic of the individual, Macmurray turns to their bearing on the morality of action and the modes of morality to which the various dispositions give rise. He has distinguished three types of disposition; one of these is positive (unitive, rooted in love), and two negative (submissive and aggressive) rooted in fear for oneself in the face of the Other. These three basic dispositions will eventually be called "categories of apperception" at the climax of the following section which considers the matter of intentions.

Intention: the Knowledge Dimension in Action

Up to this point, motives of action have been examined to the exclusion of intentions. However, though every action must have a motive, it

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groups above the family, communities, classes, races and nations all present men with the same twofold opportunity for self-denial and self-aggrandisement; and both possibilities are usually exploited. Patriotism is a high form of altruism, when compared with lesser and more parochial loyalties; but from an absolute perspective it is simply another form of selfishness. The larger the group the more certainly will it express itself selfishly in the total human community. . . . It is a rather pathetic aspect of human social life that conflict is a seemingly unavoidable prerequisite of group solidarity. Furthermore the greater the strength and the wider the dominion of a community, the more will it seem to represent universal values from the perspective of the individual." Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, /1932/ 1960), pp. 47-48.

is not determined by its motive. Hence intention must be considered since in the absence of intention morality cannot arise and, indeed, there can be no action but only activity. Action is determined, as this specific action, by the operation of intention. It will be recalled from the earlier treatment of action that the knowledge which Macmurray refers to as a dimension of action is primary knowledge. That is, it is not reflective, or theoretical knowledge. Further, the knowledge dimension of action, here designated specifically as intention, is not the same thing as the end.

> It is in action, and is not fully determinate. The analysis of actions into means and ends is reflective, and presupposes that the action is both complete and successful. Our actions are not necessarily planned in advance.[79]

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[79] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 173, n. 1. Speaking of reflective activity in the framework of "the rhythm of withdrawal and return," Macmurray writes, "In most practical activities, the withdrawal into reflection is forced upon us because we meet unforeseen difficulties. We have to stop what we are doing and consider the next step. It may be that alternative procedures present themselves, between which we must choose, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of these must be considered. It may be that the means we are using fail to produce the expected result; and we have to think out a new method of procedure and start afresh. In all such cases the periods we spend in reflection and consideration fall within a dominant practical purpose, and are negative moments in the realization of a practical intention. We may notice here that the relative time spent in action and in reflection is of no theoretical importance. Many actions involve little reflection and much practical activity; others require much careful planning and then perhaps a single decisive act. Many would have been accomplished more speedily and more successfully if longer time had been spent in considering each step in advance." Ibid., p. 181. This passage is offered both for its illustration of the rhythm of withdrawal and return as applied to reflection, and also as a preventive against misunderstanding Macmurray's statement about means and end, above.

Besides this point, to understand intention, it is necessary to appreciate a number of other factors which influence it and constitute its setting as Macmurray sees it.

The first of these, is that intention itself is the positive or practical aspect of attention; and attention determines our knowledge of a situation in which we are acting, and which we are altering, or determining farther by our action. Here we are speaking of the situation as we apprehend it at the point of action, which is the present.

With regard to the primary knowledge inherent in action we distinguish attention and intention.

> We intend a modification of the Other, to be determined by our agency. We attend to a mode of the other which is already determinate [a situation which we face, for example] in order that it may reveal to us the structure of its determination. Thus "intention" and "attention" refer respectively to the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of knowledge in action, to anticipation and memory.[80]

Attention refers to our apprehension of a situation at the point of action. This apprehension may contain an element of error--we may misapprehend the situation. The consequences of misapprehending a situation are obvious enough and need not delay consideration of the primary point that it is always a limited apprehension that we enjoy, even if it is correct within its limits. The reason for this is that attention is selective and the selection is relative to an interest in the agent.

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[80] *Ibid.*, pp. 171-72.

> In any situation we notice what interests us, and attend to it; for only this is relevant to our intentions. The rest of what is there presented for our perception is overlooked. It is irrelevant to our interests. It is this process--for the most part automatic and unconscious--which is described by the term "apperception." Our established or habitual interests function as dispositions to select from what is presented to us at any given moment and to organize it in consciousness in terms of its relevance to our intention.[81]

For this reason, intention cannot be considered without taking into account attention--what we apprehend at the point of (intentional) action. "In a particular action, the effective knowledge in it is selected by attention, just as the direction of the acting is selected by intention."[82] Attention, in turn, is selective and its selectivity depends upon our personal interests, our own bent, and style of life. The process of selecting (and concomitantly, disregarding) elements in a situation in one's attending is given the name apperception. This is tantamount to a particular approach, a frame of reference with which we approach life in the living of it, our especial angle of vision, according to which we are on the qui vive for certain aspects of situations, while discounting others. One's apperception therefore depends largely on his settled interests.

> Most of our settled interests are empirical. By this is meant that they are established by particular experience, and vary from one person to another. The birdwatcher on a country walk notices the birds and attends to their activities. His companion, the botanist,

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[81] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 111.

[82] Ibid., p. 120.

> notices unusual plants which his friend overlooks. But there are certain interests which are universal and necessary because they belong to the structure of personal experience. Indeed, there must be such original interests, if the process of apperception is to arise at all. For all perception involves apperception, since it involves selection and interpretation.[83]

Since action is primary and since, as earlier stated, to act is to choose, there must be presupposed in the agent, as the basis of action as such, a system of motives whose differentiations refer to the Other, and so provide the possibility for a differential apperception of the same Other, and so for a choice between contrasted intentions. This system of motives in the agent, treated in the previous pages, is necessarily presupposed because all our activities, whether practical or theoretical, have their motive as well as their intentions, and are sustained by an emotional attitude.[84]

> This is not to say that all our thinking is prejudiced or coloured by an emotional bias. It may be true in fact that none of us can escape completely from prejudice. But this is not because an element of emotion if present in all our reflection, nor is it true that if we could get rid entirely of this emotional element we should escape from prejudice. We should, in fact, lose the capacity to think altogether. Uncontrolled feelings, like loose thinking, can lead us

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[83] Ibid., p. 111.

[84] "The relation of our personal to our impersonal knowledge of other people is primarily and practically the relation of two emotional attitudes to the Other, which provide the motives for two different ways of behaving in relation to the Other, and therefore, in the reflective aspect of action, in conceiving the Other. Now since both attitudes are the attitudes of a person, both are, in this sense, personal attitudes. But if the Other is another person, as attitudes to the Other, the one is personal, while the other is impersonal." Ibid., p. 33.

> into error. But even strong emotions, such as love or hatred or anger, may sharpen the focus of our attention, quicken our apprehension of the object upon which they are directed, and lead to the recognition of truths, and even of facts, which otherwise would have escaped our notice.[85]

Thus all our knowledge (as stressed earlier) has an emotional character as does our motivation. Significant for present purposes, however, is that our habitual motivation, besides being emotive, is differentiated by reference to the Other. Out of this emotive style of responding to the Other, grows the possibility of different ways of apperceiving the Other.

> Now as the bare form of choice, this can only be represented by the distinction between a positive and a negative apperception of the Other. The agent must act *with* the Other, since there can be no action in the void. But the Other is at once a resistance and a support to the agent; and therefore can be apperceived either positively as a support or negatively as a resistance, and the agent can accordingly act either for or against the Other. His relation to the Other demands action; but leaves him the choice between a positive and a negative response to the demand.[86]

At this point Macmurray's effort to elaborate the styles of motivation that underlie relations between persons assumes special importance. In summarizing his ideas on this matter, it was indicated that he sees three types of disposition arise through the interplay of positive and negative (love and fear) polarities of motivation, in the process of personal development. Since these dispositions affect our apperception--how we attend to life situations--they ultimately affect the intention of all our actions. For the intention of an action here and now depends on my attention at the point of action, what I select as significant in the situation which I am to determine farther by my action. My attention to situations is, in turn, part of an habitual frame of selectivity, based on my special interests, a process Macmurray calls apperception.

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[85] *Ibid.*

[86] *Ibid.*, pp. 111-12.

Macmurray now employs the three types of disposition worked out in his treatment of motivation as the three a priori motives which determine the way in which we apperceive the Other in action and which, to that extent, determine the "form" of our action, as our practical response to the situation as we apprehend it. Borrowing Kantian terminology, he calls this original system of apperception "categorical" and its three determinations "categories" of apperception.

> The three categories of apperception give rise to three "ways of life," each of which has its own moral structure, and reflectively, its own conception of morality. There are, therefore, three distinguishable modes of morality, each rooted in one of these three categories. It is convenient to assign descriptive titles to the three categories in terms of the way of life to which they give rise. The positive apperception may be called "communal," the two negative types "contemplative" and "pragmatic" respectively., The contemplative apperception is the submissive form, the pragmatic the aggressive form of negative apperception.[87]

Before describing these three modes of morality in detail, Macmurray chooses first to consider morality in general, irrespective of its modal differentiations.

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[87] Ibid., p. 112.

Morality in General

When action was discussed earlier in this chapter the point was made that action *is* choice and that the distinction between "right" and "wrong" is inherent in the nature of action.

> To act is to realize intention, but it is also to enter into relation with the Other. We must therefore say that to act is to realize intention with the help of the Other. This does not apply merely to the personal Other. I open a packing-case with the help of a screwdriver, as well as lift it with the help of another man. In other words, to realize my intentions, I must make use of the Other.[88]

Hence, action inevitably involves a relation to the Other.

> This relation, however, is a practical relation. It is not matter of fact, but matter of intention. At any moment I stand in specifiable relations to everything in the world. This is matter of fact. But when I act I enter into relation with something other than myself in virtue of my intention.[89]

Parenthetically, the same is true of reflective activities, and accounts for the difference between seeing and looking. When I look at something I see it with the intention of knowing it, and this transforms the seeing from matter of fact to matter of intention. Intentional relating of myself to the Other depends upon two factors: knowledge of, and skill in using the Other. Knowledge of the Other is necessary since the rightness or wrongness of my action--because it depends on the instrumentality of the Other, acting with the help of the Other--depends upon the rightness or wrongness of my apprehension of the other. In addition, the rightness or wrongness of my action depends upon acquired skill in using the Other for my purpose. To act rightly, then, I must know, insofar as is relevant to my intention, both what the properties or characters of the Other are, and also how to use the Other as a means to my purpose.

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[88] *Ibid.*, p. 113. Note in these preliminary observations, preparing for the discussion of *moral* action, Macmurray does not restrict "the Other" to the personal Other. He does this, apparently, so as to make certain points about pragmatic and aesthetic judgments concerning action. These criteria apply to action which is less than personal, but are inadequate as standards for the action of persons.

[89] *Ibid.*

Consequently, there are two ways in which my action might go wrong: either through a misapprehension of the Other--which could include misapprehending a situation--or through lack of skill in operation. Either of these might result in failure to realize the intention of an agent; but they need not do so, though if the purpose is achieved it would be "by accident."

> In particular, I may achieve my purpose clumsily, with unnecessary effort, or in an inappropriate fashion, and all these are modalities of "acting wrongly." Acting rightly, therefore, we may say, is either a matter of efficiency or a matter of style; and we may note that both criteria can be used in the valuation of any action, and that which of the two standards is the subordinate one will depend on whether the end or the means is subordinate in the intentionality of the action. For there are actions which are performed "for their own sake," as we say. They necessarily have a goal--an end which is aimed at--but the end is incidental in intention and the action is done as an exhibition of skill.[90]

Neither of these modes of rightness is moral. Rightness which is a matter of efficiency is a technological rightness. Stylistic rightness is aesthetic;

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[90] Ibid., p. 114.

it is manifested in the freedom, ease and grace with which the action, a dance for example, is performed. Moreover, it is judged from the standpoint of the spectator, since the agent, the dancer, must concentrate his attention on the end, and the style of his activity, resting upon already acquired skill, is a matter of habit. While he is in action, the agent's judgment here is in terms of success or failure.

> The aesthetic judgement of rightness expresses, therefore, a contemplative attitude; the judgement which is concerned merely to assess efficiency is technological, and manifests a pragmatic frame of mind.[91]

When judging an action pragmatically, we tend to use the terms "right" and "wrong"; when we judge it contemplatively we tend to call it "good" or "bad." But these two modes of rightness are not really separable, and any action provides grounds for both types of judgment. These distinctions are gounded in the attitude of mind from which one judges, and whichever attitude is adopted, one cannot exclude, only subordinate the other attitude. For a style which necessarily hindered the success of the action could not be judged good, even from a purely aesthetic point of view.

These remarks on the rightness of action apply to the agent as isolated. This is clear from the fact that nothing has been said of the rightness of the agent's intention. For the same reason, the aesthetic and pragmatic modes of rightness are not moral. Obviously, the most immoral action can be efficiently and skillfully performed. As mentioned in the earlier discussion of action, so long as other persons are kept out of the account of action, the isolated agent lacks an essential criterion for (truly personal) action. Such an isolated agent exists only in abstraction. There we can imagine him vis-à-vis a less than personal Other, namely in an organic and/or material environment. But so situated, he has no ground for personal discrimination and judgment. He can act in terms of material or organic beings and so perform actions which (were another person present to assess them) could be judged as pragmatically or aesthetically right or good, but not morally so. The Other which such an isolated agent needs and employs for action is of such a nature that it could only be used instrumentally. This is but another way of saying that there is no possibility for moral action, since persons cannot be so employed in action which is morally right. Without a relation of agents in one field of action there would be no reason for choosing one possible action in preference to another.

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[91] Ibid. Macmurray uses the term "pragmatic" rather than "practical" to describe the judgment assessing efficiency because the term "practical" suggests the full and appropriate judgment of action. What he wishes to convey by using "pragmatic" is a standard of judgment based exclusively on the success or failure of an agent to achieve his object by whatever means he adopts.

> An action is defined by its intention, and its absolute rightness must lie, therefore, in the rightness of its intention. But if the intention can itself be either right or wrong, the ground for this cannot lie in the agent whose intention it is, but in the Other. Further, it cannot lie in the Other as the means used by the agent to accomplish his intention, but only in the Other as itself intentional, and therefore in the personal Other. The moral rightness of an action, therefore, has its ground in the relation of persons. The moral problematic of all action--the possibility that any action may be morally right or

> wrong--arises from the conflict of wills, and morality, in any mode, is the effort to resolve this conflict.[92]

Criticizing Macmurray on this point, E. Harris asks,

> If we assert that no action is possible except in an environment of persons, are we not commited to some sort of hylozoism? If not, how are we to conceive, for instance, the activity of Robinson Crusoe on his island before the advent of Friday?[93]

Perhaps a passage from Bergson might shed some light on this query.

He writes:

> Vainly do we try to imagine an individual cut off from all social life. Even materially, Robinson Crusoe on his island remains in contact with other men, for the manufactured objects he saved from the wreck, and without which he could not get along, keep him within the bounds of civilization, and consequently within those of society. But a moral contact is still more necessary to him, for he would be soon discouraged if he had nothing else to cope with his incessant difficulties except an individual strength of which he knows the limitations. He draws energy from the society to which he remains attached in spirit; he may not perceive it, still it is there, watching him: if the individual ego maintains alive and present the social ego, he will effect, even in isolation, what he would with the encouragement and even the support of the whole of society. Those whom circumstances condemn for a time to solitude, and who cannot find within themselves the resources of a deep inner life, know the penalty of "giving way," that is to say of not stabilising the individual ego at the level prescribed by the social ego. They will therefore be careful to maintain the latter, so that it shall not relax for one moment its strictness towards the former. If necessary, they will seek for some material or artificial support for it. You remember Kipling's Forest Officer, alone in his bungalow in the heart of the Indian bush? He dresses every evening for dinner, so as to preserve his self-respect in his isolation.[94]

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[92] Ibid., p. 116.

[93] Harris, loc. cit., 458.

[94] Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashely Audra, et al. (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, n. d.), p. 16.

In quite another vein, Sartre indicates the necessity of the other person's existence to my action by quipping, "Nobody can be vulgar all alone!"[95]

Fully appreciated, the import of the last quoted passage from Macmurray, establishes as the ground for morality, not conformity of action to laws, but the fittingness of action, in its intention and motivation, to foster the relationship of persons. He is asserting more than the commonly observed fact that morality is essentially social. Obviously, the rightness of an action arises from the fact that actions of one person affect, either by way of help or hindrance, the actions of others.

> This, we may agree, is true, but it misses the essential element in the truth by considering the agents as isolated individuals and the relations of their individual actions as accidental or extrinsic.[96]

However, as he has insisted repeatedly, the individuality of agents in relation is merely the negative aspect of an intrinsic relatedness. Since the "I" and the "You" are both constituted by the personal relation, the intention of one particular agent is inherently related to the intention of the Other, and not merely accidentally. "Consequently, the morality of an action is inherent in action itself, and does not supervene in cases where a particular action has consequences which impinge in a critical fashion on the lives of other people."[97] To express this truth as formally as possible, Macmurray alludes to an earlier point he made about action, that action is the determination of the future. For this aspect of action takes on further significance when the agent is considered as one of a group of agents related in the same field of action. Here it is especially necessary to bear in mind the consequences of the practical standpoint Macmurray has adopted.

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[95] Thomas J. Owens, "Absolute Aloneness as Man's Existential Structure: A Study of Sartrean Ontology," The New Scholasticism, XL (1966), 353.

[96] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 116.

[97] Ibid., p. 117.

> The theoretical standpoint, with its dualism of Subject and Object, compels us to think the world as Object and the identity of the Self as a unity of consciousness or thought. When we then seek to give some account of action, we credit the Self with some curious power to effect changes in the world by acts of will. The effect of this is that we think of our experience as a continuity of awareness, which constitutes the continuing identity of the Self in time. Occasionally, this continuum of consciousness somehow gives rise to acts which have casual /sic; presumably, causal/ effects in the external world, if a conscious decision to do so has been reached. These acts are then thought as atomic, connected with one another only through the fact that they are all separate acts of one and the same Subject.[98]

However, when this point of view is exchanged for the agent-self, postulating the primacy of the practical, the world is then thought as a unity of action, and the self-identity of the agent is a continuity of action.

> What happens occasionally is that the intentionality of our action may be reflected back upon itself, and so produce a reflective activity, while the practical activity continues automatically, as a result of established habits.[99]

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[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid. Cf. Bergson, op. cit., p. 19, where he speaks of continuous choices we make at every instant as the very stuff of daily life, and the fact that on occasion only we become conscious of having to choose. Though this is done in the context of Bergson's notion of duty and obedience, there is a similarity to the view Macmurray expresses above concerning the continuity of our practical activity with a periodic reflecting back of the intentionality of action upon itself.

If we now replace the abstract conception of the agent by the group or society of agents, this society must be conceived as a differentiation of the agent, and not as a set of individual objects. As agents, they have their being in the continuum of action which is the world.

> If the whole society of agents is contrasted with the world as their "Other," this does not deny that the society is part of the world: and if an individual agent contrasts himself with the society as his Other, even asserts his total opposition to the society, he does not assert that he is not a member of this society.[100]

As persons, it will be recalled, we always are and remain part of the personal Other from which we distinguish ourselves.

> Now if the world is a continuum of action, and there are in it a number of agents; and if action is the determination of the future, the condition for action is a unity of intentions, and the actions of the different agents must be unified in one action. For the future of the World cannot be determined in incompatible ways. If it could be, the world would become, as it were, a plurality of incompatible worlds. Whatever actions are done in the world, it must remain one world. If then, two agents, or two groups of agents have incompatible intentions, both intentions cannot be realized. In this situation, either one agent must yield to the other, of his own free will, or they must seek to prevent one another from acting. In the first case one of the agents loses his freedom, and cannot realize his nature as an agent; in the second, both lose their freedom until one has mastered the other and forced him to abandon his intention. For in a struggle of wills action is negative. . . . The intention of each party is dictated by the other, and neither determines the common future.[101]

Of course, the struggle may have catastrophic consequences not _intended_ by the agents in the struggle. And this applies whether the agents are in direct or indirect relation with one another. The success of one man on Wall Street can ruin a party in Europe. Most of what Macmurray says in this lengthy citation is easily grasped, but one might pause over its major premise: that the world is to be thought of as one action. This will be commented on at the close of this chapter, but it suffices to note that this unifying conception helps as a meaningful setting both for the consequences he has elaborated up to now and for the following crucial points.

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[100] Macmurray, _Persons in Relation,_ p. 118.

[101] _Ibid._

> This interrelation of agents, which makes the freedom of all members of a society depend upon the intentions of each, is the ground of morality. It provides a reference beyond themselves for all possible intentions in virtue of which they can be either right or wrong, and this rightness or wrongness is neither technical nor aesthetic, but moral. Its corollary is that the freedom of any agent--that is to say, his capacity to realize his own being as an agent--is conditioned, inherently, by the action of all other agents. My freedom depends upon how you behave. This provides an absolute, though only an indeterminate or formal criterion of morality.[102]

Extending this perspective, if the harmonious interrelation of agents is called their "community," one may say that a morally right action is an action which intends community.

> Any act of any agent is an expression of his own freedom. But if the world is one action, any particular action determines the future, within its own limits, for all agents. Every individual agent is therefore responsible to all other agents for his actions. Freedom and responsibility are, then, aspects of one fact. The intention of any agent is, however, relative to his knowledge of the Other. His responsibility cannot extend beyond his knowledge. Consequently, whatever he does is morally right if the particular intention of his

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[102] Ibid., pp. 118-19. Cf. Johann, The Review of Metaphysics, XVII (1964), 328.

> action is controlled by a general intention to maintain the community of agents, and wrong if it is not so controlled.[103]

Adopting this general intention as his own each person is provided with a unifying intention. Not only does this intention maintain the unity of any group of agents, but it serves as a unifying intention for all the actions of an individual person in his life considered singly. [illegible] is an intention which remains the same for all one's actions, and to which they can all be referred as to a standard. Most of all, it accords with reality, for it is a universal and necessary intention for all agents, since the relation of persons is constitutive for their existence as persons.

> They can only be themselves and realize their freedom as agents through their relation to one another. The interrelation of agents is a necessary matter of fact. But it is also a necessary matter of intention.[104]

This latter observation is collinear with Antonin Sertillanges' notion of dynamic morality as the science of what men ought to be by reason of what they are. Expanding the point that the interrelation of agents is matter of fact, but must become as well matter of intention for personal agents,

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[103] Macmurray, *op. cit.*, p. 119. Cf. Lepp, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-11: "Common action--and it must be positive action, as often as possible creative--is, in effect, the first condition for the formation of a community of friends. . . . Under no circumstances is it enough to meet at the level of leisure alone. This is precisely what radically distinguishes a community of friends from a group of casual companions. The first is united by a concern for essentials . . . the second, on the other hand, is founded on the unessential; consequently, the result is not a solid and durable edifice but a simple agglomeration of juxtaposed existences."

[104] Macmurray, *Persons in Relation,* p. 119.

Macmurray observes that it is not enough to constitute the agent a person that he should in fact be a member of a group of persons.

> He must know that he is a member of the group, and that in all his actions he is entering into intentional relation, directly or indirectly, with the others. This universal and necessary intention, which is the same for all agents, because it springs purely from their nature as agents, provides, therefore, a norm for the rightness or wrongness of all actions whatever. It is this that enables us to define morality by reference to maintaining community in action.[105]

Having sketched the ground plan of morality, Macmurray points out two consequences of his assertion that moral rightness or wrongness lies in the intention of an action. The first is that it is independent of success or failure. One who attempts a murder and fails is morally guilty of the crime, if not legally. A second corollary that follows connects with the earlier discussion concerning apperception. Effective knowledge in action, it was said, is selected by attention, just as the direction of one's acting is selected by intention. Attention concerns the situation as we apprehend it at the point of action, and influences intention--directional knowledge in action. The further point made, however, was that any general type of selection in attention, characteristic of a particular agent, will constitute his normal mode of apperception. The general style one has of selecting what he does attend to, and what he ignores, will ultimately affect the attention he pays to a concrete situation, and consequently the intention which informs his action in a given situation. In his personal relation with other agents, his normal mode of apperception will be his normal mode of moral apperception, and will decide how he envisages the community of agents of which he is a member.

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[105] Ibid., p. 120.

> It is to this knowledge that the rightness or wrongness of his intention in action is relative, and his moral responsibility is limited by it. Even if his conception of morality is an inadequate one, his intentions in particular are morally right if they exemplify it, and morally wrong if they negate it. An agent's morality must be relative to his own conscience.[106]

This passage is significant since it affords as the proximate criterion for judging the intentions of particular actions one's normal mode of apperception. This leaves scope for what are usually designated "subjective" elements in morality. It need scarcely be added, however, that one's normal mode of apperception may leave much to be desired, and that if such be the case, one is responsible for modifying this apperception, the ultimate ground (within the agent) for the morality of his particular acts.

At least implicitly, Macmurray acknowledges our responsibility for the way we customarily apperceive the Other, in the observations he makes in leading up to his sketch of the three modes of morality. He notes first, that if a particular mode of moral apperception is generally characteristic for any community of persons, it will determine the moral outlook considered normal in that community, and consequently its moral orthodoxy. Even if the conscience of someone in the group is unorthodox, it is still related to what is deemed the orthodox code.

> For morality refers to the structure of personal relations which unites the members in a community of agents, and personal relations

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[106] Ibid.

> are necessarily reciprocal. What is expected of me by the Other must always play an important part, though not always a decisive part, in determining the morality of actions.[107]

A second consideration, indicating further complexity, is that one has to distinguish the moral orthodoxy of any community from its traditional moral code. For it is possible for the code of morality which is traditionally proposed in any community to differ widely from the system of norms which in practice guides the behavior of most of its members when they act conscientiously, and which determines what is expected of any member as a responsible moral agent. As alluded to early in the first chapter, with reference to the stoical cast of early Christian morality, it is possible for the morality traditionally professed to be ideal and theoretical; while the normal orthodox morality is practical and effective.[108]

These considerations bridge Macmurray's discussion of morality in general with his treatment of the three categories of moral apperception, designated earlier as communal, contemplative, and pragmatic. Attention to these categories of apperception is important, because each of them determines the form in which the community of agents is conceived. My apperception will determine the form of the demand upon me to which my actions are a response. Macmurray calls these three modes of morality typical, in the sense that they are formal possibilities--not that one or other of them must completely characterize any individual or any community. It is likely that in actual life all three may be operative, either in an individual or in the orthodoxy of a group. It is probable, however, that one of the three will tend to dominate in a person or group at any time. As a whole, then, the moral orthodoxy of a group will tend to be in one or other of the three modes.

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[107] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

[108] *Ibid.*

> The reason for this tendency is that if they are mixed they will give rise to moral conflict, which can only be avoided if one of them is taken as normal for the others. There is a natural pressure towards system in practice as well as in theory, and the avoidance of conflict in personal relations is one of the functions of moral orthodoxy.[109]

One last prenote is that larger communities may contain smaller ones within them, and the code of morality taken as normal for the small community may be in a different mode from that espoused by the larger. A man's apperception of his relation to members of his family, for example, may differ modally from his apperception of his relations as a citizen to other members of his nation.

The Three Typical Modes of Morality

Of the three typical modes of morality, one is based upon a positive apperception of the Other, and two upon negative apperceptions, which are opposite and ambivalent (like the submissive and aggressive behavior of children motivated by fear). The positive mode of morality is the communal, and the negative modes are designated as contemplative and pragmatic.

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[109] Ibid., p. 122.

Resting as it does on a positive motivation, the communal mode is characteristically heterocentric. That is, the center of reference for the agent in this mode of morality, when he strives to act rightly, is always the personal Other. To act rightly is to act for the sake of the Other and not for oneself. In this mode, the Other always remains fully personal; persons are always treated as persons.[110] "It is characteristic for this mode, then, that in the face of the moral problem, which is the problem of hostility resting upon fear, it demands the transformation of motives by the overcoming of fear."[111] The normal expression of communal morality is the injunction to love one's neighbor as oneself. Equally characteristic, in relation to negative motivation in the Other, is the formula, love your enemies. Obviously this mode of morality is what Christian morality, when true to itself, professes.

By contrast, the two negative modes are both egocentric. Egocentricity creates dualism.

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[110] As Macmurray indicates elsewhere in Persons in Relation, it is possible for one accustomed to treat other persons as persons, in a particular instance, to treat another impersonally. This is justified only when the activity directed by the impersonal attitude of the agent falls within, and is subordinated to, an intention to restore the other person to normal mental health, for example, or some facet of personhood to which the other needs to be restored. See the particular example he uses (on pp. 35 ff.) to which might be added, disciplinary measures which a guardian might have to exercise over his charges.

[111] Ibid., p. 122.

> For the relation to the Other constitutes both oneself and the other; the intention to maintain, in general, the relations that unite the members in a community is a necessary intention. But the habitual motivation negates this.[112]

Consequently, for negative modes of apperception, the world divides into two worlds; an actual world which does not answer to our demands, and refuses to satisfy us, and another world, an ideal one which we can imagine, which does. Either a contemplative or pragmatic mode of morality will arise from this source, depending upon which of the two worlds is thought of as the real world, which, that is to say, is taken as being for the sake of the other.

> Similarly, the self becomes two selves, for each of which one of these two worlds is "the Other." There is a spiritual self with a spiritual life and a material self with a bodily life. The positive apperception, through its heterocentricity, escapes this dualism.[113]

The real world for the contemplative mode of morality is the spiritual world, and the real life is the spiritual life. Just as the child, in the example used previously, takes refuge from the apparent hostility of the mother by withdrawing into a life of phantasy, so the adult can solve problems of living in a world which appears threatening by withdrawing into reflection, adopting the attitude of a spectator. Of course he cannot escape from the necessity of practical activity, and the necessity of relating to other agents which this entails, since his dependence upon the Other is matter of fact.

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[112] Ibid., p. 123.

[113] Ibid.

> But he can cease consciously to intend the practical life. He can seek to realize himself in the private isolated world of his own thoughts and feelings and imaginings. To do this, he must conform in practice, and make the practical life a means to the inner life of the mind. This is possible provided that, and so far as, the practical life can be made automatic, a matter of routine and habit, which supports as a whole a deliberate and intentional life of reflection, contemplation and ideal construction. He will engage in deliberate practical activity only because he must and only so far as he must.[114]

Earlier this perspective received attention for its effects on the individual's life. For this category of apperception to prevail as the normal one for a society, the harmony of the relations of its members in practical life must be made automatic. This is possible with the establishment of a common form of social life which is unchanging, within which the activity of each member is adjusted to that of the others automatically. This form will consist of a system of social habit in which the activity of each member is functionally related to the activity of the others, so that the practical life of the society is a balanced and harmonious unity, a system of social habit.

> To maintain this each member must have his function in the common life; he must be trained from childhood to recognize the social pattern and his own function in it, and to develop the system of habits which makes conformity to it a second nature.[115]

The contemplative mode of morality is, then, a morality of good form. Wrong action is bad form, unseemly. The operative standard, broadly speaking, is the aesthetic one. As such it is not the sort of standard that can easily be formulated in general precepts.

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[114] Ibid., pp. 123-24.

[115] Ibid., p. 124.

> It has to be felt. It is a kind of beauty or grace in social relations, a matter of style, of balance, of tact and poise. It displays a knowledge of how to behave which rests on insight or intuition, and cannot be reduced to general rules. It depends upon a vision of the good which is the same for all who are united in personal activity by means of it. We should be inclined to regard it as concerned rather with manners than with morals, but that is because our normal mode of apperception relegates it to a subordinate role in the realization of a harmony of action in society. For it presupposes that the real life is not the life of action but of reflection. The classical exposition of this mode of morality is Plato's *Republic*, and it is the normal mode of morality for the Classical Greek moralists.[116]

The antithesis and complement of this, is the other negative mode of morality--the "pragmatic." Here the material life--the life of action--is taken as real, while the life of the spirit is subordinate, serving as a means to practice. In this case the conflict of will is met by aggression, by the effort to overpower the resistance of other agents, to compel them to submit. Should one apperceive life in this way, his goal would be the appropriation of power, and the relation of agents would be viewed as a competition for power. The problematic of action becomes the effort to achieve one's own purpose in the face of resistance from the other. Because of the inescapable interdependence of agents, however, this selfish effort must be limited by the necessity to maintain the unity of society, that is, the systematic cooperation of agents. In the mode of morality suited to this apperception of life, all problems of action become technological.

> For the ends of action are taken for granted. Each individual has his own intention which he is determined to realize. His problem concerns the means to realize it in the face of resistance; it is

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[116] *Ibid.*, pp. 124-25.

> efficiency in action that determines right and wrong. Now the technique for maintaining a harmony of cooperation in a society is law, conceived as a means for keeping the peace. The pragmatic mode of morality will then be conceived as obedience to law--to a moral law which the individual imposes upon himself, and through which he secures the universal intention to maintain the community of action. It will be a morality of self-control, of power over the self, limiting its own freedom for the sake of maintaining the community.[117]

Such a morality will be expressed in terms of will-power, obligation and duty, as a set of rules or principles which are the same for all, and which limit for each the use of his own power to do what he pleases. This familiar mode of morality has its origins, so far as Western Europe is concerned, in the stoic philosophy and Roman law and its most brilliant exponent in the modern world has been Immanuel Kant.[118]

These views of morality provide a background for Macmurray's thoughts on the social aspect of the personal. Having stressed the relation of persons, even to the extent of making it the matrix of personal individuality, he has, for the most part, looked at it from the standpoint of one of the related individuals. From this vantage, morality is still, in a sense, characteristic of the individual. It is in him that the moral demand arises, and is experienced as a demand that he makes upon himself. Yet its reference to him is as a member of a society of agents, and its function could not be fulfilled--indeed it would not be a moral demand--if it were not universal, if each member of the society did not make the same demand upon himself.[119] This essential characteristic of morality, its truth for all men, demands that the relation of persons from the social standpoint be considered.

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[117] Ibid., p. 125.

[118] Ibid., p. 126.

The Relation of Persons from the Social Standpoint

What was said earlier of the individual person, applies to society as well: as a unity of persons, society is not merely matter of fact but also a matter of intention. It is not a natural phenomenon, and therefore cannot be understood or described in biological terms. For this reason Macmurray does not believe that the persistence and development of human society can be described as an evolutionary process. As is evident from the following passage, his objection to use of the evolutionary model to describe human society is directed against that use of the evolutionary perspective _which would abstract from man's intentional participation._ In brief, if the evolutionary model is applied to matters of mankind's collective striving, it cannot be evolution in an automatic sense, as a process whose progress is independent of man's effort.

> An evolutionary development moves from an original homogeneity to an increasing heterogeneity--as in the evolution of species. The history of human society, on the contrary, moves from an original heterogeneity to an increasing homogeneity. Its continuity is a continuity of action, not of process. Any human society, however primitive, is maintained by the intention of its members to maintain it. Short of the extermination of its members, it can be destroyed only by destroying this intention. The history of the Poles or the Czechs, or, above all of the Jews, should be sufficient evidence of this. To seek its basis in a supposititious herd-instinct is merely

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[119] _Ibid._, p. 127.

> puerile. Human beings have no instincts, and a human society is not a herd. Any human society is a moral entity. Its basis is the universal and necessary intention to maintain the personal relation which makes the human individual a person, and his life a common life. It is an instantiation of the "I and You" as the unit of the personal. It is constituted and maintained by loyalty and keeping faith.[120]

The commonplace that man is essentially social cannot be interpreted to mean that man is one of the herd animals, that like ants, bees and buffaloes, he behaves as a member of a group. In this view, the unity that constitutes a human community is the same, in principle, as that which constitutes the beehive community. The difference between them is merely one of complexity, not of type. This interpretation of the social character of human life is to be rejected for the fundamental reason that it treats human society as a mere matter of fact, which can be observed and described from the standpoint of a spectator.[121] To an extent, such theories of human society have their usefulness. But if, without qualification, they are presumed to be, in principle, adequate accounts of the social character of human life, they rest upon and propagate an illusion. One can watch and theorize about the activity of bees in a hive; true or false, adequate or inadequate, one's theory makes no difference to the bees.

> But if I form theories about human society in the same fashion this is not the case. For I am not just a spectator of human activity, but a participant. Indeed, this search for understanding which leads me

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[120] Ibid., p. 128.

[121] Ibid., p. 129.

> to form my theories is itself a characteristic human activity which has no parallel among the animals. If I really believe my theory, that is, if I integrate it with my behaviour as part of my knowledge in action, it modifies my behaviour as a member of a human society.[122]

For when I redefine myself, I redefine my relationship to others. If I do not act in conformity with my theory, I behave as if it were not true and so offer proof that I do not really believe it. The same is true of a society's conception of itself. A theory of practice that would not work in practice is ipso facto a false theory.

> We are here, you may notice, very close to the origins of the dualism of mind and matter. It lies in the dominance of the negative in us, in the fear of the Other, and the illusion that is inseparable from this negativity. For our fear of the Other generates the desire to escape from the demands of the Other upon us, by withdrawing from action into another life, the life of the mind, in which we can exist as thinkers, and realize our freedom in reflection. If this could be, then we should be pure minds, and spectators of a world of activity in which our actions would be determined for us by laws not of our making. In the realm of thought we should be free, but our bodily life would be determined by the laws of that world of necessity from which we have escaped. The world of action would become an external world, a world of phenomena; that is to say, a show--a dramatic spectacle which unrolls itself upon the stage for us to watch, to follow and to enjoy.[123]

This illusion and self-deception is a dualism that ultimately derives from the desire to know the truth without having to live it. From the consideration of the three typical modes of morality, Macmurray moves on to considerations of societies that arise from differing apperceptions of the other. Important as such issues are, they are not immediately pertinent to the scope of the present investigation. Enough has been gleaned from his maturest works to reveal the importance of Macmurray's perspectives for morality.

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[122] Ibid., pp. 129-30.

[123] Ibid., pp. 130-31.

In this section we have dealt with the importance and types of apperception, as they especially apply to morality. Morality is a science dealing with the activity of persons and is therefore concerned with conceptions men have of themselves and their relations one with another. Since morality deals with practice, practical knowledge (intention in action), is of primary concern. The central issue considered is that our reality as persons, and our collective existence in society, is not merely matter of fact, but matter of intention. Our activity as persons, and the progress of human society depend upon the intention informing personal action. Our conception of such realities demands examination since, if our conceptions are false, the actions they determine will be misdirected, for the intention of our action will be misdirected. If the misconception under which we labor is categorial, then our actions will be inherently self-frustrating. For error will then infect the form of our action in general and not its particular content as this or that particular action. In such a case, to change the objective will not remove the frustration.

> For whatever objective we aim at, the attainment of it will reveal itself as only an apparent success, and the end will be found to be not what we really intended. So long as we can believe that the error lies in our choice of objective, we can try again. But this cannot continue indefinitely; the alternatives are limited. The discovery that all objectives have the same illusory character is

> the experience of despair. It is expressed in the judgement that human life is inherently meaningless and that all action is futile.[124]

In Macmurray's terms, a categorial misconception (an inadequate apperception) is a misconception of one's own nature. In other words, our habitual perspective is fundamental for all our actions. It is easy enough to appreciate that error in theory involves failure in practice, a principle upon which all verification rests.

> If, however, the error lies in our conception of our own nature, it must affect all our action, for we shall misconceive our own reality by appearing to ourselves to be what we are not, or not to be what we are. The result can only be a self-frustration based upon a self-deception.[125]

This consideration emphasizes the importance of realizing our relational character as persons, and the necessity of making it operative in the intent of our action, by overcoming negative by positive motivation in our relations with others. If one's apperception of the Other, his habitual style of regarding the Other, rests upon a negative motivation, he misconceives his own nature and that of the Other. His action is then defensive and appears to be dictated by the other person, against whom he must defend himself. Always on the defensive, one denies his own freedom. As when two friends quarrel and are estranged, each blames the other for the bad relations between them. Here, in miniature, one can see what appears to be the root of all moral evil.[126]

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[124] Ibid., pp. 148-49. Cf. Keniston, loc. cit., pp. 205-206 on the theme: in a generation as in individuals the conviction of powerlessness begets the fact of powerlessness.

[125] Macmurray, op. cit., p. 149.

So long as persons remain negatively motived toward one another, the freedom of each is impaired. Each remains on the defensive, in isolation from the other, denying in the practical order, the truth of their inter-relational character.

> Or, to put it otherwise, if my motivation is negative then I appear to myself as an isolated individual who must act for himself and achieve whatever he can achieve by his individual efforts, in a world which cares nothing for his success or failure. Yet in reality, my isolation is a self-isolation, a withdrawal from relationships through fear of the other. This attitude, which expresses the experience of frustration and despair, is nothing but the sophisticated adult version of the attitude of the child whose mother refuses to give him what he wants. Its unsophisticated formula is, "Nobody loves me."[127]

If, despite such negative motivation regarding the Other, I still have to act with him, my action will lack positive motivation. Fear of the other remains, but is suppressed. This makes possible cooperation between persons to achieve such ends as each of them has an interest in achieving. But they remain isolated individuals, and the cooperation between them, though it may appear to satisfy their need of one another, does not really satisfy them.

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[126] In this regard Robinson, commenting on St. Paul's treatment of Christ's death in relation to the power of evil, makes some illuminating observations. "The only way evil ever wins victories," he writes, "is by making a man retort by evil, pay it back, and thus afford it a new lease on life. Over one who persistently absorbs it and refuses to give it out, it is powerless. It is in this kind of way that Paul sees Christ dealing with the forces of evil--going on and on and on, triumphantly absorbing their attack by untiring obedience, till eventually there is nothing more they can do. Or, rather, there is one thing more--and that is to kill Him. This they do. But in the very act they confess their own defeat. For all they achieve thereby is to deprive Him, still inviolate, of the flesh through which they have any power of temptation over Him. He thus slips their grasp and renders them impotent. The Resurrection is the inevitable consequence of this defeat; death could have no grip on Him, since sin obtained no foothold in Him. It was impossible that He should be holden of it. This same process Paul works out in relation to the same . . . thraldom under which humanity stands." J. A. T. Robinson, The Body: a Study in Pauline Theology (London: SCM Press, 1952), p. 40.

[127] Macmurray, op. cit., p. 149.

> For what we really need is to care for one another, and we are only caring for ourselves. We have achieved society, but not community. We have become associates, but not friends.[128]

Community

From what has been said of the nature of persons, and the only type of action that truly fulfills personhood, it is obvious that the communal mode of morality (and society), as opposed to the contemplative and pragmatic modes, is the only fitting style for the person. Some indication of Macmurray's ideas on communal existence will reveal further implications of his central thesis: all meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action is for the sake of friendship.

As distinct from a mere society, a community is a group of individuals united in common life, the motivation of which is positive. Though a community is a group which acts together, as does a society, unlike a mere society, its members are in communion with one another--they constitute a fellowship.

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[128] *Ibid.*, p. 150.

> A society whose members act together without forming a fellowship can only be constituted by a common purpose. They co-operate to achieve a purpose which each of them, in his own interest, desires to achieve, and which can only be achieved by co-operation. The relations of its members are functional; each of them plays his allotted part in the achievement of the common end. The society then has an organic form: it is an organization of functions; and each member is a function of the group. A community, however, is a unity of persons as persons. It cannot be defined in functional terms, by relation to a common purpose. It is not organic in structure, and cannot be constituted or maintained by organization, but only by the motives which sustain the personal relations of its members. It is constituted and maintained by mutual affection. This can only mean that each member of the group is in positive personal relation to each of the others taken severally. The structure of a community is the nexus or network of the active relations of friendship between all possible pairs of its members.[129]

Because this is true of all possible pairs of members of a community, one pair can be isolated as the unit of personal community to discover the basic structure of community as such. As Lepp says "Friendship, in a community of friends, loses none of its I-Thou quality."[130] In examining the relationship of two friends one uncovers the characteristics of communal, and therefore truly personal, existence. Each is heterocentric, placing the center of his interest and attention in the other, rather than in himself. Each considers the other as the center of value, realizing that by himself alone each has no value.

> But this is mutual; the other cares for him disinterestedly in return. Each, that is to say, acts, and therefore thinks and feels for the other, and not for himself. But because the positive motive contains and subordinates its negative, their unity is not fusion of selves, neither is it a functional unity of differences--neither an organic nor

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[129] Ibid., pp. 157-58.

[130] Lepp, op. cit., p. 109.

> a mechanical unity--it is a unity of persons. Each remains a distinct individual; the other remains really other. Each realizes himself in and through the other.[131]

In describing this structure of communion between persons it is important to realize that it does not mean the smothering of one member by the other. Rather Macmurray sees the freedom of each fully respected: both realize their freedom as agents, since in the absence of fear for the self there is no constraint on either, and each can be himself fully--neither is under obligation to act a part. This is collinear with Chardin's expression that true union differentiates. Before God, the human person is not swallowed up by the Absolute, but shines fully in his uniqueness having come home to the very source of his person in the personhood of the Trinity. On the human level as well, true union differentiates. For when we are among friends, or in a warm family circle, there is no need to be on one's guard, on the defensive; rather, without mentally rehearsing every word before uttering it, we can be ourselves, fearing no reprisals. Of others in the circle of friends, the same is true.

Similarly, what Macmurray says of the structure of communal existence between persons does not imply that each of them is equally talented, has the same interests, holds the same opinions, laughs at the same jokes. On the contrary, it is only in fellowship that variety can blossom, because fear of the other is subordinated, and each is not afraid to express himself. This kind of equality is intentional; it is an aspect of the mutuality of persons in act.[132]

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[131] Macmurray, op. cit., p. 158.

Another caution one must have in using one pair of friends to speak of the structure of community, is the obvious one that the two friends have been isolated from all other persons. It is easy enough to agree, perhaps, to the qualities of friendly relations when this model is employed. However, after using the isolated pair to say something of the structure of personal mutuality, they must again be seen in relation to all other persons. For if their relation to one another is exclusive of the others then its motivation in relation to the others is negative; the two friends must defend themselves against the intrusion of the rest. If this be the case,

> their friendship becomes a positive element in a motivation which is dominantly negative and this will destroy the realization of the exclusive relation itself. To be fully positive, therefore, the relation must be in principle inclusive, and without limits. Only so can it constitute a community of persons. The self-realization of any individual person is only fully achieved if he is positively motived towards every other person with whom he is in relation. We can therefore formulate the inherent ideal of the personal. It is a universal community of persons in which each cares for all the others and no one for himself. This ideal of the personal is also the condition of freedom--that is, of a full realization of his capacity to act--for every person. Short of this there is unintegrated, and therefore suppressed, negative motivation; there is unresolved fear; and fear inhibits action and destroys freedom.[133]

Having indicated the structure of communal existence, Macmurray devotes his attention to religion as the celebration of this communion under God. Underlying his thought is the insight that in personal relationships man is in the field of religion.[134]

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[132] Ibid.

[133] Ibid., p. 159. Cf. "the inherent ideal of the personal," specified above with Phil. 2,1-7.

In his concentration on the intrinsic relatedness of persons, Macmurray has shown how action, which for him means personal action, is only possible on the condition that we exist with other persons. For action to be action, requires knowledge and motivation. Both require, for their existence and development, a dynamic interaction between persons from infancy onwards. In shifting the center of philosophical procedure from theory to action, Macmurray draws attention to the primary knowledge, from which all other kinds of knowledge are derived, the knowledge given in action. The knowledge of the self and other existing together is certain knowledge, the only certain knowledge there is. Since existence is given, in particular the existence of others, a fact which Macmurray acknowledges by basing his philosophy on the primacy of the practical, he is not constrained, like varieties of skeptical philosophies, to the logical denial of God.[135] His argument to support the contention that a philosophy based on the primacy of the practical leads to a theistic conclusion depends upon recognizing that the world is to be thought as one action.

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[134] Corroborating this, Van Der Marck notes that religion and common humanity are materially synonymous and only formally distinct. "The religious man is not a peculiar phenomenon," he writes, "as is sometimes thought and as some psychologists would have it, arguing from empirical observations and, apparently, just as much from preconceived ideas. Fundamentally and primarily, the religious man is not the one who displays outward signs of his religion, but the one who in all respects is humanly good as a man, even if he sometimes regards himself as an agnostic or an atheist. For the directedness toward fellowmen involves precisely that directedness toward God which is expected of men." Toward a Christian Ethic, p. 157.--Macmurray is sensitive to the fact that the continuous possibility prevails that hostility and enmity may break out between members of the community and destroy fellowship. For community is matter of intention and therefore problematical. Further, the community so far achieved among men is imperfect and contains not just the possibility but the evidences of failure. Here he sees the role of religion especially prominent. In the face of man's failure in maintaining community, "religion is itself intentional. Its celebration of communion is also a means of strengthening the will to community. The function of religion is then to mobilize and strengthen the positive elements in the motivation of its members, to overcome the negative motives where they exist, to prevent the outbreak of enmity and strife, to dominate the fear of the Other and subordinate the centrifugal to the centripetal tendencies in the community." Persons in Relation, p. 163. Since he clearly views community as a task in which religion is required to play an essential role, Macmurray does not assume that fellowship is automatic. For Macmurray's acknowledgment of the limited number of friendships any one person enjoys (while yet maintaining the necessity of striving toward community), see the references given in the next chapter in connection with mutuality and freedom.

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[135] For Macmurray's elaboration of this point (which cannot be pursued conveniently here), see the last chapter (pp. 206 ff.) of Persons in Relation.--In this connection it is interesting to note that Sartre praises Heidegger for the new direction he took in philosophy by recognizing the relation between "human realities," depending one upon the other in their essential being. With all previous philosophy, the relation between selves was of the type "l'être pour," but with Heidegger, the other is no longer "for" me, but "with" me, since each person is a *Mitsein* existing in a reciprocal lateral interdependence with each other *Mitsein.* However, while acknowledging this point, Sartre takes as one of the primary conditions of his own theory that "the only starting point for us is the Cartesian Cogito." In no small measure this leads to his pessimistic conclusion that "each person, alone and unassisted by any other person above him or beside him is condemned to live out his life in the midst of a world which has no meaning beyond offering possibilities for arbitrary freedom." See, Owens, *The New Scholasticism*, XL (1966), 348-49 and 359. It is likewise worthy of noting, with Guitton, that Sartre's notion of love, like that of Stendhal, Proust, and Freud, does away with the existence of the other so that for all of them love in its essence is a *solitary* phenomenon. (*Ibid.*, 356-57, n. 46).

As indicated earlier, this perspective helps him to unify many aspects of personal existence and action. Once one accepts the thought of the world as one action, it is a short step to realize that this one action is the work of a single Agent who is the center of the universe.[136] This is obviously a metaphysical conception of the world. He approached it by analyzing personal action, the integration of the movements of the agent with those of the Other so that they form a unity which is intended. We cannot think the world as mechanical, for this deterministic conception precludes intention, therefore personal action. We cannot think of the world, comprehensively, adequately, in terms of process alone, because here too intentionality of personal action is excluded. To describe the world exclusively as process means it is a world in which everything simply happens and nothing is ever done, executed that is by personal (therefore intentional) action. Everything is matter of fact, nothing is ever intended.[137] By excluding deterministic patterns, Macmurray concludes that the only unity model of the world which will adequately account for persons and their actions is the conception of the world as one action. Is it possible to verify this metaphysical postulate? Macmurray maintains, with James and Dewey, that the verification of metaphysical statements depends on the difference that belief in them makes to our practical way of life. A metaphysic determines a manner of living and its verification depends on the satisfactoriness, and its falsification on the unsatisfactoriness, of that way of life.[138]

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[136] Macmurray, op. cit., p. 222.

[137] For an analysis of Macmurray's philosophical reasons for discounting process as an adequate model for thinking the world (as he is wont to phrase it), see McManus, op. cit., pp. 173 ff.

Alternate models for thinking the unity of the world and our place in it, leave us feeling helpless before a determined universe which rolls its predetermined course despite us, leaving us feeling utterly futile and our action pointless. Or else they locate the real elsewhere and condemn us to a shadowy world where we seek every opportunity to escape challenge in favor of phantasy. If, on the other hand, we appreciate the primacy of the realm of the interpersonal, we are not absolved from friction and pain, but are provided with the adequate context in which to spend ourselves and seek to shape the future which God has placed in our hands. Dissatisfaction with life springs not from its unreality or our lack of complete control but largely from our approach to life. If we are to profit from experience our apperception of it must be such as to leave us open to it. We must respond to reality which beckons us.

> To find himself, a man must ultimately go "out of himself." To find the real, he must finally consent to let the Other be and disclose itself and to let himself be transcended by it; he must . . . be willing to achieve his own meaning and sufficiency in what is distinct from himself. The search for the real is, therefore, in

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[138] Cf. Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 221.

> the last analysis a quest for authentic experience. . . . The real is precisely that synthesis between the self and the truly Other which each man must achieve for himself and which, born of his free response to that which never ceases to come to him, is always fresh and always new.[139]

It is in the experiential realm of interpersonal existence that the real is open to us and where we make our response. While our discontent arises from this realm, so likewise does the meaningfulness of our existence. For the Other to whom the self is correlative is not just this or that other, but the One who is present in every other and wants to be loved and served in them all.[140] Hence, to conceive the world as one action is, ultimately, to conceive it as the act of God, the Creator of the world, and ourselves as created agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can be realized only on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with His intention, and which must frustrate itself if they are not.[141]

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[139] Johann, The Review of Metaphysics, XVII (1964), 337-38.

[140] Cf. Johann, Building the Human, p. 133. Pannenberg's provocative reflections are pertinent here: "It is in Jesus' Sonship that the destiny which has stood over man and which is intended from all eternity to become his future is fulfilled. Openness to God is the radical meaning of that human 'openness in relation to the world' that constitutes man's specific nature in distinction from all animals. If man in his existence is the question about God as the supporting and reconciling origin of everything real, then the unity with God that the Christian community confesses about Jesus cannot be opposed to man's nature as such. In his personal unity with God, Jesus is then the fulfillment of the human destiny, the true man. . . . Through this event it becomes apparent that all human existence is designed to be personalized by its dependence upon God, to be integrated into a person through its relation to God the Father in such a way that men are constituted as persons by the Fatherly God in confrontation with him. . . . This does not happen universally in the way it applies to Jesus, . . . his being as person is constituted as the Son in dependence upon the Father. If, however, Jesus' identity of person with the Son of God were completely alien to human 'nature' as such, the nineteenth-century objections to the doctrine of the enhypostasis of Jesus in the Logos would still be justified." Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), pp. 344-45.

Conceiving the world as one action validates itself as a fruitful perspective, because it keeps the Whole in view in my calling as a person, and reminds me that I am fully I when I freely commit myself to its (not merely my own) realization.[142] This is no mere armchair speculation. For the man who believes that the world is a unity of intention will act differently from one who does not see that all mankind should be one. He will avoid all that makes for divisiveness, and perform all that makes for unity. He will attempt to help others overcome their fear by not striking back, not repaying evil for evil and so giving it a new lease on life. He will be a liberating influence upon his neighbor, a source of creative help (which, as Lynch remarks, is half the definition of hope) by showing them love, and so helping his fearful brother to come to be the free son of God that he is, the son in God's Son that he is meant to be. In this direction lies the whole purpose of our calling.

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[141] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 222.

[142] Cf. Johann, Building the Human, p. 134.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPORTANCE OF MUTUALITY FOR REDOING MORAL THEOLOGY

At the risk of doing injustice to Macmurray's philosophy by attending to only those distinctive features of it relevant to morality, the previous pages should have afforded sufficient evidence that his thought measures up to the requirements that Marc Oraison enunciates in writing:

> Ultimate achievement for any philosophy is found in a theory of morality. A philosophy that disregards the dynamics of human behavior in its conception of the world is patently deficient. For morality does more than add the final fillip to a particular philosophical enterprise; it implements it concretely and brings about its practical effect. This perhaps explains why we tend to judge the sagacity of a philosopher on the strength of his moral preachments. It is at once the summation of his thought and its crowning achievement.[1]

In this Macmurray is almost singular among contemporary philosophers of the English speaking world who, though concerned with moral issues, largely confine themselves to analysis and examination of moral terminology. Yet, a philosophy of morals that would meet contemporary experience and knowledge must try to ascertain the significance of morality itself. Its task, as Kenneth I. Mills recently suggested, "is to replace the question 'What ought I to do?' by the question 'How should we live?' and to conceive of the answers to this new question not as a constituting advice to someone who has a 'moral problem' on his hands."[2] For though it may be true that in the solution of a specific problem one does not explicitly ask any ultimate questions, this does not mean that there is no overall guiding principle, a philosophy of life, implicitly acting upon the decision that is made.[3] Hence, when a philosopher offers us a fundamental perspective for unifying our experience and action in a meaningful way, he provides us with the most effective instrument he can offer. Should a philosopher dare do this today, however, as Mills says,

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[1] Marc Oraison, Morality For Our Time, trans. Nels Challe (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1968), p. 21.

> It will be asked: but would this not be to prescribe a morality, a way of life? I can only answer, in Hampshire's terms, that to give any account of morality is inescapably to specify one morality among others. Why is this the job of the philosopher? Largely because to give any account of morality is to philosophize, however gropingly, however inadequately. So why not the philosopher? And if not the philosopher, who?[4]

Mills addresses the question to those who conceive moral philosophy to be an exact study of the words used in making moral judgments, the compilation of a super-grammar,[5] neglecting in this pursuit of nicety, the central issue of morality itself. Such mis-directed effort would be comical if it were not that society needs as never before a sound philosophy of man, a humanistic recapturing of a total view of man which would not necessarily be explicitly Christian or ecclesiastical.[6] For, as Paul Goodman says, "With the increasing powerlessness of people in centralized social organizations and the ordering of their behavior by systems of technology, the religious problem is no longer how souls are to be saved, but how to have human beings at all--persons, practical animals, creatures. . . . People are increasingly pushed around and processed as things, and act as personnel rather than persons."[7]

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[2] Kenneth I. Mills, "Towards a Phenomenology of Morals," Inquiry, II (1968), 37.

[3] Cf. Robert J. Roth, "Naturalistic Ethics: Problem of Method," The New Scholasticism, XL (1966), 291.

[4] Mills, loc. cit.

[5] Cf. Wolfe Mays, "Is Philosophy Dead?" Modern Age, XII (1968), 151.

While Macmurray himself acknowledges that his work constitutes a pioneering venture rather than a system,[8] and acknowledging the inability of any one thinker to supply the philosophical desideratum required by contemporary society, his work merits attention for its concentration on man's existence as a person and from a vantage unashamed to recognize man's religious nature. As he says, at the opening of his Gifford lectures, explaining why he chose as his subject "the form of the personal,"

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[6] Cf. "The Philosophical Vacuum," Herder Correspondence, V (1968), 34; and, more important, Karl Rahner, "Philosophy and Philosophizing in Theology," Theology Digest, Sesquicentennial issue (Feb., 1968), 17-29.

[7] Paul Goodman, "Religion During a Time of Dehumanization," The Critic, XXVI (Oct.-Nov., 1967), 19. Cf. also Erik H. Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1968), pp. 259-60 which, from a similar vantage, comment on the necessity and perdurance of ethics.

[8] Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 12-13.

> I had two main reasons; the first, that it is, in my judgement, the emergent problem for contemporary philosophy; the second, that it directs attention to that aspect of our common experience from which religion springs, and is in this respect appropriate to the purpose of the Gifford foundation. For it is characteristic of religion that it behaves towards its object in ways that are suitable to personal intercourse; and the conception of a deity is the conception of a personal ground of all that we experience. If then human reason, unaided by revelation, can contribute anything to theology, it is through a philosophical analysis of the personal that we should expect this to be brought to light.[9]

His Gifford lectures climax a career long devoted to religious and social concerns during which he consistently maintained that philosophy must help people to do more than merely cope with life, but to achieve themselves as persons concerned with fostering unity among themselves in friendship and celebrating that friendship in expressed worship to God, source and sustainer of it.[10] Some theological applications of Macmurray's insights were suggested in previous pages. Before instancing further applications of Macmurray's personalism to moral theology--the main task of this chapter--it would be well to recall Macquarrie's realistic reservations concerning his own predilection for employing existential philosophy in theology. He writes:

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[9] Ibid., p. 17.

[10] "When that to which we must relate ourselves is another human being, a person like ourselves, a whole new range of fact, a whole new world of demands confronts us, and the drive to rationality must find an expression for itself which is proper to this new field. It is from this necessity that religion arises as an inherent character of our human situation. There is no escaping from it. It is the central fact of all personal life, and personal life is human life, rational life, the life of objective consciousness." Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, pp. 204-205. Cf. "The Celebration of Communion," in Persons in Relation, pp. 147-65.

> Let me again say that the existential theologian, if he is wise, does not claim a monopoly in the field of theology and does not fall into the error, so lamentably common, of saying "This is the only way." In our fragmented culture, there is no single valid way of doing either theology or philosophy. The most that a wise practitioner will claim is that his particular approach solves some problems and gains some insights in this time of change and confusion.[11]

These caveats, in this writer's view, apply to the use of personalism in moral theology as well. Yet, recognizing the limits of any one philosophical style, it still holds that a moral theology that seeks acuteness in addressing modern man and in analyzing his problems needs philosophy, a philosophy which reflects as adequately as possible upon our humanness and the a priori conditions for its attainment and preservation. For, as Albert Jonsen writes in this connection,

> We must know not simply that men like to be free and that they struggle to be free, but that they _must_ be free if they are to be human. We must know not simply that men love company and seek out friends, but that they _must_ find communion if they are to be human. Our moral norms, principles and rules are the rational attempt to formulate ways and means of reaching that which we must have in order to be human.[12]

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[11] Macquarrie, _Philosophical Resources for Christian Thought_, p. 140.

[12] Albert R. Jonsen, _Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics_, p. 205.

Macmurray's thought admirably fulfills the requirements Jonsen sets for the kind of philosophy moral theology needs today. It does so because of its concentration on mutuality as the heart of personal reality. "The primary difference," Macmurray writes, "in the relation of persons to persons which distinguishes it toto caelo from the other types of relationship is its mutuality."[13] Every distinctively human attribute--the consciousness of our uniqueness, our rationality, our very freedom itself--all of these Macmurray views as conditioned by the fact of mutuality, and as finding their fulfillment in mutuality in act. This, in essence, is the distinctive feature of Macmurray's thought. The main purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to recapitulate and to expand Macmurray's treatment of these three fundamental facets of personal life: self-discovery, rationality and freedom as grounded on and fully realized in mutuality. In this way, the utility of his distinctive emphasis on mutuality will be more concretely manifested and hence also the relevance of Macmurray's philosophy for moral theology today.

Using Macmurray's philosophy, the moral theologian remains faithful to a basic tenet of Catholic ethical thought (demonstrated by the general practice of past moral theology in its use of natural law as a philosophical instrument) that human and Christian existence cohere and that reflection on the reality of man and his history in the world is a valid and necessary source of ethical knowledge.[14] Without entering the particular and thorny issues involved in separating wheat from chaff in understanding and applying traditional natural law theories, one of the general advantages accrued in using Macmurray's philosophy in moral theology is that, in its penetrating analysis of our nature as persons it provides a basic pattern for conceiving ourselves as moral agents and in so doing avoids the misemphases commonly cited as defects in current assessments of how the natural law approach was used (or misused) by the common run of moral theology manuals.[15]

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[13] Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, p. 205.

Some of these common complaints against the moral theology of the past should be recalled solely for their value as points of contrast to Macmurray's perspective and a full appreciation of its application in the pages to follow. Of the moral theology of the manuals it is said that its appeal to "human nature" as normative was as to a static abstraction afloat in a kind of platonic realm of essences. Human nature was employed in such wise as to make it seem a standard divorced from man, rather than reflective of actual human experience of changing men living in an ever changing world. First principles of human conduct were said to be immediately appreciated in such wise that one might assume that they were inserted or infused into each man singly so that as a moral agent he was sufficient unto himself. Further, the relational character of being, of human beings in particular, was especially ignored or scarcely acknowledged and its crucial implications left unplumbed.[16] Particular misemphases of this style of philosophical anthropology stemmed from what seems to have been the prevailing supposition of the manuals, that man exists atomistically.[17] Duties toward others, especially that of charity, were certainly not ignored, but the basically atomistic view of the individual made it difficult to see how charity could be anything other than a duty--imposed from without--how, in short, the imperatives God lays upon us arose not from some arbitrary divine decree but from the very manner in which he fashioned us. Since Christ was generally absent from the pages of these manuals,[18] little was said of the Father's intention, revealed in Christ, that we be one; little was made of the implications this has as revelatory of our vocation as persons to further common humanity, and further, since grace was ignored as a principle of Christian action,[19] little was made of interpersonal effects of grace as the source of brotherhood. These generalizations (which share the limitations of all generalizations) on the lineaments of moral theology as expressed in the manuals are recalled, as stated previously, as a background for appreciating the distinctively fresh emphasis moral theology would enjoy by employing what might be called Macmurray's ontology of the person.

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[14] In addition to sources cited to this effect in Chapter I, see Charles E. Curran, "Absolute Norms and Medical Ethics," in Absolutes in Moral Theology?, ed. Charles E. Curran (Washington, D.C.: Corpus Books, 1968), p. 150; and Eugene L. Donahue, "The Role of Philosophy in Moral Theology," The American Benedictine Review, XIX (1968), 386-96.

[15] In addition to Curran's article cited in the previous note, see, for example, Joseph T. C. Arntz, "Natural Law and its History," and Jan H. Walgrave, "Is Morality Static or Dynamic?" both in Concilium, V (Moral Problems and Christian Personalism, 1965), pp. 39-57 and 22-38, respectively; and Raymond J. Nogar, "The Emergence of the Person in Natural Law Theory," Chicago Studies, V (1966), 81-92.

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[16] These characteristics of previous moral theology (and more) can be found in Curran's article which, in nn. 37 and 51 refers to further sources regarding the failure of that theology to take account of being as relational. Cf. also Eugene Fontinell, "Religious Truth in a Relational and Processive World," Cross Currents, XVII (1967), at 309-310.

[17] Cf. Kwant, Encounter, p. 1.

[18] "Interestingly, the standard manuals of Roman Catholic moral theology seldom mention Christ as more than new lawgiver!" Jonsen, op. cit., p. 222.

The following pages aim to further the renewal of moral theology by indicating how mutuality, the keystone of Macmurray's analysis of the personal, applies to central concerns of morality.[20] An appropriate beginning is that climactic passage earlier designated as the most relevant one for a moral theologian concerned with renewing his discipline. As its opening lines indicate, the context of the following passage is a discussion of the conditions necessary for the exercise of human freedom, a topic which will subsequently receive extended attention. For the moment, the following passage will serve both as a platform for a renewed moral theology and a point of reference for uniting those main emphases of Macmurray's thought, treated in detail in previous chapters.

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[19] Some three decades ago, in reviewing a widely used manual of moral theology, Yves Congar was forced to conclude that the author was "a complete stranger to the notion of the supernatural reality of grace" and noted that "the author does not even mention sanctifying grace among the principles of our moral action." Cited in Jonsen, op. cit., p. 105.

[20] In doing this, Macmurray's own writings, some of which pre-date his Gifford lectures, where he himself discusses ethical concerns in terms of mutuality, will be relied on as much as possible. This use of Macmurray's earlier works, most of which were prompted by practical concerns which had philosophical problems at their roots, is justified because he addressed those concerns from essentially the same philosophical perspective that the Gifford lectures expressed in greatest depth and detail. This is not to say that there was no development in Macmurray's thought, refinement of analysis or change of terminology. It means, rather, that the mutuality of personal life early became for him the touchstone of what was truly real and the criterion by which he evaluated philosophy. As a philosopher Macmurray devoted himself to the systematic analysis of the nature of personal mutuality in order to discover and expound its significance. His first major philosophical work, Interpreting the Universe (first published in the early thirties) was his contribution toward a realistic epistemology based upon the interpersonal relationship as the origin, as well as the ultimate criterion, of knowledge. In his philosophical works from that point to their

> That my end should be good and my chosen means effective are . . . conditions of my freedom in action. But they are not sufficient conditions. For I am not alone in the world; there are other agents, and if they will not allow me to do what I desire to do I cannot do it. Moreover, there are few things which I can desire to do, and none that are of personal significance, which do not depend upon the active co-operation of others. We need one another to be ourselves. This complete and unlimited dependence of each of us upon the others is the central and crucial fact of personal existence. Individual independence is an illusion; and the independent individual, the isolated self, is a non-entity. In ourselves we are nothing; and when we turn our eyes inward in search of ourselves we find a vacuum. Being nothing in ourselves, we have no value in ourselves, and are of no importance whatever, wholly without meaning or significance. It is only in relation to others that we exist as persons; we are invested with significance by others who have need of us; and borrow our reality from those who care for us. We live and move and have our being not in ourselves but in one another; and what rights or powers or freedom we possess are ours by the grace and favour of our fellows. Here is the basic fact of our human condition; which all of us can know if we stop pretending, and do know in moments when the veil of self-deception is stripped from us and we are forced to look upon our own nakedness.[21]

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fullest expression in the Gifford lectures, Macmurray kept mutuality as the key area of philosophical investigation. Cf. McManus, op. cit., pp. 1-20.

[21] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 211.

No single passage in Macmurray's writings lays bare the relational constitution of the person, Macmurray's primary concern, as does this one. As a basis for normative ethical analysis it suggests that one begin not with an abstract "human nature," but our existence as persons which, as Macmurray remarks toward the end of the citation, all of us can know and do know in our honest moments.[22] This shift--to our nature as persons--immediately highlights the importance of being as relational, for mutuality is the basic fact of personal existence which no ontology of the person can ignore.[23] Should it do so by a metaphysical reflection that would neglect mutuality, it runs the risk of incurring all those misconceptions Macmurray indicated earlier as attendant on the policy of adopting the primacy of the "cogito," the self conceived chiefly as thinker (and usually in isolation). As McManus says of the passage cited:

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[22] Cf. Gustave Thils' recommendation: "Au lieu de faire pivoter toute la morale autour de l'axe secundum rationem, secundum naturam, ou quelque autre, il suffirait de la faire pivoter autout de l'axe secundum personam," cited in Dom Odon Lottin, Morale Fondamentale (Tournai: Desclée & Cie, 1954), p. 127. L. Smits writes, "You can't have a person standing alone. For us, the person is relation. We no longer say that man is a social being because he needs to be helped. We say he is social because his essence is being together with other persons in the world," cited in Fontinell, loc. cit., p. 309. Cf. John Gruenenfelder, "Is Substance Relevant to Contemporary Concern with the Person?" The New Scholasticism, XLI (1967), 498-505.--For an excellent exposition of the shape of ethical analysis which takes the person as relational for its starting point, see Sister Theresa Clare, C.D.P., "Morality and Real Relations," The Thomist, XXIX (1965), 396-419. For an application of this approach in treating one facet of morality, see Xavier G. Colavechio, "Conscience: a Personalist Perspective," Continuum, V (1967), 203-210.

[23] Cf. Karl Rahner, "Experiment: Man," Theology Digest, Sesquicentennial issue (Feb., 1968), 57-69.

> Perhaps better than any other passage this reveals Macmurray's approach to reality. He will not permit the isolation of the individual from his human situation for the sake of metaphysical analysis. He insists that first and foremost, the individual must be seen in relationship to his dependence upon his fellow man. Any metaphysical analysis which ignores this basic fact cannot adequately account for man and his problems.[24]

A possible objection to the Macmurray passage cited is that once man has reached maturity he is free of dependence upon his fellows and is capable of solitary existence. That a man might live in solitude Macmurray would admit, but this constitutes the exception rather than the norm. He could not, however, live as a person apart from men unless he first learned how to live with them. Each of us comes to recognize his selfhood through the experience of being opposed by another person. For the realization of personality, the awareness of our own individuality, relationship to others is essential, and without it there is no person, that is, there is not a creature called man who knows what it is to reflect. Instead of taking the fact that man is a political (i.e., social) being for granted, in defining man, Macmurray points to communal living as the key to understanding him.[25] This does not deny the individuality of the person; but it does deny that individual existence at the level of personality is possible. As McManus comments, when Macmurray says that the independent individual, the isolated self, is a nonentity, he is speaking of a totally isolated self, one who has never had contact with the community of men.

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[24] McManus, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

[25] "It is true," Macmurray writes, "that men do live in groups, for the most part. But this is not the point. It is the individuality of people which is social. Our solitariness is peopled with thoughts which are shared, which come to us from the tradition in which we live. Our ideas and beliefs have been taught to us and the variations which we make for ourselves are relatively minor embroideries upon themes not of our devising. If we withdraw into solitary living, as hermits do, we take our society with us and justify our repudiation of it, to ourselves at least, in terms which we have learned from it. The loneliness of multitudes in our great cities is evidence

> Since this is an impossibility he is able to say that such an imagined independent individual is a nonentity. The reason Macmurray uses this logically extreme example is to forcefully illustrate the fact that mutuality is an essential condition for the realization of personality. . . . When he says, therefore, that we exist as persons only in relation to others he is not denying the ontological definition of person as a rational supposit. He is saying, however, that the traditional ontological definition of person is not of primary importance at the present time. What is of prime importance is to uncover the philosophical truths about man which will enable him to live together in community without the danger of self-annihilation. And it is through an analysis of the social bond that Macmurray locates these truths. For this reason he can say that it is only in relation that man exists as a person because community is essential for the realization of personality.[26]

In addition to this exegesis, one must recall that for Macmurray mutuality is both matter of fact and matter of intention--intention which he designates as the knowledge dimension in action, and action a term he reserves for persons alone. In the passage with which we are concerned, Macmurray is describing mutuality primarily as matter of fact, indeed, as the basic fact about the way persons are. His complementary insight--that mutuality has to become

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of the social character of mankind far more than the cities themselves. The inherent sociality of mankind is perhaps exhibited best in our need for friends. It is perhaps best formulated by saying that we need one another in order to be ourselves." Macmurray, Religion, Art and Science, p. 53.

[26] McManus, op. cit., pp. 203-204. Cf. Gabriel Marcel, Problematic Man (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), pp. 24-25; and Karl Rahner, Nature and Grace (New York: Sheed & ~~Ward,~~ 1964), p. 137.

operative in the action of persons--indicates that mutuality also describes a dynamism upon which growth in personhood depends. With this appreciation of mutuality as matter of fact as well as matter of intention, the key passage cited earlier can be fully understood as programatic for moral theology, for it is then read as at once expressive of what we are and directive (in a general way) of how we are to act if we are to live up to our status as persons. So understood it provides a ground pattern for how we are to conceive of ourselves and for the qualities which should characterize our actions.

Corollaries of Macmurray's description of the person are that each of us has status--in the broadest range of the term--dignity, rights, privileges, obligations and one's very freedom itself, only before and in dependence upon others. Apart from our existence with and for others we enjoy none of these for the terminus a quo of personal life is a helpless total dependence on the personal other, and the terminus ad quem is not utter independence, but a continuing mutual interdependence of equals.[27] Our ontological situation is such that we do not first find fullness, nor self-sufficiency within ourselves and then, should we feel magnanimous enough, share it with others. Constitutionally we are relational, related to an other-than-I, an Other which when fully described and set in contrast to an individual "I", includes material, organic and personal being. Macmurray concentrates on the most significant aspect of the Other to which the "I" is related, the Other in its personal dimension which, in the concrete, means other persons. We know persons first (and best) and through them come to know about the infrapersonal. And each of us continues to need others to be himself. This need goes beyond one's dependence on others for services or social pleasure, it is an ontological need. Once this fact is grasped it becomes clear that my identity is not to be sought solely and simply by burrowing inward. If it ignored the mutuality of personhood, such a course in search of self-identity would prove illusory. We cannot know ourselves without knowing others. I can find myself only if I find my brother.[28]

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[27] Cf. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 66. It should be stressed (again) that for Macmurray "equals" applied to personal relations never means or implies that everyone has equal abilities, rights or functions or any other de facto equality. "The equality is intentional: it is an aspect of the mutuality of the relation. If it were not an equal relation, the motivation would be negative; a relation in which one was using the other as a means to his own end." Ibid., p. 158.

Mutuality and Self-identity

Macmurray's insistence on the non-value, insignificance and illusory nature of the self conceived apart from its relation to others is also complemented by what he writes concerning how one comes to appreciate one's own individuality. In delineating what he calls the rhythm of withdrawal and return--his phrase to describe the dynamism of personal action (or interaction)--he discussed the gradual growth of the person's sense of his own uniqueness. In that discussion he made clear that an appreciation of one's individuality arises from a progressive differentiation of the original unity of the "You-and-I" in a common life, and that this common life remains as the necessary perduring substrate of individuality. Aware of the apparent oddity of this assertion Macmurray observed:

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[28] Cf. Karl Rahner, Christian in the Market Place, trans. Cecily Hastings (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1966), p. 14.

> If this sounds paradoxical, it is yet a commonplace in some of its manifestations. We all distinguish ourselves, as individuals, from the society of which we are members and to which we belong. The paradox is the same: for we at once assert ourselves as constituent members of the society while opposing it to ourselves as "other-than-I." So the child discovers himself as an individual by contrasting himself, and indeed by wilfully opposing himself to the family to which he belongs; and this discovery of his individuality is at the same time the realization of his individuality. We are part of that from which we distinguish ourselves and to which, as agents we oppose ourselves. In this--which is, indeed, simply another manifestation of the form of the personal--we may find the answer to many of the questions which puzzle the moralist; the existence of conscience, for example, of responsibility and the moral struggle; or, more generally, of the capacity which is possessed by the person, and only by a person, to represent his fellows--to feel and think and act, not for himself but for the other.[29]

This citation concerns the exercise of mutuality, as it pertains to the origin and growth of personal individuality, in contrast to the earlier quotation where Macmurray focused on mutuality as matter of fact. Both aspects of mutuality cannot be separated.

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[29] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 91. For an application of the first part of this citation to our criticism of the Church cf. Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, V, 17-18. How Macmurray's insights here apply to the concerns of the moralist which he specifies at the end of the citation may be pursued with the aid of Colavechio's article on conscience and Jonsen's book on responsibility, previously cited.

The particular points to be noticed here are, first, that for a person to be aware of himself as a person it is necessary that there be immediate experience of another person. Secondly, contrary to the usual understanding of one's individuality as his complete apartness and distinctness from others, Macmurray underscores the often forgotten fact that the sense of one's apartness from others is only one dimension of what is involved in the realization of individuality. Another aspect of individuality, its necessary grounding, is that one distinguishes himself from a unity of persons to which he belongs and remains a part. To neglect this fundamental dimension of individuality can lead to an atomistic conception of one's own nature, to an illusory sense of his self-sufficiency.[30] Since such a self-interpretation is illusory it is fraught with possibly damaging psychological and spiritual effects.[31] It can send one along a path which mistakenly assumes that his genuine self is to be found solely by probing his solitary self, cultivating a kind of pure inwardness.[32] When such a course is adopted it appears that the primary question with which one is concerned in his quest for self definition is "Who am I?," that its answer lies within and that one's neighbor, if not a threat, is at least an irritant or distraction to one's quest.[33] When, with Macmurray, one realizes that his individuality stems from and continues to depend upon his relation to other persons, he appreciates that the quest for personal individuality is not adequately expressed in the query "Who am I?" but is just as much the question "Who am I for?" This question keeps alive the fact that while an adequate appreciation of one's uniqueness if inescapably dependent on an ever deepening inwardness, it is simultaneously a growing realization of, and sensitivity to his relatedness to others.[34] In terms of Macmurray's description of the dynamism that characterizes personal existence--the rhythm of withdrawal and return--inwardness is subsumed under the rubric "withdrawal" which phase is always for the sake of "return," a return that is, to communion which any kind of withdrawal subserves.[35]

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[30] "There is always an element of illusion associated with the negative phase /=withdrawal from mutuality/ in the rhythm of personal development," Macmurray writes in Persons in Relation, p. 93. Though this is so Macmurray acknowledges that this withdrawal (and its illusory character) is necessary if we are to grow in the consciousness of our own individuality. In withdrawal (from mutuality with others) we develop our capacity for reflection, which in turn enables us to distinguish between good and bad, beautiful and ugly, true and false. But this withdrawal of the self from the other is never absolute but only relative. The withdrawal is always subordinate to and for the sake of the return. As such withdrawal is a phase in one's relationship to the other. Since the common life is necessary for the individual to develop, even though he must oppose the other to realize his own individuality, this opposition can never be total but must always assume the necessity of the mutual relation as the positive good underlying his life as a person. The withdrawal must never intent to annul the relationship, but only to refuse it within certain limits. Cf. McManus, op. cit., pp. 149 ff.

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[31] Cf. Lynch, Images of Hope, esp. ch. 3 "Mutuality versus Alienation," pp. 136-151.

[32] To render the religious import of this fact more explicit it would help to recall, with Bonhoeffer that "Man is not conceived of by God, the all-embracing Person, as an isolated, individual being, but as in natural communication with other men, and in his relation with them not satisfying just one side of his otherwise closed spiritual existence, but rather discovering in this relation his reality, that is, his life as an I. . . . God does not desire a history of individual men, but the history of the community of men. Nor does he desire a community which absorbs the individual into itself, but a community of men. . . . Upon these basic relations rests the concept of the religious community and the church. . . . The body of Christ is just as much a real presence in history as it is the standard for its own history. This brings us once again to what was said at the beginning of our inquiry, about the normative character of basic ontic relationships. In the sphere of Christian ethics it is not what ought to be that effects what is, but what is effects what ought to be." Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Communion of Saints: a Dogmatic Inquiry into the Sociology of the Church, trans. R. Gregor Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 52, 146.

[33] Philip Rieff in his characterization of psychological man sees him progressively retreating inward, viewing the public world as one vast stranger, who appears at inconvenient times and makes demands viewed as purely external and therefore without the power to elicit a genuinely moral response. Cf. The Triumph of the Therapeutic, p. 52. Russel Nye sees this phenomenon, operative in the American ethos, as traceable to individualism--a term which entered the English language to describe a uniquely American way of life. Cf. Russel B. Nye, This Almost Chosen People: Essays in the History of American Ideas (Michigan State University Press, 1966), p. 251; the comments on our social narcissism in Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image or What Happened to the American Dream? (New York:

Atheneum, 1962), p. 257; and, for the reflection of these trends in modern American novels, Howard M. Harper, Jr., Desperate Faith (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 197-98, in particular.

[34] As Johann phrases it, "each person has the vocation to be for every other the vehicle of a truly creative love--indeed, of the Creator's love, in and by which we all live and move and are," Building the Human, p. 84. It will be recalled that Macmurray used the last phrase to describe the mutuality in which we exist with others. He could do so for he believes that "a relation to God which is not a relation to my neighbour is unreal," as he writes in Religion, Art and Science, p. 69.

[35] "The rhythm of withdrawal and return is the full dynamic expression of the form of the personal, as a positive /phase/ which includes, is constituted by and subordinates its own negative. It is a succession of positive and negative phases which, taken together, constitute the unity of personal experience. The negative phase, therefore, depends upon, and is subordinate to, the positive, and the whole activity can only be defined through the positive. The negative . . . has meaning only by reference to the positive, and is therefore, as a phase of activity, for the sake of this positive. The withdrawal is for the sake of the return; and its necessity lies in this, that it differentiates the positive phase by enriching its content. Without the negative there could be no development of the positive, but only the repetition ad infinitum of an original undifferentiated identity." Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 90-91.

An important practical consequence of Macmurray's unveiling of the linkage between individuality and mutuality is that any moral or spiritual program designed to foster the growth and maturation of persons as persons, cannot attain this end if it advocates a cult of pure inwardness. The fault is not with inwardness, with reflection, for example, on one's past life or pondering upon how one intends to live in the future, but rather with that kind of self-regard which assumes that the quality of one's life can be adequately assessed without making central the quality of his action to and for others. Any significant action of mine, directly or indirectly, bears upon my relation to other persons. My actions, implicitly or explicitly, express an affirmation or an attempted refusal to acknowledge the fact that I and they exist in mutual interdependence, not just functionally but ontologically. If my actions are such as to deny my intrinsic relation to others I am bound to experience frustration since to deny my relation to others, to express in action my will to annul my relationship to the other, is to will the annihilation of myself along with the other.[36] Frustration in this case is inevitable since, though I try by my conduct to suppress mutuality as matter of intention, mutuality remains a matter of fact in my constitution as a person. My attempt to negate it in action is an attempt to run counter to the human grain, mutuality as constitutive of persons. Mutuality ever abides as normative for my actions.

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[36] As earlier noted, in Reason and Emotion, p. 218, Macmurray sees the opposition of the individual will to its dependence upon the personal reality in which it exists as the essence of what the theologians call sin. Similarly, Louis Evely writes: "To separate ourselves, to withdraw ourselves, to give up our possibilities of communication, voluntary ex-communication, ex-fraternization, that is the sin. That is the evil which for ever tempts us and from which we must forever ask to be delivered. Every time we commit that sin we have a foretaste of hell, because hell is nothing else but the final settlement of that state of refusal." Louis Evely, We Dare to Say "Our Father," trans. James Langdale (New York: Herder & Herder, 1965), p. 112.

In contrast to the existentialist claim that I make myself by my choices, Macmurray's position maintains that action indeed is choice (intention is in action as a dimension of it) and our actions achieve or diminish our growth as persons, but that is not the whole story. If my actions (=my choices) are not guided by, or do not effect in some measure, the mutuality by which I am constituted, it is metaphysically impossible for me to achieve myself as a person.[37] The intention which informs action, in other words, finds its ultimate norm in the fundamental mutuality which makes persons to be persons. Hence the claim that I make myself by my choices cannot mean that the choices are simply a matter of whim.[38] If they are, specifically if they do not effect personal mutuality in some fashion, however indirectly, they are not only not personal, they have no bearing on one's self-creation, or if they are actions which intend to annul mutuality, are self-diminishing or indeed self-destructive. As McManus notes in this connection,

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[37] Discussing the theological relevance of the notion of man as his own maker, Rahner writes that Catholic Christian theology (sic) "must ask what is the 'nature' of man that should guide his self-creative activity so that he may avoid a course leading to self-destruction. Although the question has always been present, it has never been so clearly and urgently posed before the age of autocreation brought the problem explicitly to the fore. . . . In any case, the problem of human self-creation poses for the contemporary theologian the urgent question of what this 'nature' of man really and truly is. It is this that determines the moral norms and limits to man's autocreativeness." Theology Digest (Feb., 1968), 63. Macmurray's analysis of mutuality, it would seem, has much to offer theology in this regard. With regard to the passing comparison of Macmurray's views with those of existentialists, it should be recalled that in Macmurray's view, existentialism has not overcome its organic concept of the self. Cf. Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 145, n. 1.

> When Macmurray says that there must be striving in all actions to achieve and maintain a fully personal life he does not mean that there must be a conscious and direct intention to do this. But there must be an indirect intention to do so. The implicit objective of all personal action is to achieve and maintain mutuality.[39]

Clearly, then, there is a range of seriousness and intensity along which my specific actions manifest my intent to affirm and express mutuality, or deny it. These few aspects of Macmurray's consideration of action are recalled to indicate that they necessarily bear upon one's self-definition. The question of self-identity at every stage of life, it has been emphasized, is not a matter of inwardness alone, but of mutuality. Once this is appreciated, attention to mutuality drives one to examine his actions because mutuality is both an ontological fact of personhood and a moral fact, it expresses how we are and how we are to act. Contrary to the cliche of skeptical philosophical ethicists that one cannot derive an ought from an is, Macmurray's philosophy sees mutuality as the "is" (the grounding fact) from which all oughts derive.[40]

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[38] While Macmurray's perspective allows that mankind is a reality summoned to share in its own making, he sees the goal of this making as a genuine community to which each member freely gives himself, and, in the very giving, finds himself and Macmurray sees each person as sharing the responsibility to further human community. If up to this point it is not, citations from Macmurray in this chapter should make it clear that his vision is not utopian. Unwilling to play the seer (cf. McManus' comparison of Macmurray and Teilhard in this regard in McManus, op. cit., pp. 195-97) Macmurray's chief point is that constitutively mutual as persons are, mere cooperation with one another--difficult enough as that alone is to achieve--does not satisfy them fully as persons. Their full realization as persons is achieved only in genuine friendship. Even though friendship itself is rare, as persons we have no alternative but to strive in that direction, even though in our own life time we witness no dramatic corporate achievement of brotherhood.

[39] McManus, op. cit., p. 156, n. 48.

In employing Macmurray's analysis of the fundamental mutuality of persons, theology would, of course, develop the fact that one's relation to God is concretized, from the responsive human side of the dialogue of God with man, by the manner in which one lives out, executes in action, his relation to other persons. This notion, hardly a new one, is discernable in the Old Testament, notably in the prophetic literature, and is obvious in the New Testament's emphasis on brotherly love as the index to one's love of God and even (notably in the First Epistle of John) indicated as the test of orthodoxy. What Macmurray's thought adds to such scriptural perspectives on the quality of lived faith is that this imperative that we care for our fellow human beings is an inevitable condition--that there is no alternate course--if, ontologically, we are to be true to what and how we are as persons.[41] Macmurray's analysis serves hermeneutically in showing that the distinctive imperative of Christian ethics is at the same time a demand of our human constitution.[42] Like it or not we are our brother's keeper.

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[40] Macmurray overcomes the dissociation of fact and value by revealing how rationality is both emotive as well as intellectual. Cf. Macmurray's discussion of the fact/value issue in Religion, Art and Science, pp. 32-33 and 36 ff. and his discussion of valuation in Persons in Relation, pp. 173 ff.

Macmurray himself suggests how the interplay of inwardness and mutuality pertains to a religious context in what he writes by way of response to Whitehead's oft cited remark that religion is what a man does with his solitariness. Macmurray answers:

> This dictum expresses a modern tendency to emphasize the individual aspect at the expense of the corporate; a tendency which flows from

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[41] Cf. St. Paul's injunctions: "Let no one seek his own good, but the good of his neighbor," (1 Cor 10, 24); "Bear one another's burdens and so fulfill the law of Christ. For if anyone thinks he is something, when he is nothing, he deceives himself," (Gal 6, 2-3). --Also relevant are Rahner's observations: "Man is placed in an ineradicable dualism of two basic lines of self-fulfillment: he is a being who is thrust out of himself into the world and the human community, and he is a being who turns back upon himself. This double bent, to take possession of himself and of what is not himself, in knowledge and love, constitutes his essential nature. The going out of himself and entering into himself condition each other. If he did not go out into the world, to the Other as 'thou' and (so far as one can still call this a going out) to God, he would find nothing on entering into himself but the hellish emptiness and empty isolation of the damned. And if he only went out of himself, then he would indeed be alienated from himself, lost, scattered piecemeal. Gathering and scattering, entry into oneself and going out of oneself, belong to each other essentially. And what constitutes a true human being and Christian is that he entrusts himself freely to both these basic movements, as both under the direction of one same God, and, serene in this creaturely confidence, refrains from making either of them an absolute." Rahner, Christian in the Market Place, pp. 90-91.

[42] Cf. Andre G. van Melsen, "Science and Christianity as Universals of Culture," The Thomist, XXXI (1967), 156: "By following the precepts of Christ to help our fellow-man in need, we have discovered that we all are men-in-need, and not only those, who are subject to the classical forms of need, the sick, the poor and the disabled."

> and strengthens the individualism of much of our Western outlook. But individualism, like the idealism which tends to accompany and complete it, is finally incompatible with religion, if only because it is incompatible with the inherent relatedness of personal life. The individual phase of personal relation, the necessary withdrawal into the self and so into solitariness, refers to the return to community and is for the sake of that return. Its religious aspect must always have relation to corporate religion if it is to function religiously. In formal terms, a relation to God which is not a relation to my neighbour is unreal. The withdrawal of the individual into religious solitude, into prayer and meditation, into self-examination and self-dedication, is an affirmation of his personal dependence, not an escape from it.[43]

Since religion is social in nature, Macmurray points out that it contains within it (anyone's) individual religious experience. Religion in its individual phase (in the concrete: a person's withdrawal in private prayer, self-examination before God, etc.) is for the sake of his community life and only bears fruit in the communal context where faith is lived.[44] However intense the quality of individual religious experience, religion remains social in nature, providing, in fact, the grounding possibility of individual religious experience. The latter (=withdrawal in Macmurray's terminology), in turn, subserves the actual living of faith among men.[45] Just as mutuality, in Macmurray's view, contains the individual, so communal religion contains the individual element within it.[46] This is one of the chief implications for religion of locating the study of the person in the context of mutuality, the foundation upon which Macmurray works out a philosophy of man which explicates the social aspects of the developing personality.

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[43] Macmurray, Religion, Art and Science, pp. 69-70.

[44] "We live as members of a church; all our Christian acts are ecclesiological--through, with, and in the structure Christ set up for our sanctification. The existence of sin in any one of its members stops the flow of grace in a pasticular area and impedes there the growth of the Christ-life." William J. Rewark, "Mortification: an Entry into the Christ-Mystery," Review for Religious, XXIV (1965), 375. Cf. also Irénée Hausherr, "Abnégation, renoncement, mortification," Christus, XXII (1959), 182-195.

[45] The place of communal worship is omitted in the above remarks. Macmurray considers it important and discusses it in such places as Persons in Relation, pp. 147 ff., Religion, Art and Science, pp. 45 ff. and Reason and Emotion, pp. 252 ff.

His analysis of the personal in terms of mutuality is especially pertinent to the increasing attention current theology is giving to hope as the distinctive feature of Christian life.[47] If a theology of hope is to be effective it must show how Christian hope is rooted in human reality. It must show that hope is an act of the city of man, not in the external sense of that word but in the sense that it must occur between persons. Indicating how hope is rooted in what we are, Lynch observes:

> Hope is truly on the inside of us, but hope is an interior sense that there is help on the outside of us. There are times when we are especially aware that our own purely inward resources are not enough, that they have to be added to from the outside. But this need of help is permanent, abiding, continuing for each human being. Our civilization tends to associate a sense of shame with the need for help, as if all real "life" must come from within. If anything need come from the outside

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[46] A significant consequence of this point, one which cannot be pursued here, is that psychological studies of religious experience which study it from the individual angle alone, though valuable from the viewpoint of psychology, do not necessarily yield a better understanding of religion in itself for the latter is social in nature. Cf. McManus, op. cit., p. 221.

[47] In addition to Moltmann, see Cross Currents, XVIII (Summer, 1968), a special issue on hope, rich in bibliographical references to recent literature on hope. Cf. James M. Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life, pp. 249-53 for a discussion of the pertinence of hope in Christian ethics.

> there is something wrong with us! Such a view of the human world . . . is profoundly pelagian.[48]

In this indication of the human makeup in which hope as a Christian virtue is grounded and from which it grows, Lynch is pointing precisely to what Macmurray has thrown into high relief, the constitutive mutuality of persons. Without elaborating this point, suffice it to say that Macmurray's analysis of the significance of personal mutuality for every aspect of human existence holds high promise for developing a theology of hope which would view the eschatological dimension of Christian life not as a veneer of promise imposed on personal existence, but as the fulfillment of an aspiration welling from the fundamental mutuality which makes us persons.

Mutuality and Rationality

With these applications of Macmurray's emphasis on mutuality as essential for the discovery and realization of personal individuality, attention may be paid to the implications for Christian ethics of Macmurray's next major move: his analysis of the individual with the other. To the capacity for this peculiarly human kind of involvement he gives the name reason, which Macmurray defines as the capacity for objectivity. The experience of knowing is realized in its highest degree within the personal relationship. For the sake of analysis Macmurray isolates this experience and calls it immediate experience, the conscious experience that the individual has in his involvement with the other. In his treatment of immediate experience,

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[48] Lynch, Images of Hope, p. 31.

Macmurray is interested only in determining its general content which will serve him in describing the nature of reason.[49] Since, for Macmurray, the significant feature of immediate experience is the self's direct awareness of the existence of the other distinct from oneself, his main point is to indicate that this consciousness of contact of self with other has two aspects: emotional and intellectual, both included as one immediate experience. The importance Macmurray sees in this feature of immediate experience is that reason, as the capacity for objectivity, is not only intellectual awareness but emotional as well. As McManus says of Macmurray's treatment of immediate experience, it is not the biological activity of primary experience that Dewey writes about, but is a truly rational experience which includes both emotional and intellectual elements.

> The quality of the immediate experience depends upon the reflective experience of the person, as well as the actual experience itself. Macmurray's philosophy of the personal is, therefore, not based on the extremes of materialism or of intellectualism, but recognizes that this experience is the capacity for objectivity, that is, the capacity to be aware of the other in both an emotional and in an intellectual way.[50]

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[49] Because of this restricted interest, Macmurray's treatment of immediate experience is neither as full nor as adequate as that given by phenomenologists, for example. This is so because his aim is not to give a full analysis of immediate experience in and for itself, but only for what it reveals about the rational nature of the persons who encounter each other in immediate experience and only in immediate experience. Cf. McManus, op. cit., p. 204.

[50] McManus, op. cit., p. 210. See also, pp. 217-18 where (in n. 14) McManus relates Macmurray's use of "immediate experience" to what St. Thomas referred to as "turning to the phantasms."

This summary recall of the role and function of immediate experience in Macmurray's analysis provides sufficient setting for concentrating on two major aspects of Macmurray's thought which are of proximate interest and serviceability to the moral theologian: his view of reason as emotional as well as intellectual and Macmurray's understanding of objectivity. Attending to these features of his philosophy will serve to show how a full appreciation of our rationality demands seeing its connection with mutuality. Further, these features of his thought are important for recapturing the wholeness of human experience, that is, for overcoming the commonly assumed or expressed dissociation (or opposition) of reason and emotion, and the distrust of emotion in moral life, the roots of which Macmurray thinks traceable to stoicism.

Macmurray's conception of reason as both emotional and intellectual is best understood from the vantage of his initial proposition, shared by classical Christian ethics, that reason means objectivity, that is, man's capacity to stand in conscious relation to what is external to himself.[51]

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[51] From this view of reason, classical Christian ethics worked out a morality centered around the virtue of prudence. In this variety of Christian ethics, which was a morality studied in terms of virtues, each interconnected with the other and all guided and participating in prudence, morality was viewed as objective in the best sense of the term. For in this context, where prudence predominates, the true humanness of man consists in the fact that reason perfected in the cognition of truth shall inwardly shape and imprint ~~his~~ volition and action. Prudence is held as the standard of volition and action and the standard of prudence itself is the *ipsa res,* the objective reality of being. As Pieper expresses it, "the pre-eminence of prudence signifies first of all the direction of volition and action toward truth; but finally it signifies the directing of

Rationality, then, involves all that enters this relationship and this includes the emotional aspect of life as well as the intellectual. For man is conscious of an object not only intellectually but also emotionally. Further, emotion is, in Macmurray's analysis, the basis of rationality, by which he means that intellectual activity is subsidiary to the emotional.[52] This follows logically from his epistemological position which is also based on the mutuality of personhood and holds that immediate experience is the primary source of knowledge. Such knowledge is primarily emotional for it is in the feeling of the experience that a person is aware of the object of concern. Out of this emotional response arises intellectual knowledge

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volition and action toward objective reality. The good is prudent beforehand; but that is prudent which is in keeping with reality," Josef Pieper, Prudence (New York: Pantheon Books, 1959), pp. 21-22. Macmurray retains much the same perspective but sees the elements which comprise it in a different way. For him mutuality is constitutive of the personal, and hence characteristic of reason as well. Therefore mutuality plays a key role in Macmurray's epistemology. When intersubjectivity is taken account of in epistemology, it becomes apparent that knowledge of truth is not a matter of intellectual response alone but emotional response as well. Alternatively, when knowledge is appreciated as at once intellectual and emotional the socratic dictum that virtue is knowledge is admissable. On this cf. McManus, op. cit., p. 68.

[52] In Reason and Emotion, p. 75, Macmurray writes: "The emotional life is not simply a part or an aspect of human life. It is not, as we so often think, subordinate, or subsidiary to the mind. It is the core and essence of human life. The intellect arises out of it, is rooted in it, draws its nourishment and sustenance from it, and is the subordinate partner in the human economy. This is because the intellect is essentially instrumental. Thinking is not living. At its worst it is a substitute for living; at its best a means of living better. As we have seen, the emotional life is our life, both as awareness of the world and as action in the world, so far as it is lived for its own sake. Its value lies in itself, not in anything beyond it which it is a means of achieving."

which is dependent on the emotional response and is therefore subordinated to it. Hence, it is the emotional life which is the core and essence of human life, to which the intellect is subordinate because it is instrumental--a means to better living. The intellect directs and guides activity, but can never determine the substance of activity; this properly belongs to the emotions.[53]

With this emphasis on the priority of emotion in rationality, Macmurray does not mean to suggest that one's emotive response is infallible. Rather he draws a parallel with what has long been accepted about the activity of reason as intellectual. Thoughts are called true or false depending on whether or not they properly relate to reality. If thought does not harmonize with the true nature of the object, it is false. Macmurray applies the same qualifications to the person's emotional response, out of which one's intellectual response (in fact) issues. Emotions refer to reality rightly or wrongly. Emotional response is true when it reflects the true nature of the object, false if it fails to. In the latter case the emotion is subjective as it does not relate to what is, as it is. Therefore, feelings and emotions, just as is true of thought, can be rational or irrational according to the correctness or incorrectness of their reference to reality.[54]

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[53] Cf. Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 190.

[54] Ibid., p. 202; cf. also Reason and Emotion, pp. 24-25.

This parallel between intellectual and emotional responses which clarifies the fact that the quality of each of these responses depends upon how they relate to reality must not obscure Macmurray's prime point that one's intellectual response is grounded in his emotional response--that reason as emotional is the basis of reason as intellectual.[55] Implied in this is a consequence of particular relevance for the ethician, namely, that it is through our rational capacity to respond emotionally that persons are able to respond to real values in the world. By contrast, reason as intellectual is instrumental--it deals with means and ways of pursuing and achieving the values to which we respond through reason as emotional.

While the western world has made capital of reason as intellectual, and the intellect's ability to formulate "laws" of nature so as to facilitate technological progress, this emphasis on reason's instrumental role has been accompanied by a general neglect in appreciating reason as our capacity to respond emotionally, a neglect which has led to detrimental effects in personal life. It is through reason as emotional that we respond to what matters most significantly in personal life, namely, values. Beneficial as are technology and scientific advance, achieved through the use of reason as instrumental, these are not enough to satisfy us fully as persons. For this we must develop our capacity to respond to values, that is, reason as emotional.[56] Failure to appreciate reason as emotional responsiveness abets the failure to develop our rationality in this respect, and results in our insensitivity to value and that misplaced skepticism which holds that we can know facts and validate them, but not values--a dissociation which plagues much modern philosophical ethical theory.[57] To be blind to value is to lack full rationality. In pointing this out Macmurray would have us realize that the development of our human nature does not consist primarily in the growth of the intellectual life, but in the emotional life. For in the emotional life lie the basic motives of conduct. When emotional reason falsely evaluates life situations, the concomittant workings of reason as intellectual go awry.[58] For example, when my emotive response to the other whom I encounter in experience is wrong, my thinking will be false and my activity wrong. If a person has maturity of emotional reason, so that his feelings are rational (that is, he responds to the personal other as personal), then his motives in action will accord with this apperception. On the other hand, if his feelings were irrational (if, without justification, he reacted to the personal other as less than personal) he would misapperceive the other. Leaving aside the matter of assessing moral guilt, this fundamental misconception of the other would be a major frustration to a life of virtue. Only when emotional reason is rational is moral activity possible.[59] The real moral struggle centers in the emotional field because reason is the impulse to overcome bias and prejudice in our own favor, and to allow our feelings and desires to be fashioned by things as they are.[60]

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[55] Cf. Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 201-202. As he puts it in Reason and Emotion, pp. 23-24: "Every activity must have an adequate motive, and all motives are emotional. They belong to our feelings, not to our thoughts. At the most our thoughts may restrict and restrain, or direct and guide, our actions. They can determine their form but not their substance. Even this they can only do by rousing emotions which check or alter the primary motives. Thought is always subsidiary to activity even when we are not directly aware of it. The rationality that appears in thought is itself the reflection of a rationality that belongs to the motives of action. It follows that none of our activities, not even the activities of thinking, can express our reason unless the emotions which produce and sustain them are rational emotions."

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[56] In Religion, Art and Science, p. 32, having alluded to play, Macmurray writes, "In such experiences we have our primary awareness of intrinsic values. To this we might add that these values can be negative as well as positive, and that we tend to differentiate them in terms of the organic feelings which they arouse. An object or an act may be attractive or repulsive; an event may be thrilling or nauseating, terrifying or awe-inspiring; a situation may be hopeful or depressing. The range of distinctions which we have words to denote is large, though when we attempt to use them carefully and accurately we find that they are both vaguer and more limited than the differences in the experiences themselves." Linguistically we are capable only of rough approximations of the infinite variety of valuational nuances to which we are capable of responding in immediate experience. In some measure perhaps this accounts for the skepticism some think is inescapable in a discussion of value. Macmurray's allusions to play as an instance of our immediate response to intrinsic value could be pursued for their perhaps unsuspected depth in a work such as Hugo Rahner's Man at Play (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967).

[57] Cf. Wilhelm Korff, "Empirical Social Study and Ethics," Concilium, XXXV (The Social Message of the Gospels, 1968), 7-23. Reacting to ethical presuppositions of a positivistic kind, Korff observes, "Self knowledge simply refuses to deny that reason is also at work in evaluation, and that this reason is elucidative and creative," p. 13.

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[58] Cf. Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 144.

[59] Alluding to Pieper's exposition of St. Thomas' thought (in Leisure, the Basis of Culture), McManus points to the similarity of Macmurray's view of the emotional life with that of St. Thomas. In contrasting the moral teaching of St. Thomas with that of Kant, Pieper shows that whereas Kant places virtue in an action on the basis of its difficulty, St. Thomas holds that the essence of virtue is in the good. For Kant, our practice of virtue means mastering our natural bent whereas for St. Thomas virtue makes us perfect by enabling us to follow our natural bent in the right way. In fact, he says, the sublime achievements of moral goodness are characterized by effortlessness because it is of their essence to spring from love (cf. ST II, II, 108, 2). McManus, op. cit., pp. 214-15, n. 11.

> Our natural tendency is to feel and to believe in the way that satisfies our impulses. We all like to feel that we are the central figure in the picture, and that our own fate ought to be different from that of everybody else. We feel that life should make an exception in our favour. The development of reason in us means overcoming all this.[61]

Shortly after making these remarks, Macmurray adds that morality itself is a demand for rational behavior and its difficulty is the difficulty of overcoming our own natural bias in favor of ourselves and those we love, and demanding that life show us and them special consideration. "Morality demands that we should 'act in the light of eternity,' that is, in terms of things as they really are and of people as they really are, and not in terms of our subjective inclinations and private sympathies."[62] In terms of Macmurray's analysis of action as comprised of two dimensions: intention (the knowledge dimension) and movement (motivation, emotive response), intellectual reason provides intentions for action, but these are instrumental to emotional reason which supplies motives, the dynamic reaching out after value which, in the final analysis, moves the person to (and in) action.[63] "In our actions, therefore, it is emotion which determines the ends at which we aim and intellect which decides the means necessary to their attainment."[64]

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[60] Cf. Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, p. 22.

[61] Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[62] Ibid., p. 23.

The importance of these observations for moral theology cannot be overemphasized. On the one hand, Macmurray's analysis of emotional reason shows up the shortcomings of nominalistic styles of ascetical and moral theology which, in their over-emphasis on reason as intellectual alone, attempt to impose rigidly and absolutely on personal lives, a priori, officially sanctioned formulas for sanctity and abstract principles of conduct.[65] In these sources certitude is said to lie--its wellspring is not in personal existence, least of all in reason as emotional. In Macmurray's philosophy of the personal such theologies could discover the means of overcoming their radical inadequacies.[66] On the other hand, Macmurray's analysis likewise points up the shortcomings of those situation ethicists who, fully aware of the instrumental role of principles, norms and rules, nonetheless fail to take account of what is required to adequately estimate a situation. They fail to show that our emotional response in the concrete situation determines our grasp of it, our reading it correctly. If reason as emotional responds inaccurately, reason in its intellectual aspect--directive of means--will effect an inadequate if not immoral decision. Emotional reason must be progressively educated if it is to respond correctly to situations, evaluating them fittingly. Existential ethics, in its insistence on the shortcomings of a priori judgments of actions and the limits of moral rules of thumb says nothing new. When it underscores the importance of situations it fails to realize that situations of themselves decide nothing, but are precisely the problem. Situations have to be assessed. Macmurray's analysis can teach naive existential ethicists that, since persons evaluate situations, they do so specifically by the emotional character of their rationality, that ultimately the morality of one's action stems from his evaluative response to situations, and that reason as emotional does not automatically evaluate correctly.[67] This being so, emotions must be trained; education, Macmurray insists, must develop our capacity for emotive response as well as the intellect.[68]

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[63] Cf. Macmurray, Self as Agent, pp. 128 ff.

[64] John Macmurray, "Developing Emotions," Saturday Review, XLI (Sept. 13, 1958), 22. This article, written for SR's education issue of the year, offers a convenient summary of Macmurray's principles on the role of emotions and the necessity of educating them.

[65] Cf. Gelpi, Functional Asceticism, pp. 65-68. Reacting against this style of theology, and situating man in an evolving universe, Teilhard de Chardin viewed moral codes not as instruments for restraining individuals and guarding their rights, but rather as guides to personal expression, so that the "personal quantity" that is still diffuse in mankind could be disengaged as much as possible. "From now on, the highest morality is that which assumes the best development of the person, of society, and of the world. No longer to protect, but to develop. Up until now the moralist has been a kind of lawyer; he is becoming now 'the technician and engineer of the spiritual energies of the world.' " Robert L. Faricy, Teilhard de Chardin's Theology of the Christian in the World (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967), p. 180.

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[66] McManus points to the similarity between Macmurray's insights and Henri De Lubac's insistence on turning from ideal man to man as he actually is. "Where Macmurray is concerned that education should train people to a sensitivity to the values in reality, that is, of recognizing the infinite in the finite, De Lubac says /in The Drama of Atheist Humanism, p. 49/ that we must 'rekindle in ourselves the sense of mystery. May that be primarily the endeavour of those among us who are believers; may they show themselves more at pains to live by the mystery than eager to defend its formulas or impose the hard outer crust of it; and the world, impelled by its instinct to live, will follow in their footsteps.' De Lubac's writings essentially complement Macmurray's; De Lubac is primarily theological in his approach while Macmurray is philosophical." McManus, op. cit., p. 216, n. 12.

An education which stresses only intellectual development does not do justice to the integrated experience of life which is peculiarly human.[69] For, as persons, we find satisfaction in life only in the exercise of mutuality with other persons. This in turn depends upon rightly evaluating other persons as persons. At bottom, this fitting response to others is a matter of educating our emotions to the point where our response to other persons is suited to their status as persons. Educating the emotions means cultivating by exercise an increasing fineness and subtlety of sensory discrimination. "The inevitable accompaniment of this is a growing power of accurate judgment and valuation."[70] This cultivation of one's capacity to live in the senses is not an epicurean program advocating self-gratification, but the very opposite, the development of an increased sensitivity to the other-than-I, the world outside. The goal of this education is emotional maturity. Two qualities mark the maturity of an emotional state: they are sensitiveness and objectivity. Macmurray explains these qualities as follows:

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[67] Cf. Lachs, Christian Century, LXXXIII (1966), 1402-1405 on the (nominalistic) dogmatism of Fletcher's presentation of situation ethics with its use of love as an unexplained categorical imperative.

[68] Cf. Macmurray, "Education of the Emotions," and "The Early Discipline of Personality," in Reason and Emotion, pp. 67-91.--C. S. Lewis, reflecting on his own teaching experience observed, "For every one pupil who needs to be guarded from a weak excess of sensibility there are three who need to be awakened from the slumber of vulgarity. The task of the modern educator is not to cut down jungles but to irrigate deserts. The right defence against false sentiments is to inculcate just sentiments. By starving the sensibility of our pupils we only make them easier prey to the propagandist when he comes. For famished nature will be avenged and a hard heart is no infallible protection against a soft head." C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), p. 24.

[69] Cf. Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, p. 76; Self as Agent, p. 182. "The intellect, because it is instrumental, can only deal with life piecemeal. It must divide and abstract. It is in the emotional life that the unity of personality, both in its individual and its social unity, is realized and maintained. It is in emotional activity that this unity is expressed," Reason and Emotion, p. 77; cf. also Persons in Relation, pp. 31 ff.

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[70] Macmurray, "Developing Emotions," 22 and 52. By indirection, Macmurray underscores the necessity of educating emotions by describing the technological frame of mind and what accrues from its ascendancy: "Technological advance itself changes social habits and so disrupts tradition. The old forms of valuation become increasingly powerless to control and limit the new forms of power. Moreover, educational procedure will be affected; the schools and universities will be required to transfer the centre of gravity from the arts to the sciences, while the arts themselves are increasingly taught in a 'scientific' fashion. The result is the spread of an attitude to life which sees it as a series of problems to be solved, and for which all problems are technological, and what is needed for their solution is a 'scientific' approach untrammelled by traditional taboos. It is the negative aspect of this that is most important. The concentration of interest on instrumental values involves a growing unawareness of and insensitiveness to intrinsic values; and our sensitiveness to intrinsic values is the measure of our civilization. What is involved can best be seen if we consider our relations to other people. What would it mean if we were to adopt a scientific or a technological attitude in this field? . . . . Our knowledge of people would have to be like that of the scientific psychologist, for whom--when he is behaving as a scientist--other people are instances of a type, and their behaviour the exemplification of psychological laws. Intimacy, friendship and personal relationship in the familiar sense are ruled out. Practically, we would treat all people as means to our ends or as obstacles to our purposes. . . . We should, in fact, look upon and behave towards other people as if they were things for our use, so far as our power made this possible," Religion, Art and Science, p. 25.

> Immature emotion is crude and egocentric. Sensitive feeling is exact in its reference; it distinguishes its object clearly and it changes with relevant changes in the situation. . . . The claim that mature emotion is objective, however, is likely to meet with astonished rejection. The truth seems to me to be that both thought and feeling are capable of objectivity; that much of our thinking as well as of our feeling is infected with subjectivity, and that in both a perfect objectivity is hard to achieve. I shall admit willingly that it is far harder to achieve in the emotional field. There is wishful thinking, biased thinking, as well as sloppy thinking. There is feeling that is sentimental, self-interested, or perverted. But insofar as our emotional state achieves objectivity it provides us with a valid knowledge and appreciation of its object.[71]

As Macmurray is careful to point out, these considerations on the education of the emotions and emotional objectivity, important as they are, concern emotional development from the viewpoint of the individual person. They describe emotional development insofar as it is contemplative, watching, listening, enjoying.

> But there is another aspect which is mutual and reciprocal, since it is concerned with our relations to one another. We know one another only through a reciprocity of feeling; through a sharing of experience. But more than this, we are persons only through personal relationships, so that in this kind of experience we are at the absolute center of human existence, from which all other experience issues and to which it must return.[72]

Hence emotional maturity primarily concerns the "objectivity" of our relationship to other persons in immediate experience of them. Just as the discovery of one's individuality is the progressive differentiation of oneself from a personal other to whom one belongs, so too emotional maturation follows the same course. Each of us starts from total dependence upon another person, the mother. She represents our whole world, in particular so far as the present context is concerned, our emotional life is wholly (and therefore in an undifferentiated way) directed toward her. At the same time our emotional life is wholly egocentric. For the child, the mother--his whole (personal) world--exists to care for him, to satisfy his needs. Therefore, our emotional development has two facets: a process of discrimination and an overcoming of egocentricity. As to the first of these facets,

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[71] Macmurray, "Developing Emotions," p. 55.

[72] Ibid.

> The discrimination creates a world of persons and things, to each of which we are related emotionally. From an educational point of view what is important is that this differentiation of emotional relations should be correctly achieved; to each object its appropriate emotional attitude. In particular, it is essential that the relations with persons should remain central, or in other words that our direct personal relations should retain their supreme importance, and all other values be subordinated to them.[73]

In passages such as this it becomes apparent that Macmurray's chief purpose in underscoring the importance of training the emotions is that such education leads to an improvement of human relations. Such education fosters the capacity to lead the good life for it helps persons to appreciate that the truest value in life is found in mutual relationships. The second facet of developing emotions to maturity--overcoming egocentricity--is both more difficult and more characteristic.

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[73] Ibid. Cf. Persons in Relation, pp. 64 ff.

> Emotional discrimination cannot be carried through at all without it. To overcome egocentricity means to achieve self-transcendence, to set one's center of interest outside oneself, to care for the other. This capacity for self-transcendence is rationality. To be objective in this sense is to have the center of one's intellectual interest outside oneself.[74]

These lines express one of Macmurray's key insights, mirrored in the substitution of "self-transcendence" for "objectivity" as more appropriate to the context of interpersonal relations.[75]

To lead his reader to an appreciation of reason as emotional as well as intellectual, Macmurray began by defining reason as the capacity for objectivity.[76] He then noted that rationality's prime field of exercise is the world of interpersonal life, and that rationality here means mainly responding (emotionally and knowingly) in a fitting way, that is, responding to the personal other as personal.[77] Having reached this realization, the term "objectivity" is dropped. This is so, not only because it is insufficient to describe the response of one person to another in a personal way, but also because it is inadequate to describe what happens in the responder (that is, in him who adequately appreciates persons as persons). What happens is self-transcendence--he who responds to persons according to the nature of the latter, sets the center of interest outside himself and in the other. Hence, once rationality is appreciated as both emotional and intellectual, the more telling phrase to describe the actualization of the fullness of rationality (and therefore of personhood)--self-transcendence--can replace it.[78] Not only that, but self-transcendence itself is seen in its fullest meaning as well. It becomes clear that self-transcendence does not mean a flight of fancy, nor is it limited to the intellectual side of reason, but has its full and primary realization in care for other persons. The opposite of self-transcendence is egocentricity. As with rationality, self-transcendence is most adequately grasped when one sees that it has an intellectual as well as an emotional dimension, and that the latter--self-transcendence as emotive--is the more basic of the two.

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[74] Macmurray, "Developing Emotions," p. 55.

[75] As McManus (op. cit., p. 87) observes, "The capacity which man has for centering his interest on the external object Macmurray calls self-transcendence. This term 'self-transcendence' is used by him only in his most recent works. When he wrote Interpreting the Universe in the early thirties, he was satisfied that the term 'objectivity' expressed man's capacity to be aware that an object existed independently of himself. He now feels that 'objectivity' is presently aligned too much with intellectual reason. Self-transcendence includes both intellectual and emotional reason and so better expresses the meaning of rationality."

[76] It will be noted that in his use of the term objectivity, Macmurray never employs the frequently used description of it as a disinterested desire for the truth. Reacting to this description of objectivity--how can an interest in truth be disinterested?--Macmurray makes some paramount observations: "This use of the term 'disinterested' to refer to a particular way of being interested is instructive. It betrays an assumption that all interest is self-interest; that all our interests are for our own satisfaction. If this were true, then all forms of reflection including science, would be impossible, or at best, illusory. The point is of the first importance, since it is the basis of reason. If we could not, in some sense, escape from the circle of our self-satisfaction, unless we could have the center of our interest outside ourselves, we could never be rational beings," Religion, Art and Science, p. 17.

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[77] Such descriptions of the fitting response of one person to another should not be understood to mean that we can or do have direct relationships with all persons. Early in Persons in Relation (at p. 43) Macmurray writes: "We must distinguish between the direct and indirect relations of persons. This distinction is not the same as that between the impersonal and personal attitudes, though it has a relation to it. It is a distinction within the field of our enquiry. Direct relations are those which involve a personal acquaintance with one another on the part of the persons related. Indirect relations exclude this condition: they are relations between persons who are not personally known to one another. All indirect relations are therefore necessarily impersonal. Direct relations are those which may or may not be personal, at the will of the persons related. If they are maintained at an impersonal level, this requires justification." Cf. p. 29 on the general condition required for justifying impersonal attitudes in a direct personal relation.

[78] "We must get rid of the notion that our feelings are necessarily 'subjective.' You may remember that in talking about the 'objectivity' of thought in science, I suggested that the term 'self-transcendence' might be a better term to use, since the core of objectivity is the capacity to be

Emotive self-transcendence is manifestly operative in our valuational responses. Specifically, emotional self-transcendence occurs actively when, in my valuational responses, I pass from "I like it" to "It is good," that is when I shed the reference to my own egoistic reaction and stretch my horizon beyond myself. Instead of characterizing me, my judgment characterizes the object, though it is my emotion or feeling that remains as the basis of the judgment.

> The condition of this process from "I like it" to "It is good" is that I should be interested throughout in the object, and not in myself being affected by it. My feeling must really be for the object itself, and the process must be an effort to know and enjoy the object and not to enjoy myself by means of the object. This is the essence of emotional self-transcendence, or, if you will, emotional "objectivity."[79]

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interested in something for its own sake, and so set the centre of one's activity outside oneself. The opposite of self-transcendence, then, is egocentricity. Now this self-transcendence is equally characteristic of our feelings, and in particular, of our emotional reflection," Macmurray, Religion, Art and Science, p. 37. Cf. Persons in Relation, pp. 31 ff.

[79] Macmurray, Religion, Art and Science, p. 38.

Here again, "objectivity" in this citation is used to describe the process of emotional self-transcendence (or emotional rationality) as a process of progressive heterocentricity.[80] While the lines quoted could serve to describe a person's emotional self-transcendence with reference to an art object, for Macmurray this is only a partial realization of self-transcendence. The primary context in which self-transcendence applies is the realm of the interpersonal where one transcends self in favor of a personal other.[81] If in this context the term "objectivity" were retained, it would have to be qualified as "personal objectivity" (that is, centering my interest in another person, transcending myself in favor of interest in another). If "personal objectivity" or self-transcendence were completely achieved, "it would mean that in the personal relation I am for you; that for me, I am nothing, and you are everything. It would mean a complete self-devotion to the other; a perfect love which is a complete fullness of rationality."[82] Drawing out the theological application, Macmurray observes that this means that "the experience of God is the experience of a total self-transcendence and so a total rationality."[83]

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[80] Partly summarizing and expanding Macmurray's view of self-transcendence, McManus, op. cit., pp. 87-88, writes: "It is because of this capacity for self-transcendence that man is able to be interested in an object for itself. Self-transcendence enables a man to escape from himself. The assumption of science that man is interested in himself only is false. It is not necessarily to deny self-interest for a disinterested attitude, since rationality is intrinsically hetero-centered. The reasons why it appears that man is selfish are complex but basically it is because of immaturity. Man has not developed his capacity for self-transcendence to the degree that it is possible. With time it is hoped that it will be fully developed and then it will be realized that rationality is awareness of the other as an existent. This application of Macmurray's epistemology to the problem of self-interest versus interest in the other for its own sake brings out the richness of his idea of rationality. The problem of a selfish versus a distinterested love as proposed in the middle ages and debated right up to the present day without a satisfactory solution would appear to be resolved if rationality is the capacity for self-transcendence /cf. P. Rousselot's Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour au moyen âge/. This interesting topic cannot be discussed here; it is mentioned only to indicate the possible extension of Macmurray's concept of rationality."

[81] In one of his works Macmurray, after considering self-transcendence as it might be realized in the contemplation of an art object, goes on to observe, "In such a case, however, our human capacity for self-transcendence is only partially and imperfectly expressed, and unless the object is itself personal this must be so. Only another person can elicit a total response in action, of such a kind that the self-transcendence of every aspect and element of our nature is expressed and fulfilled. This is the implicit intention of all fellowship--the complete realization of the self through a

Throughout this entire analysis personal mutuality has served Macmurray as the clue to disclose the character of rationality in its deepest meaning, as emotive and intellectual and finding its primary

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complete self-transcendence. If this intention could be realized in an actual instance, the self would 'care for' the other totally; in action and in both modes of reflection, intellectual and emotional. 'I' would think, feel and act _for_ 'you,' in terms of 'your' nature and being. In this way, and only in this way, could a personal being achieve and experience a complete objectivity, a complete rationality, a complete self-realization. The ground of friendship is, therefore, the inevitable need we have to be ourselves. It is our nature, as persons, to live _in the world_ and not in ourselves; to have the centre of intention and realization outside ourselves, in that which is other than ourselves. The basic condition of this is that we should enter into fellowship, that we should love the other. So love may be defined as the complete affirmation of the other by the self: and since to be completely oneself is to be completely free, fellowship is the basic condition of freedom." John Macmurray, _Conditions of Freedom_ (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1950), p. 82.

[82] Macmurray, _Religion, Art and Science,_ p. 58.

[83] _Ibid._, p. 59.

field of activity in the context of interpersonal life. At its highest reach, rationality is the capacity for self-transcendence and its achievement too lies in setting one's center of concern in the personal other--ultimately in the Absolute Other. The pertinence of this portion of Macmurray's analysis to theological investigation is patent. With it one gains deeper insight into the centrality and inevitability of Christ's command that each of us love other persons as brothers.[84] Macmurray's conception of what is involved in self-transcendence likewise complements the Pauline conception of Christian existence as a progressive kenosis, one which participates in the kenosis of Christ himself.[85] In its ethical dimension Christian life follows the general direction of living for others. In this respect it finds a hospitable context in Macmurray's philosophy which in a variety of ways demonstrates the radical heterocentricity required of a person to be a person. In this light selfishness and self-interest are seen for what they are: signs of immaturity in the deepest sense--failures in the attainment of rationality, and self-transcendence and, as well, stumbling blocks to the attainment of our freedom--the next major topic for consideration.[86]

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[84] Cf. Rahner's observations, "This sense of being responsible for my brother, not only for his earthly needs but precisely for his eternal salvation, may be nothing short of decisive for my own eternal salvation. This is not sublime egoism. The realization that unless one loves selflessly one is risking one's own salvation does not imply some higher form of egoism. It is the scale by which I can measure how absolutely necessary is concern for my brother's salvation. The possibility that he has of working out his salvation without me means that he owes me nothing. But I can find myself only if I find my brother. The whole of life has got to be a forward movement towards loving my brother. I must love my brother, and in that love forget myself. If I do that, I am an apostle. If I do not do it, I am ultimately lost." Rahner, Christian in the Market Place, pp. 13-14.

[85] Cf. Phil 2, 1-7; Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, trans. Kendrick Grobel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, n.d.), Vol. I, 210 and 331; Yves Congar, "St. Paul's Casuistry," in A Gospel Priesthood, trans. P. J. Hepburne-Scott (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), pp. 49 ff.

Mutuality and Freedom

It will be recalled that the first lengthy citation from Macmurray in this chapter, a climactic one on the nature of personhood, was set in the context of a discussion of freedom. It is no mere coincidence that Macmurray's quintessential statement on the nature of persons should occur in a consideration of freedom--the Grenzproblem of philosophy and theology today.[87] For to probe the nature of freedom is to wrestle with fundamental questions about man--his essence, his relation to the world, to other persons, to God himself. Since freedom involves these vital issues it is a key concern in morality; or, alternatively, freedom as an issue in ethics can only be fully appreciated from the vantage of freedom as the radical vocation of the person. Since Macmurray sees freedom as he does every other distinctive attribute of man in the context of mutuality, his way of connecting morality and freedom so as to manifest their interconnection is: "Morality expresses the necessary and universal intention to maintain community, as the condition of freedom."[88] Unpacking the meaning of this pithy expression of the meaning of human freedom and the requirements necessary for its achievement is the task of the remainder of this chapter.

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[86] It follows from Macmurray's treatment of reason, that a morality based on self-interest is a morality based on an inadequate model of the human. Further it views persons as merely functionally related, not as constituted for communion one with another. Macmurray views self-interest as insufficient even for mere cooperation among persons. "Mere self-interest," he writes, "can never form the basis of effective human co-operation. Where people are bound together in an unavoidable interdependence, they must either develop a sense of friendship and loyalty to one another, or institute a struggle for power. Enlightened self-interest cannot produce the greatest good of the greatest number. If it could, there would be no need for government; and anarchism would be best. This can be seen most easily in the case of two individuals. If they are compelled to co-operate from self-interest and if this co-operation is inescapable, then if they refuse to be friends each must seek to use the other for his own ends. They must either unite or fight." Macmurray, Religion, Art and Science, p. 65. It is axiomatic for Macmurray that self-interested relation (as is true of all negatively motivated behavior) excludes the mutuality it seeks to extort. Cf. Persons in Relation, p. 105.

[87] Cf. Johannes B. Metz, "Freedom as a Threshold Problem between Philosophy and Theology," Philosophy Today, X (1966), 264-79; and John C. Murray, ed., Freedom and Man (New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1965).

In Macmurray's view, freedom is neither understandable nor achievable apart from the social nature of man. Because of our social nature as persons, our dependence on the cooperation of our fellows, our exercise of freedom is conditional upon the grace and favor of others. What is possible for me depends upon other people. For persons, possibility has a dual meaning. Much that is possible in the nature of things is made impossible if other persons will not cooperate with us in its achievement. Furthermore, if others are determined that we shall not have what we desire, they can always refuse it to us, however simple a thing it may be, however easily attainable with their good will.

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[88] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 189.

> It is this situation which sets the problem of human freedom. For it defines a wide field of possibility which is conditional upon the extent and the quality of social co-operation. Within this field we can aim at possibilities which are open to us if others will share them; and we can lose our freedom when they will not. So the essential conditions of freedom are social; and the simplest answer to the question, "Why can I not do as I please?" is, "because other people won't let me."[89]

This is the simplest way to manifest how the interdependence of persons conditions their freedom. But just as our mutuality with others means more than that we have to cooperate with them, so too the connection between our interdependence as persons and our freedom runs deeper, as Macmurray reveals in the following emphatic passage:

> There is a second corollary of our interdependence which is less widely recognized, and which seems to me the most important of all. No man can compass his own freedom for himself. He must accept it as a free gift from others; and if they will not give it to him he cannot have it. This is a law of freedom. Against it our fear and our pride beat themselves in vain rebellion. If we struggle to achieve our own private freedom we merely frustrate ourselves and destroy its possibility; for we cannot free ourselves from our dependence upon our fellows. That this is not so is one of the great illusions of a sophisticated society. When we profess our faith in freedom we often mean only that we want to be free. What value, what honour is there in such a miserable faith? Which of us would not like to do as he pleases--if only he could escape from his fear of the consequences? To believe in freedom, in any sense worthy of consideration, is to believe in setting other people free. This is to some extent within our power, and it is the greatest service we can render; even if it must be, at times, by the sacrifice of our own. In giving freedom to others, we have a right to hope that they in turn will have the grace and the gratitude to give us ours. But of this we can have no guarantee.[90]

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[89] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 26. Cf. Persons in Relation, pp. 172-73.

[90] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 27. This passage demands comparison with the one used early in this chapter and suggested as programmatic for renewing moral theology--the citation from Persons

To explicate the full meaning of this passage Macmurray points to the two ground motives, love and fear, which affect the dynamism of personal life as it was discussed in the last chapter in terms of the rhythm of withdrawal and return. As indicated there, Macmurray employs these two polarities to describe the ground motives which affect one's fundamental apperception of the world, in particular, one's view of other persons, and ultimately give rise to the three basic modes of morality--submissive and aggressive, rooted in fear, and communal morality, rooted in love. Here these same ground motives which radically modify one's apperception of other persons are seen as determinative in the exercise and achievement of freedom as well. Having indicated that human freedom is unavoidably rooted in the context of our interdependent existence with other persons, that we cannot achieve our freedom apart from others' attaining theirs--indeed, that we achieve our own freedom by working to set others free--Macmurray points to the chief obstacle to the attainment of freedom. It is fear. Fear of the future, fear for our security, fear primarily of other persons keeps us from enjoying the liberty to which we are called as persons. In Macmurray's own words:

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in Relation, p. 211. The full theological import of Macmurray's insight that our freedom is connected with setting others free could be drawn out by using Macquarrie's conception of God the Father as he who lets be--in the active sense--and how, as created in his image, we are privileged to participate in this with regard to other persons. Cf. the references to "letting-be" in the index to Macquarrie's Principles of Christian Theology.

> In the nexus of personal relationship which is our common life, the enemy of liberty, the great inhibitor of free action, is fear. I do not mean the direct fears that have an immediate danger before them; for these are natural and call only for a natural courage. But there are deep and pervasive fears in us which have primitive roots and which are projected upon the future by our imagination. If they gain control, they turn us upon the defensive, so that we see danger everywhere and spend our energies in the attempt to secure ourselves against the future. We feel relatively safe only within the circle of familiar habit, where action is automatic. Before the unusual, the foreign, the unknown, we feel the need of protection and defence; and because of our intimate dependence upon our fellows, we fear one another most of all.[91]

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[91] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, pp. 27-28. This passage uncovers the key obstacles to our exercise of the freedom wherewith Christ made us free. Given the fact that Christianity is radically future oriented, fear of the future inhibits the living of faith. Cf. William F. Lynch, "The Freedom to be Human," in Freedom and Man, pp. 70-86.--To grasp the full import of fear as the obstacle to freedom, it should be recalled that in analyzing action Macmurray indicated that if action is to determine the future (as is its nature to do) it must accord with our nature as mutually related to other persons. Mutually related as we are, a misconception of the other is a misconception of one's own nature--a categorial misconception, an error that infects the form of our action in general, not its particular content as this or that particular action. This error in the conception of our own nature, arising from our fear, must affect all our action for we misconceive our own reality by appearing to ourselves to be what we are not, or not to be what we are. The result can only be a self-frustration based upon a self-deception. "Our actions appear to be determined, though they really are free. But this is only true in virtue of a negative motivation /fear/ in relation to other persons. For then action is defensive and appears to be dictated by the other person, against whom I must defend myself. In reality it is determined not by him but by my fear of him. Thus, when two friends quarrel and are estranged, each blames the other for the bad relations between them. Or, to put it otherwise, if my motivation is negative then I appear to myself as an isolated individual who must act for himself and achieve whatever he can achieve by his individual efforts, in a world which cares nothing for his success or failure. Yet in reality, my isolation is a self-isolation, a withdrawal from relationships through fear of the other. This attitude . . . expresses the experience of frustration and despair. . . ." Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 149. In this perspective, Christian living as hopeful existence becomes practically impossible.

Fear as the inhibitor of freedom plays the same role as it did in Macmurray's characterization of fear as the origin of two negative modes of moral apperception: submissive and aggressive. For the mechanisms of self defense which we develop to serve our fear of other people are of two main types: the mechanism of withdrawal (the submissive posture which issues in the contemplative mode of morality), and the struggle for power (the aggressive response to fear which issues in what Macmurray labels the pragmatic mode of morality).

Through the negative mechanism of withdrawal we provide ourselves with the illusion of independence. We make our relations with others as indirect and automatic as possible, so that they can be stereotyped in a technique which prevents too close or intimate a contact with them. "Since this subjects our co-operation with others to a rule, we lose our freedom of action."[92] But we compensate for this, in idea, by achieving a freedom of mind, or finding our freedom in the realm of imagination, or in a private spirituality. Since, in the concrete, others are troublesome, threatening, to us, since we are inhibited by fear for ourselves in the face of the personal other, we attempt to find our freedom solely within.

> In this way we produce in ourselves a feeling that we are independent, that we are free from the others. For we meet them only impersonally, and their demands upon us appear only as the pressure of a mechanism

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[92] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 28.

> of institutions, which we call Society and which fades insensibly into the order of Nature, governed and guaranteed by eternal laws which we cannot change.[93]

Using the alternative defense mechanism against the fear we feel for ourselves in the face of others, we seek to achieve freedom for ourselves alone by a struggle for power over others.

> We meet our fear of others by an attempt to make ourselves stronger than they, so that we can compel their co-operation in our purposes. We seek some position of privilege, some superiority over our fellows that can force their service. We set up if we can, between us and our fellows, instead of the relation of fellowship, the relation of master and servant. This is the origin of all tyranny, from the petty tyrannies of family and workshop to the major but often more tolerable tyrannies of the dictators and conquerors.[94]

Just as the attempt to seek one's freedom in the life of the mind is self-defeating, since personal existence and action are ever conditioned by mutuality, so too the struggle for power as a defense against our own fear and a means of attaining freedom is illusory and self-defeating.

> For it springs from fear, and depends for its success upon the inculcation of fear. The master is dependent upon his slaves and helpless without their service; if they lose their fear of him he loses his hold upon them. The more they fear him, the more he must fear them, for he has wronged them and they are justified in rebellion. So the fear he inspires increases his insecurity and his need of power for his defence, in a vicious circle that can end only with his own destruction. He spreads fear like an infection through the circle of his relationships, and poisons the springs of freedom both for himself and for his victims. Though he may indulge in a frenzy of grandiose activity, his ends are negative and destructive.

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[93] *Ibid.*; cf. Lynch, *Images of Hope*, Part I, pp. 23-108.

[94] Macmurray, *Conditions of Freedom*, p. 29. Cf. *Persons in Relation*, pp. 125 ff., on the pragmatic mode of morality, and pp. 134 ff. the same mode operative in society.

> Nothing creative can be accomplished through fear; and no power, however impressive in its extent, can avail us against the inevitable.[95]

With this elaboration of why the struggle for power is inherently self-defeating, Macmurray completes his specification of the general principles which govern the achievement and the increase of human freedom at all times and in all circumstances. Though, as he is quick to add, our freedom is relative to still other conditions posed by present historical circumstances in which we live and the influence these have on personal relationships, freedom never escapes its roots in the mutuality which governs personal existence.[96] Its prime foe is always our fear. Fear paralyzes. It distorts our view of our neighbor, hence it distorts our conception of ourselves and this misconception of our own reality affects all our action wherein freedom is attained.

How the mutuality of persons ever conditions the realization of personal freedom can be appreciated more fully from a consideration of action. Without iterating Macmurray's analysis of action summarized in the last chapter, it will suffice to recall that one of the significant aspects of action is that it determines the future. Not fate or chance, but the action of persons determines the course of history. While action is the determination of the future, freedom is the capacity to act, and so the capacity to determine the future. Since freedom is the capacity to act, it bears the same dimensions Macmurray ascribed to action (knowledge and motivation). Like action,

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[95] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 29. Cf. Persons in Relation, p. 29. Cf. Rom 8,15.

[96] In subsequent pages of Conditions of Freedom, the main source from which the previously stated basic principles of freedom were drawn, Macmurray discusses relevant social and political issues which condition freedom at the present time. Though the limits of this study prevent even a summary of these pages, further refinements Macmurray makes of the general principles of freedom quoted will be attended to, with the purpose of showing how they are connected with his key ideas on morality.

> Freedom has two dimensions; the capacity to move, and the capacity to know; both of which have reference to the Other. To move is to modify the Other; to know is to apprehend the Other. To act, then, as the essential unity of these two freedoms is to modify the Other by intention. To this we add that since the agent is part of the Other, he cannot modify the Other without modifying himself, or know the Other without knowing himself. In determining the future for the Other he also determines his own future.[97]

Realizing, of course, that "the Other" in this passage refers, in its primary significance, to other persons, what Macmurray is indicating here is how our mutuality conditions the realization of freedom through the two dimensions that comprise action. Considering myself apart from others, I can appreciate how, in my action I actuate one of a number of possibilities so that I can say action is choice, my choice, and hence that in action I realize my capacity for freedom. To this extent, I determine myself. However, this self-determination is only one aspect of action, and therefore only a partial understanding of my own freedom. For in action I depend upon the Other as well. Insofar as my action is significant, it depends upon other persons. To be successful, then, my action depends upon the response, the reciprocity, of these others. For it is the relation of persons in action which makes action possible. The fact that I am not the only agent in the world but exist with other agents is the most significant fact conditioning the realization of my freedom as well as theirs. This means more than the fact that other persons are potential co-operators or checkmates to me in the exercise of my freedom. My relatedness to them (and theirs to me) affects me far more fundamentally. For,

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[97] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 166. Cf. Self as Agent, ch. VI, "Implications of Action," pp. 127 ff.

> The freedom of any particular agent . . . depends upon his knowledge of the Other, and this knowledge is problematic. So far as his knowledge of the Other is infected with error, his capacity to act will be frustrated; his intention will not be realized. This frustration does not mean that he cannot act at all, but that he will act wrongly and the resulting determination of the future will not be what he intended, and hence not in the strict sense his determination. It will be determined for him through his own act in a way which he did not intend. This must include, of course, a self-determination which is intentional. Again, his freedom of action will depend upon the adequacy of his knowledge: he will be able to determine the future only to the extent of his knowledge, even if it is valid so far as it goes.[98]

Clearly, these observations apply to every person as agent. Concretely, then, the import of this passage is that if any of us is to realize his full personal freedom--all of us must have a correct apperception of other persons as mutually related one to another and that we must share the same intention in our action if such action is to succeed in determining our common future.[99] Insofar as we fall short of this, the radical freedom of all of us is frustrated. Because we are grounded in mutuality, creating the conditions for the exercise of our freedom, at its deepest, is a communal task. Viewed from Macmurray's analysis of action, the conditions of freedom are the conditions of action as the capacity to determine the future in accordance with an intention.[100] As persons we are mutually related. As agents we are interrelated.

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[98] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 166-67. After formulating the inherent ideal of the personal as "a universal community of persons in which each cares for all the others and no one for himself," Macmurray adds: "This ideal of the personal is also the condition of freedom--that is, of a full realization of his capacity to act--for every person. Short of this there is unintegrated, and therefore suppressed, negative motivation; there is unresolved fear; and fear inhibits action and destroys freedom," ibid., p. 159.

> This interrelation of agents, which makes the freedom of all members of a society depend upon the intentions of each, is the ground of morality. It provides a reference beyond themselves for all possible intentions in virtue of which they can be either right or wrong, and this rightness is neither technical nor aesthetic, but moral. Its corollary is that the freedom of any agent--that is to say, his capacity to realize his own being as an agent--is conditioned, inherently, by the action of all other agents. My freedom depends upon how you behave.[101]

As indicated in the last chapter where this passage was cited, Macmurray offers the penultimate sentence cited as an absolute, though only indeterminate or formal criterion of morality. Positively stated, and if we call the harmonious interrelation of agents their "community," a morally right action is an action which intends community.[102] So far as the present context is concerned, the significant point is that the actualization of freedom depends upon the actualization of mutuality. This is most clearly seen by appealing to Macmurray's usual example of personal existence at its fullest--friendship. Here every dimension of the person finds fullness: his emotive and intellectual rationality, or capacity for self-transcendence, his identity, and likewise his freedom. In friendship each person in the relationship is free to be in the fullest sense; each comes to himself. By contrast, the common character of our experience is that our reality as persons is always in us, and yet always beyond us. "We are and are not ourselves."[103] We come to ourselves in the active exercise of mutuality in human fellowship.

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[99] As he stresses particularly in one of his religious works, Search for Reality in Religion (London: George, Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1965), pp. 44-46, the intention shared by persons must harmonize with God's intention (that we be one). Cf. Persons in Relation, p. 159.

[100] Cf. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 118-19.

[101] Ibid., pp. 118-19.

[102] Ibid., p. 119.

Yet friendship, or human fellowship (to use a phrase to denote the exercise of charity on a wider scale) is never achieved once for all, but is always a task.[104] For it requires constant tending, perduring personal action (i.e., intention and motivation) to sustain it. The pertinence of this to freedom is that, granting we find our freedom at its fullest in the exercise of mutuality with other persons, our freedom--like our personhood--is always beyond us, always, that is, a matter of achievement. For it depends upon human fellowship which is always a matter of achievement, requiring personal action that goes beyond mere co-operation if it is to be sustained. Macmurray indicates this is pointing out how freedom, along with equality (dealing with other persons as persons)[105] relate to friendship.

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[103] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 74.

[104] "The understanding of charity as friendship, and therefore first of all as the pursuit of friendship, is more than ever necessary for Christians in the practice of the precept of love toward all men," writes Henri-Marie Feret, "Brotherly Love in the Church as the Sign of the Kingdom," Concilium, XXIX (1967), 15-37, at 16, n. 1. The article, which supports this theme from documents of Vatican Council II, is highly significant for the application of Macmurray's key concepts on morality. As John Ferguson writes, "Christian love offered something which friendship /as analyzed by ancient Greek and Latin writers/ could not offer. Yet when this has been said, it is surprising that the Christian tradition has not made more of the value of friendship." John Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959), p. 75.

> Any human fellowship /as Macmurray repeatedly says of mutuality/ is both matter of fact and matter of intention. Equality and freedom are constitutive principles of friendship, but they are also ideals to be achieved in friendship. It is the mutual intention to treat one another as equals and to be free in relationship that makes us friends; and the presence of the intention in the relationship means that it is already, to some extent realized. Yet it is never completely realized, not merely because we fail to achieve it, but also because it "grows by what it feeds on." Each partial or temporary realization creates new possibilities of further and fuller realization.[106]

Further, as constitutive principles of fellowship, equality and freedom condition one another reciprocally.

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[105] Cf. Persons in Relation, p. 158: "A positive unity of persons is the self-realization of the personal. For, firstly, they are related as equals. This does not mean that they have, as matter of fact, equal abilities, equal rights, equal functions or any other kind of de facto equality. The quality is intentional: it is an aspect of the mutuality of the relation. If it were not an equal relation, the motivation would be negative; a relation in which one was using the other as a means to his own end. Secondly, they both realize their freedom as agents, since in the absence of the fear for the self there is no constraint on either, and each can be himself fully; neither is under obligation to act a part. Thus equality and freedom are constitutive of community. . . ."

[106] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 74.

> Equality is a condition of freedom in human relations. For if we do not treat one another as equals, we exclude freedom from the relationship. Freedom, too, conditions equality. For if there is constraint between us there is fear; and to counter the fear we must seek control over its object, and attempt to subordinate the other person to our own power. Any attempt to achieve freedom, must, therefore be self-defeating.[107]

These insights are big with import for civil rights problems in American society today and, more generally, to the consideration of justice in moral theology. Regarding the latter, Macmurray's observations on the mutual conditioning of equality and freedom in personal relations imply that no one has any rights save on the condition that other persons recognize them; no one can claim or strive for any rights realistically unless he is willing to acknowledge that every other person is entitled to the rights he claims for himself. In short, the existence of rights is grounded on the mutuality of personhood, and the acquisition, maintenance and preservation of rights depends upon the active exercise of mutuality. What I claim for myself, I claim for you. Failing this attitude, none of us is free in practice to enjoy the particular right in question.[108]

Well aware that freedom, equality and brotherhood have been and are employed as political slogans and objectives, Macmurray does not believe that they can be political objectives because political means cannot achieve them. In his view, the state, as such, being a center of organization within territorial limits, can only provide at best the material conditions in which fellowship can flourish and through which it can manifest itself.[109] The state can at best attempt to make conditions such as to foster and insure cooperation among men (a functional relationship of persons), but it cannot create community--fellowship, friendship among men. This ever remains, of necessity, a personal task. It depends upon a progressive centering of one's interest away from self and in the personal other. As was indicated in discussing Macmurray's treatment of self-transcendence as the complete realization of one's rationality (emotive and intellectual), so also must it be said of our freedom that its ground is friendship. The basic condition of our coming to ourselves, hence of our freedom, is that we center our interest outside ourselves in the personal other.

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[107] Ibid.

[108] The rights referred to here are basic ones; in this brief mention of the applicability of Macmurray's thought to justice there is no intention of denying the distinctions concerning what might be due to certain classes of persons (the aged, for example), matters which St. Thomas covered in treating equity. For a more detailed consideration of Macmurray's ideas on justice see Persons in Relation, pp. 188 ff. Cf. also Johann, "I want my rights," in Building the Human, pp. 137-39.

> The basic condition of this is that we should enter into fellowship, that we should enter into fellowship, that we should love the other. So love may be defined as the complete affirmation of the other by the self: and since to be completely oneself is to be completely free, fellowship is the basic condition of freedom.[110]

To this Macmurray adds that the essential condition for realizing fellowship, and therefore freedom, is a mutual reciprocity.

> The individual cannot achieve freedom in fellowship unless the other person does so too. I may love another person and find that my love

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[109] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 75.

[110] Ibid., p. 82.

> is not returned. In such a case my love for the other remains only an intention which cannot be realized. Without reciprocity no common life can be established between us. Further, the intention to be friends, even if it is mutual, does not itself constitute fellowship; it constitutes merely the condition of its possibility. Fellowship has to be realized in the activities of a common life, under material as well as psychological conditions which vary continually. It has to be lived through difficulties, and the difficulties have to be overcome. But provided the intention is maintained on both sides, some realization of fellowship and of freedom is certain, and some common life is necessarily established. But its quality depends upon the extent to which the fear of the other--which is the fear for the self--is overcome in practice and not merely in intention. Fellowship has to be lived: it cannot be established once for all. For though the activities of a common life may persist through habit after the intention of fellowship has ceased, the unity which remains is no longer a fellowship but only a co-operation for common purposes.[111]

As this passage shows, once the point is made that the full realization of human freedom depends on personal communion (typified in the terms friendship or fellowship), it follows that freedom depends on all those conditions necessary for achieving and sustaining friendship--a relationship which has to be lived and cannot be established once for all.

Illuminating as this is, the fact remains that friendship (being the intimate relationship it is) is rare, and no man can have more than a few true and lasting friends. Macmurray acknowledges this, but does not think it invalidates the point that we find our freedom only in such a type of personal communion. After noting the rarity of genuine friendships he writes:

> Friendship . . . is only the full realization, the ripe fruit of human fellowship, and it is, perhaps, even rarer than we are apt to think.

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[111] Ibid., pp. 82-83.

> But the root from which it springs and the soil in which it grows, are universal. In particular, the intention which it fulfills is the same in all forms of fellowship, and it is this . . . that is decisive. Since we can only be ourselves in fellowship, in a mutual caring for one another, it follows that the intention to enter into fellowship is implicit in every human being and in every human activity. This indeed is what makes us human. It is the positive ground-motive of all personal life, and so both absolutely basic and absolutely universal. The ground of fellowship is common humanity. It is not one intention among others, but the integrating intention which gives meaning to all the others, and to which they are relative.[112]

It is this very intention which Macmurray specified as the characteristic one in the communal mode of morality which, as indicated in the last chapter, is the only style of conduct that genuinely suits the nature and destiny of persons.[113]

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[112] Ibid., p. 84; cf. p. 71: "In a group the full realization of the potentiality of fellowship is limited, and the larger the group the severer must be the limitation. This does not mean that in the larger communities fellowship is less real, or that it differs in its essential character. In the larger fellowship the full intention remains latent and potential, as it were, and is fully expressed only in the direct relations of its members, each to each." Cf. also Persons in Relation, p. 43.

[113] "Such a general intention /to maintain the community of agents/ is a unifying intention. Not only is it the intention which maintains the personal unity of any group of agents; but it also unifies the actions of an individual agent in a single life. For it is the intention which remains the same for all his actions, and to which they all have reference. It is a universal and necessary intention for all agents, since the relation of persons is constitutive for their existence as persons. They can only be themselves and realize their freedom as agents through their relation to one another. The interrelation of agents is a necessary matter of fact. But it is also a necessary matter of intention. For it is not enough to constitute the agent a person that he should in fact be a member of a group of persons. He must know that he is a member of the group, and that in all his actions he is entering into intentional relation, directly or indirectly, with the others. This universal and necessary intention, which is the same for all agents, because it springs purely from their nature as agents, provides, therefore, a norm for the rightness or wrong-

The fact that the ground of communal morality is common humanity means, in the concrete, that the natural tendency of any two human beings who meet one another is to enter into fellowship, irrespective of their individual talents, differences, race, sex or social condition.

> If, in fact, they do not, it must be because the natural tendency is inhibited by fear. Any meeting of persons holds the potentiality of self-realization for all of them. Since this rests upon the basic structure of human personality, its objective correlate is a universal fellowship of persons, a single human community.[114]

It is in fact what St. Paul calls the mystery of the Father's will, hidden for all ages until revealed in Christ, that all be united in Christ (cf. Eph 1, 9). To make the fostering of brotherhood the intention of all one's actions is to participate in the intention of God himself.[115] Maintaining

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ness of all actions whatever. It is this that enables us to define morality by reference to maintaining community in action." Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 119-20.

[114] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 84.

[115] As indicated previously, Macmurray sees the realization of our freedom as conditional upon the realization of mutuality in fellowship. This means that if my freedom is to be actual, the intention of my action or actions, must harmonize with the intention of other persons. If not, if our intentions are disparate, none of us can realize what he wishes by acting. More than this, however, Macmurray points out that not only are we interdependent with other persons, but all of us are dependent upon God. Consequent upon the mutuality all of us have with God, it follows that the intention which informs human action must also harmonize with God's intention. This is that we be--live and act--as one family under Him. If our actions do not directly or indirectly harmonize with this divine intention, they are bound to be frustrated. To conceive the world personally and as one action "is to conceive it as the act of God, the Creator of the world, and ourselves as created agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can be realized only on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with His intention, and which must frustrate itself if they are not," Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 222.

such an intention in all one's actions would, in Macmurray's view, demonstrate the proper meaning of what is called "love of humanity."[116] He hesitates to use this phrase, however, because it is so often construed as a thin, diffuse and sentimental attitude of general benevolence.

> But in its proper meaning "love of humanity" is simply the recognition and explicit affirmation of the implicit intention which constitutes our own personal nature. To love humanity is not to feel a vague affection for some imaginary human totality. It is to maintain the disposition to care for any human being with whom we are brought into relation, in whatever fashion circumstances make possible, and simply on the ground of our common humanity.[117]

Despite the fact that Christianity in its history has failed to maintain this its characteristic intention, it is, Macmurray observes, most easily discovered in the teaching of Jesus. "The parable of the Good Samaritan is a definite assertion that the basis of human relationship is common humanity."[118] The practical moral import of Macmurray's own philosophical analysis, centered on the ontology of the person, as he explicitly acknowledges, is that the moral imperatives for our conduct arise from our nature as persons and that they are one with what Christ requires of his followers. "The implicit goal of human intentionality," he writes, "is the realization, in concrete experience, of an inclusive total human fellowship, a brotherhood of mankind."[119]

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[116] Cf. Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, pp. 41 ff. ("The Meaning of Christianity"). Cf. Rahner, Christian in the Market Place, p. 11; and "The Unity of Love of God and Neighbor," Theology Digest, XV (1967), 87-93.

[117] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 85.

[118] Ibid., p. 92. Cf. the opening paragraph of Ratzinger's study on the meaning of Christian brotherhood: "You have one teacher, and you are all brethren (Mt. 23:8). These words of Christ define the relationship between Christians as a relationship of brothers, and thus contrast with the natural brotherhood of blood relationship a new brotherhood of the spirit. So the Christian ethos is, or should be, an ethos of brotherliness." Joseph Ratzinger, The Open Circle: the Meaning of Christian Brotherhood, trans. W. A. Glen-Doeple (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1966), p. 25. Ratzinger goes on to show that the inner ring of brotherhood among Christians, the Church, does not and must not exist for its own sake, becoming ingrown and exotic, but rather for the sake of the wider ring (i.e., mankind) to which it must continually reach out and with which it must continually identify. The church as a "separating off," from other men, he insists,

But this is merely the starting point. The problem it sets is a realistic and practical one, namely, how is the universal fellowship to be created?

> The question, I repeat, is realistic and practical. There is a tendency in many quarters to think that it is idealistic and impractical, because it would involve a universal perfection of character which is far beyond the reach of the mass of human beings. Such a view rests upon an elementary misunderstanding of the relation between theory and practice. Any theory is ideal, and provides a standard which can never be fully realized in its application. One does not say that because ideal justice cannot be realized on earth, we should not aim at justice in the political field. We do not scorn the theory of the steam-engine because a perfect steam-engine cannot be built. Nor do we imagine that because an ideal friendship is beyond our capacity, it is stupid to make friends. The question of a universal community is of the same sort.[120]

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is for the sake of service to the whole--all men. Macmurray's leitmotif--the rhythm of withdrawal and return--has application to this communal reality as well. Ratzinger's exposition, more explicitly theological than Macmurray's (who in the aspect of his thought under discussion is thinking of the church when he refers to a limited fellowship which intends universality) mesh perfectly.

[119] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 92. And, Macmurray insists, brotherhood is properly a religious term. Cf. Religion, Art and Science, p. 66.

[120] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, pp. 92-93. Cf. Charles E. Curran, "The Ethical Teaching of Jesus," Commonweal, LXXXVII (Nov. 24, 1967), 248-58.

More than ever Christianity must take seriously these remarks on the practicality of realizing brotherhood for, as Jolif has recently indicated, it is precisely here that we find the forceful challenge of atheistic humanism. It asks not whether it is rational to be a Christian or not, it asks not whether Christianity is theoretically adequate or not, but rather, has Christianity realized brotherhood, has it transformed relations between man and man and is it doing so now?[121]

Since Macmurray rejects idealism, his answer to this kind of challenge is not by appeal to some abstract essence of Christianity, apart from its concrete historical manifestations.[122] He admits that the Christian churches, divided among themselves, have acted as divisive forces and are therefore still immature. They are untrue to their founder. For in Macmurray's view, "what is often referred to as the 'ethical teaching of Jesus' is a realistic attempt to answer this question: what conditions must be fulfilled by any actual community if it is to extend without limits and so become an inclusive fellowship?"[123]

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[121] Cf. Jean-Yves Jolif, "The Real Challenge of Atheistic Humanism," Concilium, XXIX (Opportunities for Belief and Behavior, 1967), 5-13.

[122] Cf. Jolif, loc. cit., 9 on the fallacy of appealing to an abstract essence of Christianity as a method of defending it; this technique (ironically) proves the case of atheistic humanism. Cf. Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, p. 26: "I was wholly convinced by Marx that idealism is a dangerous illusion which must be rejected. But I was not convinced that religion is necessarily a form of idealism."

[123] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 93. Without explicitly citing New Testament texts regarding the life and teaching of Jesus, in detailing the conditions necessary for a limited fellowship which intends

The general conditions to be fulfilled, Macmurray explains, are those which constitute a unity of fellowship in contrast to a mere unity of cooperation.[124] Specifically they are the very same conditions Macmurray offered as the conditions of freedom: recognition of our interdependence with others, striving to free others from the variety of slaveries which constrict them (and in the process attaining our own freedom), and attempting to overcome their fear by our loving initiative. To these he would add the active intention of universality.

> Clearly such an expansion cannot be based upon aggression, and cannot appeal to fear. The very nature of fellowship renders such methods self-stultifying. The alternative rests upon the principle that fellowship between persons is natural, and will be realized

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universal fellowship Macmurray is thinking of the Church. Cf. Conditions of Freedom, p. 97 where this is explicitly stated. For Macmurray, a mature religion is universal (in intent and in action).

[124] In his last work Search for Reality in Religion, in the first chapter of which he reviews his philosophical career, he notes that he has been accused of treating Jesus merely as a social reformer (p. 36). Macmurray does not think Jesus was simply that. But, he asks, "How could Jesus or any Hebrew prophet, or any Hebrew at all, for that matter, be a religious teacher without being a social reformer, or a social reformer without being a religious teacher?" (p. 36). Christianity, he insists, is not idealism. "A purely spiritual religion is necessarily an idealist religion, and so unreal? (p. 27). As he says in Religion, Art and Science, p. 69: "In formal terms, a relation to God which is not a relation to my neighbour is unreal." In his insistence on the fact that genuine religion, Christianity in particular, affects life and is proved in life, Macmurray is surely correct. However, it is true, in this writer's estimation, that Macmurray concentrates on the ethical nature of Christianity. Christianity is indeed a brotherhood which intends universal brotherhood. More specifically, to become a Christian means to become incorporated in the Son, in Christ, so that we become "sons in the Son" of our one heavenly Father. This is both a sacramental and an ethical process (cf. Ratzinger, op. cit., p. 83). Macmurray mainly considers its ethical side.

> where fear is overcome. Consequently, the technique for the expansion of a fellowship--if one may use such a phrase--must be a technique for eliminating fear. This enables us to understand the principle of "forgiveness" which Jesus substitutes for "punishment" in dealing with injury, or the injunction to "love one's enemies." These are, in fact, the conditions of reconciliation; and granted the intention of universal fellowship, they follow of necessity as practical rules for its achievement.[125]

This general description of the activity of a limited fellowship which actively intends universal fellowship can be specified still further. And the specifics particularly concern the internal and external referents of fear--for it is essential that fear be excluded as a principle by a fellowship which intends universality. Within the limited fellowship itself fear must be excluded.

> Internally, the fellowship must be constituted in such a fashion that it is potentially universal. It must, in principle, be open to everyone, and therefore no principle which differentiates between people must enter into its constitution. . . . Since its constitution is psychological, is the structure of its common mind, this means that it is not on the defensive. It does not seek to defend its exclusive individuality against other groups or individuals. It must be prepared to lose its life as this particular community in order to find it again in a more inclusive community.[126]

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[125] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 94. "The faith of Christ's friends is not to be isolated and loveless, but a faith which is true in love, is vigorous and bears fruit; neither they nor the community are to enjoy existence for themselves but they are to devote their whole life to others; they are not to take the lives of others, but give their own lives for others," Hans Kung, The Church (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967), pp. 259-60. So far Kung and Macmurray agree, but Macmurray does not allude to the tenet of faith which Kung adds immediately after the lines just quoted, viz., "The love of the Father, which is given entirely to the Son, is given also to all who are in fellowship with the Son (cf. Jn 16,27). The Father's love, which unites Father and Son, unites all and all will unite in the Church who believe in the Son [Kung then cites Jn 17,20-26]," p. 260.

[126] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, pp. 94-95. "When we confess that Jesus Christ became man and suffered for us men and our salvation," writes Rahner, "we are at the same time clearly stating that the

Externally, the fellowship which intends universality is not afraid of those who are outside its membership, whether these be individuals or groups.

> Since it intends universality, all men are potentially members of it. They are outside only because they exclude themselves; and they exclude themselves because they are afraid. The problem of achieving their inclusion is the problem of overcoming the fear which excludes them.[127]

This is possible only if the community which seeks to include them in its fellowship is one of which no one can rightly be afraid. "It must neither withdraw into itself nor become aggressive against others: and it must maintain this attitude, under all circumstances, in its relations with outsiders."[128] This applies, critically, when aggression is directed against the fellowship itself. It must not retaliate. Its refusal to defend itself, of course, provides the condition for successful aggression. Yet the fellow-

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Church is not an end in herself but exists for men. But this also means that the service of which we are speaking, as the new task of the Church and of Christians in a new situation, really is a service of men. It has to come to rest in them, and not turn back towards itself. I mean that this service contributes most to the growth of Christianity, which is the religion of self-forgetful love, when it thinks about people themselves: each one of them, all of them, those far off as well as those near, the unhappy creature from whom there is nothing to be gained, who is no addition to the battalions of the Church Militant. . . . The more we can convince a person, in deed and in truth, that we are serving him because we love him in God and are seeking for nothing besides, the more we shall convince him of Christ, of God's grace and love in the community of those who love, which is the Church. They can take a great deal away from us Christians, but not this love, because they could only take this by taking it into their own hearts. But this can only be done by a Christian. . . . Real divine caritas is a power of God, which can bring conviction of the truth of the gospel." Rahner, Christian in the Market Place, p. 38.

[127] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 95.

[128] Ibid.

ship must not resist--not for the sake of pacifism in itself--but, in Macmurray's view, only as a means to achieve its end; for if it resists it abandons its purpose. There is no guarantee that not resisting aggression will be successful in every instance. The justification of the fellowship's refusal to resist evil lies in the belief that the fear which motivates aggression is illusory and self-stultifying; and this is only because its own refusal to resist is not a means of self-defense, not a withdrawal from cooperation, not a mere submissiveness grounded on fear. Rather,

> it is only the negative aspect of its offer of friendship and co-operation, of its care for the other party and for the interests of the other party. The pacifism which is a weapon of self-defence, since it rests on fear, justifies the fear which lies behind aggression, and cannot hope to eliminate it.[129]

These are the principles which dictate the behavior of any limited fellowship which intends a universal fellowship. As statements of principle, they are necessarily ideal.

> They are the norms for conduct which aims at a community which shall be all-inclusive. When we apply them to the actual conditions of human life, we shall expect them to involve a simplification of the actual issues. In the light of this we may restate the conclusion as follows. Firstly, any fellowship which intends the creation of a universal human community will tend to be successful in so far as it behaves in accordance with these principles, and will tend to fail in so far as it abandons them. Secondly, in so far as any community actually behaves in accordance with these principles will tend to create a universal community.[130]

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[129] Ibid., p. 96.

[130] Ibid. Cf. "The Future of the Church," in Macmurray's Search for Reality in Religion, pp. 63-81.

Both these assertions must hold because a group may intend universality and yet fail to achieve it by using means that are incompatible with this intention; and also for the reason that it may tend to produce universality by behaving in a way that has this effect, without consciously intending a universal fellowship.

As previously footnoted, in describing this fellowship which intends universality and the norms of conduct according to which its members must behave, Macmurray is describing the nature of the Church in so far as it follows the teaching of its founder, Jesus Christ.[131] As he expressly states:

> The Christian churches are the outcome of the life and teaching of Jesus. The Hebrew community to whom Jesus appealed to undertake the task was not prepared to sink its individual identity in a universal fellowship.[132]
>
> The Christian Church was established to take over, as an actual community, the task of preparing the universal community . . . and a good deal of the New Testament, particularly the gospels, is concerned to determine the type of actual community which could be capable of effecting such a transformation. It is to be at once a model of what a true human community must be, and open to all men on a basis of common humanity--the mustard seed that grows till it fills the whole earth.[133]

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[131] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 97.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Macmurray, Religion, Art and Science, p. 74. Commenting on Paul's contrast of our brotherhood in Adam and our brotherhood in Christ, Ratzinger observes that "Only the new brotherhood, which is also universal in its tendency, brings a true unity of salvation. . . . Its brotherhood is not yet universal, but it seeks to become so. Men, in general, are not yet brothers in Christ, but they can and must become so." While the doctrine of the two Adams, despite its universal tendency, involves in the concrete a certain limitation of brotherhood, it "may never

Therefore, Macmurray concludes, no one who is seriously concerned about the future of freedom can afford to overlook or underestimate Christianity. The achievement of freedom ultimately depends upon community and the achievement of an inclusive human fellowship is a religious task, not a political one.[134] For politics, even when it best fulfills its instrumental role in human affairs, cannot create community--at best it can only further cooperation among men.[135] A constant refrain in Macmurray's works is:

> Religious problems cannot be solved by political means. The reason is simple. Religious problems are problems of free personal rela-

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be seen as a closed, but always an open brotherhood." "Neither Paul, nor anyone else in the New Testament, understood the Christian community according to the analogy of a mystery brotherhood. This community is far more public. . . . It sees itself . . . in analogy with the people of Israel--indeed with humanity. It claims to be the true Israel, and the germ cell of the new mankind. Its new brotherhood is to be understood from this claim." Ratzinger, op. cit., pp. 60-62, passim.

[134] Cf. Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, pp. 32 ff. and 100 ff.; Religion, Art and Science, pp. 66 ff.; "The Devices of Politics," in Persons in Relation, pp. 186 ff. and Search for Reality in Religion, pp. 27 ff.

[135] Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom, p. 102, as well as references in the previous note. "The failure of even the wisest type of social pedagogy to prompt benevolences as generous as those which a more intimate community naturally evolves, suggests that ethical attitudes are more dependent upon personal, intimate and organic contacts than social technicians are inclined to assume. The dependence of ethical attitudes upon personal contacts and direct relations contributes to the moral chaos of a civilization, in which life is related to life mechanically and not organically /Macmurray would say, personally/, and in which mutual responsibilities increase and personal contacts decrease." Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, pp. 28-29.

> tions; they are problems of friendship, of fellowship, or reconciliation. One can organize cooperation: one cannot organize love.[136]

In claiming this Macmurray also insists that religion, Christianity in particular, is not a theory but a matter of practical action among persons. "In religion we are not concerned merely with ideas but with action, and with ideas only as they enter into action."[137] Christianity must recover this facet of its own nature; it must reject idealism--that the religious reference is away from this life to another. It must recover as well its universal attitude both internally, through the reunion of Christian churches and externally, by actively effecting the brotherhood of all men--the roots of which lie in our common humanity, the mutuality in which and by which we are constituted as persons.[138]

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[136] Macmurray, *Religion, Art and Science,* p. 68. As he says in *Persons in Relation,* "The central point is that law, and the structure of the State which law requires, is a system of devices. The State, as the legal organization of society, is essentially pragmatic: it is the technological aspect of society. Consequently, its only value lies in its efficiency: it is a means, not an end, and has no intrinsic value in itself. It is therefore a radical error to treat the law, or the State which is the creature of law, as if it were self-justifying or had any *raison d'être* other than its usefulness. The State is a public utility, and should be treated and judged as such. It is a dangerous error to personalize the State and to attribute it to [sic] characters or qualities which belong only to human beings. . . . 'Liberty, equality and fraternity' do, as we have recognized, constitute community. For this very reason they cannot be achieved by organization; yet the democratic revolutions proclaimed them as the goal of politics. To create community is to make friendship the form of all personal relations. This is a religious task, which can only be performed through the transformation of the motives of our behaviour. . . . The modern abolition of sin is only one form of the idealistic illusion that we can abolish facts by refusing to take account of them [here Macmurray is alluding to Rousseau's idea of man's natural goodness and his proclamation that men did not need to be changed, but only required political means to express their natural goodness]. *Persons in Relation,* pp. 197-98.

[137] Macmurray, *Religion, Art and Science,* p. 74.

Obviously, in the applications he makes of his philosophy to the conduct of the churches, Macmurray relies on his Christian faith.[139] Yet his practical recommendations regarding Christianity arise from the heart of his philosophical analysis. As he does in discussing the full meaning of any of man's distinctive attributes, Macmurray sees the full meaning of human freedom in the realization of mutuality--the most concrete example of which is friendship. The relation of two persons in friendship provides him with a convenient reference to illustrate the full actualization of human freedom. In friendship each of the persons involved comes to himself, hence to his freedom. For each is positively motivated toward the other, has his center of interest in the other, and fear is overcome. Both realize their freedom as agents since in the absence of fear for the self there is no constraint on either and each can be himself fully; neither has to pretend. Yet, to attain this analysis the two persons who exist in friendship have been isolated from their relation to all other persons. When the latter are taken into account, it becomes evident that their relation to each other cannot be exclusive of the others for then its motivation in relation to these others is negative. The two friends must defend themselves against the intrusion of the rest. Their friendship would then constitute a positive element in a motivation which is dominantly negative and this would destroy the realization of the exclusive relation itself. Hence, to be fully positive the relation must be in principle inclusive and without limits.

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[138] Ibid., pp. 75 ff. "To be on the defensive is to be incapable of action. In the personal life friendship is the condition of freedom," ibid., p. 54. Cf. Kung, The Church, p. 259: "It is only possible to abide in Christ--and this is where the ultimate meaninglessness of the Inquisition and the ultimate meaning of the Church is revealed--by abiding in love /followed by citation of Jn 15, 9-17/.

[139] As McManus, op. cit., p. 195, says in commenting on Macmurray's suggestion that the world be conceived as one action, "Macmurray's concept of one action is very close to St. Paul's doctrine of the mystical body where the analogy of the human body is used to express the idea that all members work together for the good of the whole. Whereas St. Paul is concerned to show the closeness of the bond uniting the baptized with Christ, Macmurray is concerned to show that the intentions of all men must be united with the one intention of God if . . . the community of mankind is ever to be realized. Macmurray's approach is purely philosophical but it is evident that his motivation to find a philosophical solution to the problem of mankind's unity springs from his Christian faith. He is a great admirer of St. Paul and often quotes him in his writings." And p. 220, n. 17: "Macmurray would not be upset by the current problem of some Christian philosophers who wonder if it is possible to be a believing Christian and at the same time a true philosopher. This is another form of the dualism consequent upon idealism." Cf. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 224.

> Only so can it constitute a community of persons. The self-realization of any individual person is only fully achieved if he is positively motived towards every other person with whom he is in relation. We can therefore formulate the inherent ideal of the personal. It is a universal community in which each cares for all the others and no one for himself. This ideal of the personal is also the condition of freedom--that is, of a full realization of his capacity to act--for every person. Short of this there is unintegrated, and therefore suppressed, negative motivation; there is unresolved fear; and fear inhibits action and destroys freedom.[140]

This inherent ideal of the personal (which is also the condition of freedom) arises from Macmurray's analysis of personal mutuality and flows as a logical consequence of this analysis. It is at the same time just what Christianity, a universal (mature) religion has always claimed. Yet, Macmurray cautions, we must remind ourselves that any actual religion is the religion of an actual group of persons and the community of any actual group is highly problematical because it depends on maintaining community.[141] That is, it depends on personal action (involving knowledge and motivation). Since the problematic of personal unity is the central aspect of religion as well, and since it is the function of religion to maintain and extend, to deepen and develop human community, Macmurray attends to Christianity to assess its fidelity in fulfilling its mission and (since he judges that it is not living up to its universality) makes suggestions as to how it must overcome its immaturity.[142] In the logic of his analysis, to be concerned about human freedom is to be concerned about Christianity for religion, not politics, effects brotherhood among men and before God.

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[140] Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 159.

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[141] Ibid. Cf. also pp. 163 ff.

[142] Speaking of the function of religion in Religion, Art and Science, pp. 54-55, Macmurray writes, "Its function is to maintain and extend, to deepen and develop human community. All valid forms of religious activity are conditioned by this function and can be understood through it. This does not mean that in our religious activities we are aiming directly at this end. Religion is a mode of reflection, and has its own reflective ends /as well/. . . . If someone wishes to insist that religion is concerned with knowledge of God and communion with God, there is no need to dispute this. It is not an objection to what has been said, that the reference of religion is to the problematic of personal relations. The two assertions are not merely compatible. In the end they imply one another. That religion arises from and refers to the field of human relations is sufficiently guaranteed by the characteristic language which it uses. Terms like communion and fellowship; disobedience and forgiveness; love, enmity, estrangement and reconciliation are drawn directly from our experience of personal relationship and have meaning for us only because of this." In Search for Reality in Religion, p. 45, n. 1, in the course of his observations

Summary

As he indicated at the beginning of his Gifford Lectures, Macmurray sees the problem of the personal as the central philosophical problem of the day. In analyzing the nature of personal being he focuses on mutuality as its constitutive character and sees in the actualization of mutuality the fulfillment of the personal in all its dimensions. Our rationality, emotive and intellectual, our action and our freedom depend upon and are fully attained in communion with our fellows. Further, mutuality is a fact of the practical order--it is found in immediate experience of the person with others. In contrast to philosophies which yield primacy to the theoretical, Macmurray, by starting with the primacy of the practical, that is, with mutuality as the first principle, argues that philosophy must logically arrive at a theistic conclusion. Further, the theistic conclusion is not to an impersonal God but a personal one. Once his first principle of mutuality is accepted, Macmurray's argument for a personal God and a personal universe is internally sound.[143] "Many, however, undoubtedly

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on the limits of demythologizers in religion, Macmurray observes: "God is beyond the personal, of course; but it is the personal in our experience which points in the direction of God, and provides the most adequate language we possess for references to God."

[143] So McManus, op. cit., p. 236 in his conclusion.

will reject his first principle," McManus opines, "because he interprets rationality--which is realized fully only in mutuality--to be both emotional and intellectual in nature."[144] Yet, any philosophy of the person can hardly ignore the integration of man's emotional and intellectual nature and the growing evidence accumulated in psychology and sociology that human emotion is distinctively personal. Finally, Macmurray's analysis of the personal must find its ultimate test according to the fundamental canon that guides his entire philosophical investigation: namely, that all knowledge is ultimately practical. Specifically, all meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action and all meaningful action is for the sake of friendship.[145]

If one accepts Macmurray's analysis--in its main lines, if not in every detail--on its own terms, one is confronted with a challenge. Either he accepts the claim that the problem of the personal is the central problem we face as modern men, or one denies it. If one denies it, he refuses the challenge to spend himself for others and this refusal, according to Macmurray, is fraught with destructive consequences for us in our personal lives, in our social relations, and in our international relations as well. If one accepts the challenge of what personal existence is and implies, one is committed to a progressive course of self-forgetfulness in favor of commitment to others, and this is fundamentally a religious act.[146] By this logic Macmurray is compelled to consider religion, for the problem of the personal and the problems of religion are one. As McManus observes in the final sentence of his dissertation on Macmurray, "His concept of the personal, incorporating as it does traditional metaphysical values with the latest findings of science about man and grounding it all on the category of mutuality, is a philosophical achievement of great merit and one that is destined to have an increasing influence."[147]

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[144] Ibid.

[145] Macmurray, Self as Agent, p. 15.

Its pertinence to developing a renewed fundamental moral theology lies specifically in Macmurray's stress on mutuality. Appreciating the many implications that mutuality holds for the development of personhood, and in particular how our action, insofar as it has any genuine significance for us as persons, depends upon and is conditioned by the mutuality which marks personal existence, provides moral theology with a prime instrument for overcoming excessive individualism in its elaboration of what Christian life involves. With the aid of Macmurray's analysis, the moral theologian can view rationality, the human capacity for objectivity and self-transcendence, not simply as the differentia that marks man off from the animal, but as distinctly personal in the sense that its prime referent is the personal Other (inclusive of his fellowmen and God). Each distinctively human potentiality when viewed in the context of personal mutuality is seen in new light. This is particularly true of freedom which is both a condition for and a product of mutuality. Hence, it is Macmurray's view that morality at its truest (what, in his typology of moral styles he calls communal morality, as opposed to pragmatic and contemplative styles) expresses the necessary and universal intention to maintain community as the condition of freedom. Such a morality arises from love as its ground motive, as opposed to other modes of morality grounded in fear for one's own security. While this morality, as Macmurray elaborates it, does not despise justice, nor the necessary role of politics in securing justice--without which morality becomes illusory and sentimental, the mere appearance of morality--it maintains that morality can be defined only through its positive aspect which is our calling as persons to personal communion.[148] Hence, it is a morality that is positive, personal and dynamic.[149] Such a morality cannot be achieved merely by legislation. For community can only be actual in direct personal relations since we can only be actually in fellowship with those whom we know personally. Where our relations with other persons are indirect, fellowship can only be potential; and this means that if we did come into direct relation with one of these other persons the relation would be positively motived.[150] To express the full realization of communal morality one appeals to a relation between two persons in which each cares wholly for the other, and for himself only for the sake of the other, in keeping with such typically Pauline injunctions as: "Let no one seek his own good, but the good of his neighbor," (1 Cor 10, 24) and "Bear one another's burdens and so fulfill the law of Christ. For if anyone thinks he is something, when he is nothing, he deceives himself," (Gal 6, 2-3).

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[146] Cf. Rahner, Theological Investigations, II, 249; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together: a Discussion of Christian Fellowship (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 25-26; and Rahner, The Christian Commitment, pp. 69-70.

[147] McManus, op. cit., p. 237.

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[148] Cf. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 189.

[149] "The word personal," writes Vanderhaar, "characterizes the philosophy of man which underlie contemporary theology." Gerard A. Vanderhaar, "The Status of Scholastic Philosophy in Theology Today," Proceedings of the Catholic Theology Society of America, XXI (1966), at 82. Cf. Walgrave, Concilium, V (1965), 22-38.

In such a relationship justice would appear to be transcended. But, as Macmurray himself insists, it is not. Justice remains in his morality of progressive heterocentricity (which is at the same time the pattern of personal growth) as what he calls the "negative" aspect of morality, grounding, but subordinated to the positive aspect of morality, the communal relation. For even when the ideal of communion between persons is achieved, justice remains as a necessary source of differentiation between them. In the concrete, this means that in the relation of two persons (or agents), each of them remains himself, differentiated from the other. There must be no self-identification of one with the other, else the reciprocity of each of them will be lost and the heterocentricity of the relation will be only apparent. Macmurray's conception of communal morality, realized in the communion of persons, is not that of a smothering self-interested "generosity" which in fact subordinates the other party to oneself. To him this is tyranny--a tyranny which destroys the mutuality of the personal by destroying the equality of persons as persons which a genuine exercise of mutuality respects.[151] While Macmurray's position on the role of justice has not played a major role in this chapter, this suggestion of his conception of it is required to forestall misunderstanding of his statements on the limited role of politics. In his realism, he stresses the solely instrumental role of politics in securing the common good so as to prevent its being made an idol. He would have us recall that we cannot entertain false hopes that social engineering will solve the problematic of personal relations, the realization of fellowship. This task exceeds the powers of political technique even if it necessarily presupposes them; its solution lies in the strictly personal dimension of our existence as moral agents. Grounding his analysis on our experience as persons, Macmurray uncovers the criterion of morality in personal mutuality, the basic fact of our being. It is also necessarily a matter of intention. Under this dynamic aspect of mutuality, Macmurray details what is involved in pressing toward the fulfillment of personhood and what frustrates this progress. As his discussion of the conditions required for the realization of our freedom shows with particular clarity, the fulfillment of the individual depends upon the creation of community. In the concrete, this means men must begin from a limited brotherhood, a limited fellowship which intends not exclusivity but the intention of effecting universal fellowship. At this point the pertinence of a constant in Macmurray's works becomes especially clear--that the problematic of personal relations is the problematic of religion. Hence, in considering unity in a limited fellowship which intends universality he considers Christianity as lived by the Christian churches here and now. When he does so, as was previously footnoted, he emphasizes the ethical import of what Christian existence involves. While his analysis in this regard is most useful for modern moral theology in overcoming the individualistic traits under which the textbooks of the past suffered, it has to be complemented by further and fuller theological analysis of Christian existence. In this regard, one of the chief theological facts required to complement Macmurray's stress on fellowship is that all Christian agape is from God. The source of the divine and human family is agape, because the Father is the source of all things, the beginning without beginning, the principle not only of creation but of the divine family itself, since the other two Persons of the trinity, though they are perfect God, are so only by proceeding from the Father. In the same way the soul of the whole great missionary flow or sequence is this love which is its own reason and principle--this source of love which is the property of the Father and the origin of all good, truth and gifts.[152]

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[150] Cf. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 189.

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[151] "To maintain equality of persons in relation is justice; and without it generosity becomes purely sentimental and wholly egocentric. My care for you is only moral if it includes the intention to preserve your freedom as an agent, which is your independence of me. Even if you wish to be dependent on me, it is my business, for your sake, to prevent it. This is the problematic of personal relations, and it is therefore a religious problematic in terms of the distinction between real and unreal. I can love another person either for his sake or for my own sake. In either case my feeling for the other is, *qua* feeling, the same. The question is whether I *really* love him or not. The verification of this problematic lies in the answer to another question. 'If my love is not reciprocated, does it turn to resentment and hatred?' " Macmurray, *Persons in Relation*, p. 190.

The Father loves because, being good, he wishes to give, to communicate himself. This is the reason why there is mission; first Christ's own mission, and in its flow, the sendings of apostles and all who, by virtue of their faith, are called to be vehicles of the Father's creative love. While the soul of Christian life, then, is indeed the love that gives it is always a love which the Christian has as gift from the Father, through Christ and his indwelling Spirit. In short, the Christian as a person who effects brotherhood, his mutuality with other persons, relies not on his own strength but on God's grace, sanctifying grace which St. Thomas called gratia fraterna.[153] While Macmurray's analysis would require theological amplification along this line when used to elaborate the meaning of Christian life, moral theology would stand to gain from using his philosophy a means of showing that grace, the core of

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[152] Cf. Congar, Gospel Priesthood, p. 5.

[153] Schillebeeckx, The Church and Mankind, p. 71.

Christian living, is not a private privilege but God's freely bestowed love which he intends the Christian to use in self-forgetting concern for his fellowmen.

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